Walter Trockel
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Walter Trockel has a total of 16 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Claus-Jochen Haake
Paderborn University, Paderborn, Germany
4 shared publications Egbert Dierker
University of Bonn, 53 Bonn, Federal Republic of Germany
3 shared publicationsHildegard Dierker
University of Bonn, 53 Bonn, Federal Republic of Germany
3 shared publications- Papatya Duman
Center for Mathematical Economics (IMW), Bielefeld University, Bielefeld, Germany
2 shared publications Bernard Cornet
1 shared publicationBirgit Grodal
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 2 November 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Homo Oeconomicus
- Vol. 43 (1) , 13
TU-Games: Revisiting Fundamental Concepts
This article addresses conceptual shortcomings in literature on coalitional TU-games. We revisit and partly redefine key notions such as coalition , coalition function , efficiency , and duality , emphasizing their dependence on the class of TU-games under scrutiny. We also introduce a refined notion of a dual game, which aligns better with its typical interpretation and coincides with the classical version on superadditive games. Finally, we characterize the cohesive hull of a game via the duality theorem in linear programming, drawing parallels to the construction of the core via the Bondareva-Shapley theorem.
- 2 November 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Homo Oeconomicus
- Vol. 43 (1) , 13
Open AccessTU-Games: Revisiting Fundamental Concepts
This article addresses conceptual shortcomings in literature on coalitional TU-games. We revisit and partly redefine key notions such as coalition , coalition function , efficiency , and duality , emphasizing their dependence on the class of TU-games under scrutiny. We also introduce a refined notion of a dual game, which aligns better with its typical interpretation and coincides with the classical version on superadditive games. Finally, we characterize the cohesive hull of a game via the duality theorem in linear programming, drawing parallels to the construction of the core via the Bondareva-Shapley theorem.
- 30 July 2024
- Published by World Scientific Pub Co Pte Ltd in International Game Theory Review
- Vol. 27 (01)
Nash Smoothing on the Test Bench: Hα-Essential Equilibria
Nash’s [1953] demand game models the second step in a “two-move game” that formalizes his “Negotiation Model”. Nash claimed for any two-person bargaining game [ ] the existence of a unique stable equilibrium of its associated second move demand game that by its payoff vector supports the symmetric Nash solution of that bargaining game. Nash’s negotiation game is considered the first contribution to the Nash program. Only weaker versions of stability than that claimed by Nash have been formally proven later by other authors. However, Nash’s request for “studying the relative stabilities” of the demand game’s equilibria has never been complied with. By performing that task, we establish analogous stability results for all generalized Nash solutions and thereby disprove Nash’s “unique stability” claim. Furthermore, we explain the impact of our result on the Nash solution with endogenous variable threats (NBWT) of the two move negotiation game, which is defined as the symmetric Nash solution of that bargaining game [ ] whose status quo point [ ] is the unique payoff vector of the payoff-equivalent equilibria of the first move threat game.
- 30 July 2024
- Published by World Scientific Pub Co Pte Ltd in International Game Theory Review
- Vol. 27 (01)
Nash Smoothing on the Test Bench: Hα-Essential Equilibria
Nash’s [1953] demand game models the second step in a “two-move game” that formalizes his “Negotiation Model”. Nash claimed for any two-person bargaining game [ ] the existence of a unique stable equilibrium of its associated second move demand game that by its payoff vector supports the symmetric Nash solution of that bargaining game. Nash’s negotiation game is considered the first contribution to the Nash program. Only weaker versions of stability than that claimed by Nash have been formally proven later by other authors. However, Nash’s request for “studying the relative stabilities” of the demand game’s equilibria has never been complied with. By performing that task, we establish analogous stability results for all generalized Nash solutions and thereby disprove Nash’s “unique stability” claim. Furthermore, we explain the impact of our result on the Nash solution with endogenous variable threats (NBWT) of the two move negotiation game, which is defined as the symmetric Nash solution of that bargaining game [ ] whose status quo point [ ] is the unique payoff vector of the payoff-equivalent equilibria of the first move threat game.
