Árpád Ábrahám
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Árpád Ábrahám has a total of 3 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Nicola Pavoni
Bocconi University
3 shared publications - Sebastian Koehne
Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich (LMU); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
2 shared publications - Sarolta Laczó
Queen Mary University of London
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 31 October 2017
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Review of Economic Studies
- Vol. 85 (3) , 1389-1424
Efficient Risk Sharing with Limited Commitment and Storage
We extend the model of risk sharing with limited commitment (Kocherlakota, 1996) by introducing both a public and a private (unobservable and/or non-contractible) storage technology. Positive public storage relaxes future participation constraints, hence it can improve risk sharing, contrary to the case where hidden income or effort is the deep friction. The characteristics of constrained-efficient allocations crucially depend on the storage technology’s return. At the steady state, if the return on storage is (i) moderately high, both assets and the consumption distribution may remain time-varying; (ii) sufficiently high, assets converge almost surely to a constant and the consumption distribution is time-invariant; (iii) equal to agents’ discount rate, perfect risk sharing is self-enforcing. Agents never have an incentive to use their private storage technology, i.e., Euler inequalities are always satisfied, at the constrained-efficient allocation of our model, while this is not the case without optimal public asset accumulation. Finally, we find that, in contrast with the limited-commitment model without storage, past income affects consumption growth negatively both in our model with storage and in data from Indian villages.
- 31 October 2017
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Review of Economic Studies
- Vol. 85 (3) , 1389-1424
Efficient Risk Sharing with Limited Commitment and Storage
We extend the model of risk sharing with limited commitment (Kocherlakota, 1996) by introducing both a public and a private (unobservable and/or non-contractible) storage technology. Positive public storage relaxes future participation constraints, hence it can improve risk sharing, contrary to the case where hidden income or effort is the deep friction. The characteristics of constrained-efficient allocations crucially depend on the storage technology’s return. At the steady state, if the return on storage is (i) moderately high, both assets and the consumption distribution may remain time-varying; (ii) sufficiently high, assets converge almost surely to a constant and the consumption distribution is time-invariant; (iii) equal to agents’ discount rate, perfect risk sharing is self-enforcing. Agents never have an incentive to use their private storage technology, i.e., Euler inequalities are always satisfied, at the constrained-efficient allocation of our model, while this is not the case without optimal public asset accumulation. Finally, we find that, in contrast with the limited-commitment model without storage, past income affects consumption growth negatively both in our model with storage and in data from Indian villages.
- Open Access
- 1 April 2016
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Public Economics
- Vol. 136, 14-29
Optimal income taxation when asset taxation is limited
- 1 April 2016
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Public Economics
- Vol. 136, 14-29
Open AccessOptimal income taxation when asset taxation is limited
- 1 July 2011
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Theory
- Vol. 146 (4) , 1331-1361
On the first-order approach in principal–agent models with hidden borrowing and lending
- 1 July 2011
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Theory
- Vol. 146 (4) , 1331-1361
On the first-order approach in principal–agent models with hidden borrowing and lending
- 1 April 2005
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Journal of the European Economic Association
- Vol. 3 (2) , 370-381
The Efficient Allocation of Consumption Under Moral Hazard and Hidden Access to the Credit Market
- 1 April 2005
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Journal of the European Economic Association
- Vol. 3 (2) , 370-381
The Efficient Allocation of Consumption Under Moral Hazard and Hidden Access to the Credit Market