Tonja Jacobi
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Tonja Jacobi has a total of 3 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Álvaro Bustos
2 shared publicationsEmerson H. Tiller
Northwestern University School of Law
1 shared publication- Lee Epstein
Northwestern University School of Law, Chicago, Illinois 60611;
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 1 August 2015
- Published by Elsevier in International Review of Law and Economics
- Vol. 43, 107-118
Communicating judicial retirement
- 1 August 2015
- Published by Elsevier in International Review of Law and Economics
- Vol. 43, 107-118
Communicating judicial retirement
- 2 July 2015
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in American Law and Economics Review
- Vol. 17 (2) , 529-565
A Theory of Justices’ Retirement
This paper introduces a formal model of Supreme Court retirement, in which the justices, the President and the Senate are rational agents who aim to shift the median ideology of the Court as close as possible to their own ideologies. The model shows that the probability of retirement depends on a set of personal, contextual, and political variables. It provides a rigorous theory for the effect of extant variables, and identifies variables that have not previously been fully appreciated. In particular, it shows the impact of the ideologies of the non-retiring justices and whether the ideology of the retiring justice is moderate or extreme. This more complete explanation of strategic judicial retirements raises empirically testable predictions to differentiate among the disparate findings of the existing literature.
- 2 July 2015
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in American Law and Economics Review
- Vol. 17 (2) , 529-565
A Theory of Justices’ Retirement
This paper introduces a formal model of Supreme Court retirement, in which the justices, the President and the Senate are rational agents who aim to shift the median ideology of the Court as close as possible to their own ideologies. The model shows that the probability of retirement depends on a set of personal, contextual, and political variables. It provides a rigorous theory for the effect of extant variables, and identifies variables that have not previously been fully appreciated. In particular, it shows the impact of the ideologies of the non-retiring justices and whether the ideology of the retiring justice is moderate or extreme. This more complete explanation of strategic judicial retirements raises empirically testable predictions to differentiate among the disparate findings of the existing literature.
- 1 December 2010
- Published by Annual Reviews in Annual Review of Law and Social Science
- Vol. 6 (1) , 341-358
The Strategic Analysis of Judicial Decisions
Since the 1990s, there has been an explosion of empirical and theoretical work dedicated to advancing strategic accounts of law and legal institutions. Reviewing this extensive literature could be accomplished in multiple ways. We chose an approach that underscores a major contribution of strategic accounts: that they have forced scholars to think about the interdependent—i.e., strategic—nature of judicial decisions. On strategic accounts, in other words, judges do not make decisions in a vacuum, but rather take into account the preferences and likely actions of other relevant actors, including their colleagues, their judicial superiors, and members of the other branches of government. After defining strategic analysis and how it differs from other approaches to judicial decisions, we examine the literature on the forms of strategic behavior in which (preference-maximizing) judges engage when interacting with these three sets of actors.
- 1 December 2010
- Published by Annual Reviews in Annual Review of Law and Social Science
- Vol. 6 (1) , 341-358
The Strategic Analysis of Judicial Decisions
Since the 1990s, there has been an explosion of empirical and theoretical work dedicated to advancing strategic accounts of law and legal institutions. Reviewing this extensive literature could be accomplished in multiple ways. We chose an approach that underscores a major contribution of strategic accounts: that they have forced scholars to think about the interdependent—i.e., strategic—nature of judicial decisions. On strategic accounts, in other words, judges do not make decisions in a vacuum, but rather take into account the preferences and likely actions of other relevant actors, including their colleagues, their judicial superiors, and members of the other branches of government. After defining strategic analysis and how it differs from other approaches to judicial decisions, we examine the literature on the forms of strategic behavior in which (preference-maximizing) judges engage when interacting with these three sets of actors.
- 12 May 2007
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization
- Vol. 23 (2) , 326-345
Legal Doctrine and Political Control
We model legal doctrine as an instrument of political control by higher courts over lower courts and the case outcomes they produce. We focus on the choice between determinate and indeterminate doctrines within a hierarchy of courts where political–ideological alignment between lower and higher courts varies. We show that the choice over doctrinal determinacy depends on the distribution of cases, the distribution of litigants, judicial types, and the level of policy alignment between higher and lower court judges. The model suggests the optimal doctrinal choice for a high court, given the political–ideological alignment between the high court and the lower court, the control characteristics of doctrines themselves, and the matching of doctrines to litigant pools. This has implications regarding preference divergence within the judicial hierarchy, the interaction of different doctrines, and interplay between doctrinal specificity and doctrinal reach.
- 12 May 2007
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization
- Vol. 23 (2) , 326-345
Legal Doctrine and Political Control
We model legal doctrine as an instrument of political control by higher courts over lower courts and the case outcomes they produce. We focus on the choice between determinate and indeterminate doctrines within a hierarchy of courts where political–ideological alignment between lower and higher courts varies. We show that the choice over doctrinal determinacy depends on the distribution of cases, the distribution of litigants, judicial types, and the level of policy alignment between higher and lower court judges. The model suggests the optimal doctrinal choice for a high court, given the political–ideological alignment between the high court and the lower court, the control characteristics of doctrines themselves, and the matching of doctrines to litigant pools. This has implications regarding preference divergence within the judicial hierarchy, the interaction of different doctrines, and interplay between doctrinal specificity and doctrinal reach.