Nikita Zakharov
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Nikita Zakharov has a total of 16 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Gunther G. Schulze
University of Freiburg, Institute of Economics, Freiburg, Germany
3 shared publications - Koen Schoors
Ghent University
2 shared publications - Alexander Libman
Freie Universität Berlin
1 shared publication Bambang Suharnoko Sjahrir
University of Freiburg
1 shared publicationDmitrii Kofanov
University of Barcelona
1 shared publication- Dmitrii Kofanov
University of Barcelona
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 3 August 2026
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in British Journal of Political Science
- Vol. 56, e45
Can Authoritarian Electoral Propaganda Compete with the Opposition? Experimental Evidence from Russia
We examine the effectiveness of electoral propaganda in an autocracy, using Russia as a unique setting. Exploiting the unexpected release of a pro-regime propaganda video about Vladimir Putin shortly before the presidential election, we conducted a field experiment by randomly promoting the video to voters via a telephone survey and measuring self-reported voting behaviour after the election. Our results show that the pro-regime treatment successfully mobilized offline media consumers to vote for Putin, but failed to persuade online media users, and even backfired among respondents dissatisfied with the regime. Using electoral statistics for all major Russian cities and instrumenting public interest in the propaganda video with rainfall, we find a positive, albeit moderate, causal effect of the video on Putin’s vote share. As an alternative treatment, we used a viral anti-corruption video by opposition leader Alexei Navalny, which consistently undermined regime support among both offline and online media consumers.
- 3 August 2026
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in British Journal of Political Science
- Vol. 56, e45
Open AccessCan Authoritarian Electoral Propaganda Compete with the Opposition? Experimental Evidence from Russia
We examine the effectiveness of electoral propaganda in an autocracy, using Russia as a unique setting. Exploiting the unexpected release of a pro-regime propaganda video about Vladimir Putin shortly before the presidential election, we conducted a field experiment by randomly promoting the video to voters via a telephone survey and measuring self-reported voting behaviour after the election. Our results show that the pro-regime treatment successfully mobilized offline media consumers to vote for Putin, but failed to persuade online media users, and even backfired among respondents dissatisfied with the regime. Using electoral statistics for all major Russian cities and instrumenting public interest in the propaganda video with rainfall, we find a positive, albeit moderate, causal effect of the video on Putin’s vote share. As an alternative treatment, we used a viral anti-corruption video by opposition leader Alexei Navalny, which consistently undermined regime support among both offline and online media consumers.
- Open Access
- 11 July 2026
- Published by Elsevier in Economics Letters
- Vol. 268
Under the wing: The effect of parental proximity on intimate partner violence and underreporting
- 11 July 2026
- Published by Elsevier in Economics Letters
- Vol. 268
Open AccessUnder the wing: The effect of parental proximity on intimate partner violence and underreporting
- Open Access
- 1 May 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Economics of Governance
- Vol. 27 (1)
Elections and (mis)reporting of COVID-19 mortality: a quasi-natural experiment
We investigate the effect of direct presidential elections on underreporting COVID-19 mortality, measured as the difference between excess mortality and official statistics. Our identification strategy leverages a natural experiment of the unanticipated onset of the Coronavirus pandemic in 2020 and the asymmetric electoral schedule of presidential elections around the world, in which some countries faced the pandemic with upcoming elections in the next 2 years, while others did not have this electoral pressure. Contrary to conventional wisdom that governments manipulate COVID figures downward to avoid being seen as weak in the politically sensitive times, we find that governments facing elections in the following years report COVID fatalities more truthfully. This effect explains one-fourth of the variation in data manipulation. Further heterogeneous analysis shows that the effect is primarily driven by high-quality democratic elections. Finally, we provide some suggestive evidence for OECD countries that underreporting is strongly negatively correlated with trust in government, thus imposing political costs before the election, which may serve as an explanation of why democratic governments seek to avoid data manipulation during election times.
- 1 May 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Economics of Governance
- Vol. 27 (1)
Open AccessElections and (mis)reporting of COVID-19 mortality: a quasi-natural experiment
We investigate the effect of direct presidential elections on underreporting COVID-19 mortality, measured as the difference between excess mortality and official statistics. Our identification strategy leverages a natural experiment of the unanticipated onset of the Coronavirus pandemic in 2020 and the asymmetric electoral schedule of presidential elections around the world, in which some countries faced the pandemic with upcoming elections in the next 2 years, while others did not have this electoral pressure. Contrary to conventional wisdom that governments manipulate COVID figures downward to avoid being seen as weak in the politically sensitive times, we find that governments facing elections in the following years report COVID fatalities more truthfully. This effect explains one-fourth of the variation in data manipulation. Further heterogeneous analysis shows that the effect is primarily driven by high-quality democratic elections. Finally, we provide some suggestive evidence for OECD countries that underreporting is strongly negatively correlated with trust in government, thus imposing political costs before the election, which may serve as an explanation of why democratic governments seek to avoid data manipulation during election times.
- Open Access
- 31 March 2026
- Published by Elsevier in European Economic Review
- Vol. 186
Fear, soft propaganda, and the demand for government intervention: Quasi-experimental evidence from Russia
- 31 March 2026
- Published by Elsevier in European Economic Review
- Vol. 186
Open AccessFear, soft propaganda, and the demand for government intervention: Quasi-experimental evidence from Russia
- Open Access
- 26 June 2023
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Political Cycles of Media Repression
We analyze media repression in Putin’s Russia (2004–2019), a smart dictatorship that mimics democratic institutions, notably relatively free elections, and a relatively free press. Drawing on a unique granular dataset on journalist harassment and the pre-determined, staggered timing of local elections, we find evidence of strong political cycles of media repression. This media repression ahead of elections leads to a more favorable tonality of the news coverage of incumbents. Free press and free elections are temporally decoupled, thus disallowing them to work as effective accountability mechanisms. This secures dictator’s power while upholding an image of competence and democratic rule.
