Political Cycles of Media Repression
Preprint
- 26 June 2023
- preprint
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Abstract
We analyze media repression in Putin’s Russia (2004–2019), a smart dictatorship that mimics democratic institutions, notably relatively free elections, and a relatively free press. Drawing on a unique granular dataset on journalist harassment and the pre-determined, staggered timing of local elections, we find evidence of strong political cycles of media repression. This media repression ahead of elections leads to a more favorable tonality of the news coverage of incumbents. Free press and free elections are temporally decoupled, thus disallowing them to work as effective accountability mechanisms. This secures dictator’s power while upholding an image of competence and democratic rule.Keywords
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