Bo Cowgill
Research Subjects
Bo Cowgill has a total of 31 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Amanda Y. Agan
Rutgers University, Department of Economics
3 shared publicationsJorge Guzman
Columbia University - Columbia Business School; NBER
3 shared publicationsLaura Gee
Tufts University; IZA
3 shared publicationsPatryk Perkowski
Yeshiva University
3 shared publicationsB. Pablo Montagnes
Emory University - Department of Political Science
2 shared publications- Dany Bahar
Center for Global Development, Washington, USA
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 23 September 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Contracting for Decision-Relevant Beliefs
Forecasts guide decisions, but an expert who privately values the decision may misreport beliefs to influence it. We study contracts that jointly screen the expert's belief about a verifiable state and her stake in a binary action. When two distinct stake types can each hold every belief, exact belief-only IC forces the action to ignore the report. Joint screening permits responsiveness but may require implementation rent. For thresholds, minimum rent equals the distribution-weighted positive curvature of the belief-dependent cutoff. Optimal threshold design is rent-adjusted concavification. We give sufficient conditions for unrestricted threshold optimality and bound possible gains when they fail.
- 23 September 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessContracting for Decision-Relevant Beliefs
Forecasts guide decisions, but an expert who privately values the decision may misreport beliefs to influence it. We study contracts that jointly screen the expert's belief about a verifiable state and her stake in a binary action. When two distinct stake types can each hold every belief, exact belief-only IC forces the action to ignore the report. Joint screening permits responsiveness but may require implementation rent. For thresholds, minimum rent equals the distribution-weighted positive curvature of the belief-dependent cutoff. Optimal threshold design is rent-adjusted concavification. We give sufficient conditions for unrestricted threshold optimality and bound possible gains when they fail.
- Open Access
- 21 September 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Contracting for Decision-Relevant Beliefs
Forecasts guide decisions, but an expert who privately values the decision may misreport beliefs to influence it. We study contracts that jointly elicit the expert's belief about a verifiable state and her stake in a binary action. When agents with different stakes can hold the same belief, exact belief-only IC forces the action to ignore the report. Joint screening permits responsiveness but may require implementation rent. For thresholds, minimum implementation rent equals the distribution-weighted positive curvature of the belief-dependent cutoff. Optimal threshold design is rentadjusted concavification. We give sufficient conditions for unrestricted threshold optimality and, beyond them, bounds and a direct optimality certificate.
- 21 September 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessContracting for Decision-Relevant Beliefs
Forecasts guide decisions, but an expert who privately values the decision may misreport beliefs to influence it. We study contracts that jointly elicit the expert's belief about a verifiable state and her stake in a binary action. When agents with different stakes can hold the same belief, exact belief-only IC forces the action to ignore the report. Joint screening permits responsiveness but may require implementation rent. For thresholds, minimum implementation rent equals the distribution-weighted positive curvature of the belief-dependent cutoff. Optimal threshold design is rentadjusted concavification. We give sufficient conditions for unrestricted threshold optimality and, beyond them, bounds and a direct optimality certificate.
- 27 April 2026
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
Does AI Cheapen Talk? Theory and Evidence from Global Entrepreneurship and Hiring
Screening human capital based on signals such as job applications or entrepreneurial pitches is crucial for organizations. Signals are often informative insofar as they require differential knowledge and effort to produce. Generative AI (GAI) complicates screening by lowering the cost of producing impressive signals. We model the informational effects of GAI, showing that applicants’ access to GAI can increase—and also decrease—an evaluator’s screening mistakes. This result depends on how GAI affects experts’ signals compared with nonexperts’. Using experiments in hiring and start-up investing, we estimate that senders’ access to GAI (ChatGPT) lowers screening accuracy by 4%–9% for employers and start-up investors. Consistent with our model, senders’ access to GAI also improves screening accuracy in some settings, in our case, among senders from non–English-speaking countries. These results show that GAI can profoundly shape screening accuracy. This paper was accepted by Anindya Ghose, information systems. Funding: We are grateful for the Columbia Business School Digital Future Initiative Grant for helping fund this project. B. Cowgill thanks the Kauffman Foundation Emerging Scholars Program, the Columbia Center for Political Economy, the NET Institute, and the Stellar Development Foundation. P. Hernandez-Lagos thanks the Yeshiva University Sy Syms Dean’s Research Fund. Supplemental Material: The online appendix and data files are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2024.07027 .
