TU-Games: Revisiting Fundamental Concepts
Open Access
- 2 November 2026
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Springer Nature in Homo Oeconomicus
- Vol. 43 (1) , 13
Abstract
This article addresses conceptual shortcomings in literature on coalitional TU-games. We revisit and partly redefine key notions such as coalition , coalition function , efficiency , and duality , emphasizing their dependence on the class of TU-games under scrutiny. We also introduce a refined notion of a dual game, which aligns better with its typical interpretation and coincides with the classical version on superadditive games. Finally, we characterize the cohesive hull of a game via the duality theorem in linear programming, drawing parallels to the construction of the core via the Bondareva-Shapley theorem.Keywords
Funding Information
- Universität Bielefeld
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