On the first-order approach in principal–agent models with hidden borrowing and lending
- 1 July 2011
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Theory
- Vol. 146 (4) , 1331-1361
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This publication has 23 references indexed in Scilit:
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