- 27 April 2026
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
Does AI Cheapen Talk? Theory and Evidence from Global Entrepreneurship and Hiring
Screening human capital based on signals such as job applications or entrepreneurial pitches is crucial for organizations. Signals are often informative insofar as they require differential knowledge and effort to produce. Generative AI (GAI) complicates screening by lowering the cost of producing impressive signals. We model the informational effects of GAI, showing that applicants’ access to GAI can increase—and also decrease—an evaluator’s screening mistakes. This result depends on how GAI affects experts’ signals compared with nonexperts’. Using experiments in hiring and start-up investing, we estimate that senders’ access to GAI (ChatGPT) lowers screening accuracy by 4%–9% for employers and start-up investors. Consistent with our model, senders’ access to GAI also improves screening accuracy in some settings, in our case, among senders from non–English-speaking countries. These results show that GAI can profoundly shape screening accuracy. This paper was accepted by Anindya Ghose, information systems. Funding: We are grateful for the Columbia Business School Digital Future Initiative Grant for helping fund this project. B. Cowgill thanks the Kauffman Foundation Emerging Scholars Program, the Columbia Center for Political Economy, the NET Institute, and the Stellar Development Foundation. P. Hernandez-Lagos thanks the Yeshiva University Sy Syms Dean’s Research Fund. Supplemental Material: The online appendix and data files are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2024.07027 .
- Open Access
- 10 April 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Multidimensional Screening with Element-wise Monotone Independence
This paper develops a Myersonian approach to multidimensional screening with a finite action set. The principal's objective admits a virtual-surplus representation that yields score-based allocation rules. We identify a simple multidimensional regularity condition-element-wise monotone independence-under which the score-maximizing allocation rule is globally optimal and implementable. The result delivers a tractable characterization of optimal multidimensional mechanisms through virtual values and deterministic scoring rules.
- 10 April 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessMultidimensional Screening with Element-wise Monotone Independence
This paper develops a Myersonian approach to multidimensional screening with a finite action set. The principal's objective admits a virtual-surplus representation that yields score-based allocation rules. We identify a simple multidimensional regularity condition-element-wise monotone independence-under which the score-maximizing allocation rule is globally optimal and implementable. The result delivers a tractable characterization of optimal multidimensional mechanisms through virtual values and deterministic scoring rules.
- 1 March 2025
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
- Vol. 71 (3) , 2508-2526
Stable Matching on the Job? Theory and Evidence on Internal Talent Markets
A principal often needs to match agents to perform coordinated tasks, but agents can quit or slack off if they dislike their match. We study two prevalent approaches for matching within organizations: centralized assignment by firm leaders and self-organization through market-like mechanisms. We provide a formal model of the strengths and weaknesses of both methods under different settings, incentives, and production technologies. The model highlights trade-offs between match-specific productivity and job satisfaction. We then measure these trade-offs with data from a large organization’s internal talent market. Firm-dictated matches are 33% more valuable than randomly assigned matches within job categories (using the firm’s preferred metric of quality). By contrast, preference-based matches (using deferred acceptance) are only 5% better than random but are ranked (on average) about 38 percentiles higher by the workforce. The self-organized match is positively assortative and helps workers grow new skills; the firm’s preferred match is negatively assortative and harvests existing expertise. This paper was accepted by Joshua Gans, business strategy. Funding: This work was supported by the Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation (Emerging Scholar Award). Supplemental Material: The online appendix and data files are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.01373 .
- 1 March 2025
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
- Vol. 71 (3) , 2508-2526
Stable Matching on the Job? Theory and Evidence on Internal Talent Markets
A principal often needs to match agents to perform coordinated tasks, but agents can quit or slack off if they dislike their match. We study two prevalent approaches for matching within organizations: centralized assignment by firm leaders and self-organization through market-like mechanisms. We provide a formal model of the strengths and weaknesses of both methods under different settings, incentives, and production technologies. The model highlights trade-offs between match-specific productivity and job satisfaction. We then measure these trade-offs with data from a large organization’s internal talent market. Firm-dictated matches are 33% more valuable than randomly assigned matches within job categories (using the firm’s preferred metric of quality). By contrast, preference-based matches (using deferred acceptance) are only 5% better than random but are ranked (on average) about 38 percentiles higher by the workforce. The self-organized match is positively assortative and helps workers grow new skills; the firm’s preferred match is negatively assortative and harvests existing expertise. This paper was accepted by Joshua Gans, business strategy. Funding: This work was supported by the Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation (Emerging Scholar Award). Supplemental Material: The online appendix and data files are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.01373 .
