Communicating judicial retirement
Authors:
- Álvaro BustosÁBÁlvaro Bustos
- Tonja JacobiTJTonja Jacobi
- 1 August 2015
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in International Review of Law and Economics
- Vol. 43, 107-118
Abstract
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Funding Information
- Ezra Friedman, Peter Dicola
- American Law and Economics Association (1141235)
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