- 18 January 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in Review of Economic Design
- Vol. 27 (2) , 471
Correction to: Socio-legal systems and implementation of the Nash solution in Debreu–Hurwicz equilibrium
- 18 January 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in Review of Economic Design
- Vol. 27 (2) , 471
Correction to: Socio-legal systems and implementation of the Nash solution in Debreu–Hurwicz equilibrium
- Open Access
- 11 December 2021
- Published by Springer Nature in Review of Economic Design
- Vol. 26 (4) , 635-649
Socio-legal systems and implementation of the Nash solution in Debreu–Hurwicz equilibrium
In this article we combine Debreu’s (Proc Natl Acad Sci 38(10):886–893, 1952) social system with Hurwicz’s (Econ Design 1(1):1–14, 1994; Am Econ Rev 98(3):577–585, 2008) ideas of embedding a “desired” game form into a “natural” game form that includes all feasible behavior, even if it is “illegal” according to the desired form. For the resulting socio-legal system we extend Debreu’s concepts of a social system and its social equilibria to a socio-legal system with its Debreu–Hurwicz equilibria. We build on a more general version of social equilibrium due to Shafer and Sonnenschein (J Math Econ 2(3):345–348, 1975) that also generalizes the dc-mechanism of Koray and Yildiz (J Econ Theory 176:479–502, 2018) which relates implementation via mechanisms with implementation via rights structures as introduced by Sertel (Designing rights: invisible hand theorems, covering and membership. Tech. rep. Mimeo, Bogazici University, 2001). In the second part we apply and illustrate these new concepts via an application in the narrow welfarist framework of two person cooperative bargaining. There we provide in a socio-legal system based on Nash’s demand game an implementation of the Nash bargaining solution in Debreu–Hurwicz equilibrium.
- 11 December 2021
- Published by Springer Nature in Review of Economic Design
- Vol. 26 (4) , 635-649
Open AccessSocio-legal systems and implementation of the Nash solution in Debreu–Hurwicz equilibrium
In this article we combine Debreu’s (Proc Natl Acad Sci 38(10):886–893, 1952) social system with Hurwicz’s (Econ Design 1(1):1–14, 1994; Am Econ Rev 98(3):577–585, 2008) ideas of embedding a “desired” game form into a “natural” game form that includes all feasible behavior, even if it is “illegal” according to the desired form. For the resulting socio-legal system we extend Debreu’s concepts of a social system and its social equilibria to a socio-legal system with its Debreu–Hurwicz equilibria. We build on a more general version of social equilibrium due to Shafer and Sonnenschein (J Math Econ 2(3):345–348, 1975) that also generalizes the dc-mechanism of Koray and Yildiz (J Econ Theory 176:479–502, 2018) which relates implementation via mechanisms with implementation via rights structures as introduced by Sertel (Designing rights: invisible hand theorems, covering and membership. Tech. rep. Mimeo, Bogazici University, 2001). In the second part we apply and illustrate these new concepts via an application in the narrow welfarist framework of two person cooperative bargaining. There we provide in a socio-legal system based on Nash’s demand game an implementation of the Nash bargaining solution in Debreu–Hurwicz equilibrium.
- Open Access
- 1 November 2020
- Published by Springer Nature in Homo Oeconomicus
- Vol. 37 (1-2) , 1-6
Introduction to the Special Issue “Bargaining”
- 1 November 2020
- Published by Springer Nature in Homo Oeconomicus
- Vol. 37 (1-2) , 1-6
Open AccessIntroduction to the Special Issue “Bargaining”
- 31 May 2019
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 1-7
In Lieu of an Introduction: HowIRemember Leonid Hurwicz
- 31 May 2019
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 1-7
In Lieu of an Introduction: HowIRemember Leonid Hurwicz
- 12 June 2014
- Published by Springer Nature in Economic Theory Bulletin
- Vol. 3 (1) , 9-17
Axiomatization of the discrete Raiffa solution
- 12 June 2014
- Published by Springer Nature in Economic Theory Bulletin
- Vol. 3 (1) , 9-17
Axiomatization of the discrete Raiffa solution
- 1 May 2014
- Published by Elsevier in Games and Economic Behavior
- Vol. 85, 32-36
Robustness of intermediate agreements for the discrete Raiffa solution
- 1 May 2014
- Published by Elsevier in Games and Economic Behavior
- Vol. 85, 32-36
Robustness of intermediate agreements for the discrete Raiffa solution