- Open Access
- 13 December 2024
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Clause and Effect: Theory and Field Experimental Evidence on Noncompete Clauses
We study worker noncompete clauses in a large field experiment with two finance firms. Across ~14,000 job offers to freelance recruiters on short-term contracts, we randomize wages and the presence, salience, and duration of noncompetes. Removing a noncompete increases mobility between competing employers by 36-52% and raises workers' total earnings from the two firms by 12-17%. We find no evidence---rejecting even small effects---that removing noncompetes generates secret leakage. We also find no evidence that workers choose noncompete jobs for higher pay. Many workers appear unaware of noncompetes before firms' post-employment communication. The results align with a model of inattention and uncertainty about enforcement.
- 13 December 2024
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessClause and Effect: Theory and Field Experimental Evidence on Noncompete Clauses
We study worker noncompete clauses in a large field experiment with two finance firms. Across ~14,000 job offers to freelance recruiters on short-term contracts, we randomize wages and the presence, salience, and duration of noncompetes. Removing a noncompete increases mobility between competing employers by 36-52% and raises workers' total earnings from the two firms by 12-17%. We find no evidence---rejecting even small effects---that removing noncompetes generates secret leakage. We also find no evidence that workers choose noncompete jobs for higher pay. Many workers appear unaware of noncompetes before firms' post-employment communication. The results align with a model of inattention and uncertainty about enforcement.
- 1 September 2024
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Organization Science
- Vol. 35 (5) , 1571-1588
The Gender Disclosure Gap: Salary History Bans Unravel When Men Volunteer Their Income
This study investigates whether the success of salary history bans could be limited by job-seekers volunteering their salaries unprompted. We survey American workers in 2019 and 2021 about their recent job searches, distinguishing when candidates were asked about salary history from when they were not. Historically well-paid workers may have an incentive to disclose, and employers who are aware of this could infer that nondisclosing workers are concealing low salaries. Through this mechanism, all workers could face pressure to avoid the stigma of silence. Our data shows a large percentage of workers (28%) volunteer salary history, even when a ban prevents employers from asking. An additional 47% will disclose if enough other job candidates disclose. Men are more likely than women to disclose their salaries unprompted, especially if they believe other candidates are disclosing. Over our 1.5-year sample covering jurisdictions with (and without) bans, unprompted volunteering of salary histories increased by about 6–8 percentage points. Funding: This work was supported by W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research; Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation (Emerging Scholars Program). Supplemental Material: The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/orsc.2023.17384 .
- 1 September 2024
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Organization Science
- Vol. 35 (5) , 1571-1588
The Gender Disclosure Gap: Salary History Bans Unravel When Men Volunteer Their Income
This study investigates whether the success of salary history bans could be limited by job-seekers volunteering their salaries unprompted. We survey American workers in 2019 and 2021 about their recent job searches, distinguishing when candidates were asked about salary history from when they were not. Historically well-paid workers may have an incentive to disclose, and employers who are aware of this could infer that nondisclosing workers are concealing low salaries. Through this mechanism, all workers could face pressure to avoid the stigma of silence. Our data shows a large percentage of workers (28%) volunteer salary history, even when a ban prevents employers from asking. An additional 47% will disclose if enough other job candidates disclose. Men are more likely than women to disclose their salaries unprompted, especially if they believe other candidates are disclosing. Over our 1.5-year sample covering jurisdictions with (and without) bans, unprompted volunteering of salary histories increased by about 6–8 percentage points. Funding: This work was supported by W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research; Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation (Emerging Scholars Program). Supplemental Material: The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/orsc.2023.17384 .
- Open Access
- 1 January 2024
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
The Gender Disclosure Gap: Salary History Bans Unravel When Men Volunteer Their Income
This study investigates whether the success of salary history bans could be limited by job-seekers volunteering their salaries unprompted. We survey American workers in 2019 and 2021 about their recent job searches, distinguishing when candidates were asked about salary history from when they were not. Historically well-paid workers may have an incentive to disclose, and employers who are aware of this could infer that non-disclosing workers are concealing low salaries. Through this mechanism, all workers could face pressure to avoid the stigma of silence. Our data shows a large percentage of workers (28%) volunteer salary history, even when a ban prevents employers from asking. An additional 47% will disclose if enough other job candidates disclose. Men are more likely than women to disclose their salaries unprompted, especially if they believe other candidates are disclosing. Over our 1.5-year sample covering jurisdictions with (and without) bans, unprompted volunteering of salary histories increased by about 6-8 percentage points.