- 26 June 2023
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessPolitical Cycles of Media Repression
We analyze media repression in Putin’s Russia (2004–2019), a smart dictatorship that mimics democratic institutions, notably relatively free elections, and a relatively free press. Drawing on a unique granular dataset on journalist harassment and the pre-determined, staggered timing of local elections, we find evidence of strong political cycles of media repression. This media repression ahead of elections leads to a more favorable tonality of the news coverage of incumbents. Free press and free elections are temporally decoupled, thus disallowing them to work as effective accountability mechanisms. This secures dictator’s power while upholding an image of competence and democratic rule.
- Open Access
- 31 March 2023
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
The Effect of COVID-19 Cash Transfers on Health and Well-being of Adolescents: Quasi-Experimental Evidence from Russia
This paper investigates the causal impact of direct cash transfers on health, well-being, and life satisfaction among adolescents in Russia during the pandemic years. We study an unanticipated introduction of a COVID-19 state support policy for families with children in the form of two one-off transfers (140$ each) for all children younger than 16 years on the date of the policy approval. Our quasi-experimental design takes advantage of the sharp age discontinuity allowing us to compare the health and well-being of adolescents marginally eligible and marginally ineligible for these cash transfers using the data from a Russian longitudinal survey. The panel structure of the survey data enables the difference-in-difference approach as we control for past values of the outcome variables in the pre-pandemic year. We find a significant positive effect of cash transfers on adolescents’ material well-being, life satisfaction, and self-assessed health in the first and second pandemic years. Placebo estimations and various robustness tests confirm the validity of our results.
- 31 March 2023
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessThe Effect of COVID-19 Cash Transfers on Health and Well-being of Adolescents: Quasi-Experimental Evidence from Russia
This paper investigates the causal impact of direct cash transfers on health, well-being, and life satisfaction among adolescents in Russia during the pandemic years. We study an unanticipated introduction of a COVID-19 state support policy for families with children in the form of two one-off transfers (140$ each) for all children younger than 16 years on the date of the policy approval. Our quasi-experimental design takes advantage of the sharp age discontinuity allowing us to compare the health and well-being of adolescents marginally eligible and marginally ineligible for these cash transfers using the data from a Russian longitudinal survey. The panel structure of the survey data enables the difference-in-difference approach as we control for past values of the outcome variables in the pre-pandemic year. We find a significant positive effect of cash transfers on adolescents’ material well-being, life satisfaction, and self-assessed health in the first and second pandemic years. Placebo estimations and various robustness tests confirm the validity of our results.
- Top Cited PapersOpen Access
- 6 December 2022
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in British Journal of Political Science
- Vol. 53 (3) , 835-860
Encouraged to Cheat? Federal Incentives and Career Concerns at the Sub-national Level as Determinants of Under-Reporting of COVID-19 Mortality in Russia
This article investigates the determinants and consequences of manipulating COVID-19 statistics in an authoritarian federation using the Russian case. It abandons the interpretation of the authoritarian regime as a unitary actor and acknowledges the need to account for a complex interaction of various bureaucratic and political players to understand the spread and the logic of manipulation. Our estimation strategy takes advantage of a natural experiment where the onset of the pandemic adjourned the national referendum enabling new presidential terms for Putin. To implement the rescheduled referendum, Putin needed sub-national elites to manufacture favourable COVID-19 statistics to convince the public that the pandemic was under control. While virtually all regions engaged in data manipulation, there was a substantial variation in the degree of misreporting. A third of this variation can be explained by an asynchronous schedule of regional governors’ elections, winning which depends almost exclusively on support from the federal authorities.
- 6 December 2022
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in British Journal of Political Science
- Vol. 53 (3) , 835-860
Top Cited PapersOpen AccessEncouraged to Cheat? Federal Incentives and Career Concerns at the Sub-national Level as Determinants of Under-Reporting of COVID-19 Mortality in Russia
This article investigates the determinants and consequences of manipulating COVID-19 statistics in an authoritarian federation using the Russian case. It abandons the interpretation of the authoritarian regime as a unitary actor and acknowledges the need to account for a complex interaction of various bureaucratic and political players to understand the spread and the logic of manipulation. Our estimation strategy takes advantage of a natural experiment where the onset of the pandemic adjourned the national referendum enabling new presidential terms for Putin. To implement the rescheduled referendum, Putin needed sub-national elites to manufacture favourable COVID-19 statistics to convince the public that the pandemic was under control. While virtually all regions engaged in data manipulation, there was a substantial variation in the degree of misreporting. A third of this variation can be explained by an asynchronous schedule of regional governors’ elections, winning which depends almost exclusively on support from the federal authorities.
- 29 March 2022
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
- Vol. 197, 472-492
Who profits from windfalls in oil tax revenue? Inequality, protests, and the role of corruption
- 29 March 2022
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
- Vol. 197, 472-492
Who profits from windfalls in oil tax revenue? Inequality, protests, and the role of corruption
- 1 January 2020
- Published by Elsevier in Economics Letters
- Vol. 186, 108515
Asymmetric oil price shocks, tax revenues, and the resource curse
- 1 January 2020
- Published by Elsevier in Economics Letters
- Vol. 186, 108515
Asymmetric oil price shocks, tax revenues, and the resource curse
- 1 January 2019
- Published by Elsevier in European Journal of Political Economy
- Vol. 56, 39-61
Does corruption hinder investment? Evidence from Russian regions
- 1 January 2019
- Published by Elsevier in European Journal of Political Economy
- Vol. 56, 39-61
Does corruption hinder investment? Evidence from Russian regions