Public Policy and Venture Capital Financed Innovation: A Contract Design Approach
Author:
- Julia HirschJHJulia Hirsch
Preprint
- 1 January 2006
- preprint
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Abstract
The effects of public policy programs which aim at internalizing spill-overs due to successful innovation are analyzed in a sequential double-sided moral hazardKeywords
All Related Versions
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