- 1 January 2024
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessThe Gender Disclosure Gap: Salary History Bans Unravel When Men Volunteer Their Income
This study investigates whether the success of salary history bans could be limited by job-seekers volunteering their salaries unprompted. We survey American workers in 2019 and 2021 about their recent job searches, distinguishing when candidates were asked about salary history from when they were not. Historically well-paid workers may have an incentive to disclose, and employers who are aware of this could infer that non-disclosing workers are concealing low salaries. Through this mechanism, all workers could face pressure to avoid the stigma of silence. Our data shows a large percentage of workers (28%) volunteer salary history, even when a ban prevents employers from asking. An additional 47% will disclose if enough other job candidates disclose. Men are more likely than women to disclose their salaries unprompted, especially if they believe other candidates are disclosing. Over our 1.5-year sample covering jurisdictions with (and without) bans, unprompted volunteering of salary histories increased by about 6-8 percentage points.
- Open Access
- 1 January 2024
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Stable Matching on the Job? Theory and Evidence on Internal Talent Markets
A principal often needs to match agents to perform coordinated tasks, but agents can quit or slack off if they dislike their match. We study two prevalent approaches for matching within organizations: Centralized assignment by firm leaders and self-organization through market-like mechanisms. We provide a formal model of the strengths and weaknesses of both methods under different settings, incentives, and production technologies. The model highlights tradeoffs between match-specific productivity and job satisfaction. We then measure these tradeoffs with data from a large organization’s internal talent market. Firm-dictated matches are 33% more valuable than randomly assigned matches within job categories (using the firm’s preferred metric of quality). By contrast, preference-based matches (using deferred acceptance) are only 5% better than random but are ranked (on average) about 38 percentiles higher by the workforce. The self-organized match is positively assortative and helps workers grow new skills; the firm’s preferred match is negatively assortative and harvests existing expertise.
- 1 January 2024
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessStable Matching on the Job? Theory and Evidence on Internal Talent Markets
A principal often needs to match agents to perform coordinated tasks, but agents can quit or slack off if they dislike their match. We study two prevalent approaches for matching within organizations: Centralized assignment by firm leaders and self-organization through market-like mechanisms. We provide a formal model of the strengths and weaknesses of both methods under different settings, incentives, and production technologies. The model highlights tradeoffs between match-specific productivity and job satisfaction. We then measure these tradeoffs with data from a large organization’s internal talent market. Firm-dictated matches are 33% more valuable than randomly assigned matches within job categories (using the firm’s preferred metric of quality). By contrast, preference-based matches (using deferred acceptance) are only 5% better than random but are ranked (on average) about 38 percentiles higher by the workforce. The self-organized match is positively assortative and helps workers grow new skills; the firm’s preferred match is negatively assortative and harvests existing expertise.
- Open Access
- 1 January 2024
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Delegation in Hiring: Evidence from a Two-Sided Audit
Firms increasingly delegate job screening to third-party recruiters, who must not only satisfy employers' demand for different types of candidates, but also manage yield by anticipating candidates' likelihood of accepting offers. We study how recruiters balance these objectives in a novel, two-sided field experiment. Our results suggest that candidates' behavior towards employers is very correlated, but that employers' hiring behavior is more idiosyncratic. Workers discriminate using the race and gender of the employer's leaders more than employers discriminate against the candidate's race and gender. Black and female candidates face particularly high uncertainty, as their callback rates vary widely across employers. Callback decisions place about 2/3rds weight on employer's expected behavior and 1/3rd on yield management. We conclude by discussing the accuracy of recruiter beliefs and how they impact labor market sorting.
- 1 January 2024
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessDelegation in Hiring: Evidence from a Two-Sided Audit
Firms increasingly delegate job screening to third-party recruiters, who must not only satisfy employers' demand for different types of candidates, but also manage yield by anticipating candidates' likelihood of accepting offers. We study how recruiters balance these objectives in a novel, two-sided field experiment. Our results suggest that candidates' behavior towards employers is very correlated, but that employers' hiring behavior is more idiosyncratic. Workers discriminate using the race and gender of the employer's leaders more than employers discriminate against the candidate's race and gender. Black and female candidates face particularly high uncertainty, as their callback rates vary widely across employers. Callback decisions place about 2/3rds weight on employer's expected behavior and 1/3rd on yield management. We conclude by discussing the accuracy of recruiter beliefs and how they impact labor market sorting.