Multiple large shareholders and risk-taking of commercial banks
Authors:
- 6 January 2025
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Applied Economics Letters
- Vol. 33 (10) , 1555-1559
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
Funding Information
- National Social Science Fund of China (18AJY002)
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