Clause and Effect: Theory and Field Experimental Evidence on Noncompete Clauses
Authors:
- Bo CowgillBCBo Cowgill
- Brandon FreibergBFBrandon Freiberg
- Evan StarrESEvan Starr
Preprint
- 13 December 2024
- preprint
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Abstract
We study worker noncompete clauses in a large field experiment with two finance firms. Across ~14,000 job offers to freelance recruiters on short-term contracts, we randomize wages and the presence, salience, and duration of noncompetes. Removing a noncompete increases mobility between competing employers by 36-52% and raises workers' total earnings from the two firms by 12-17%. We find no evidence---rejecting even small effects---that removing noncompetes generates secret leakage. We also find no evidence that workers choose noncompete jobs for higher pay. Many workers appear unaware of noncompetes before firms' post-employment communication. The results align with a model of inattention and uncertainty about enforcement.Keywords
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