Signing Blank Checks: The Roles of Disclosure and Reputation in the Face of Limited Information
Open Access
- 5 February 2024
- journal article
- research article
- Published by American Accounting Association in The Accounting Review
- Vol. 99 (2) , 395-419
Abstract
We examine how disclosure and manager reputation influence capital raised when there is no commercial substance underlying the investment. Special Purpose Acquisition Companies (SPACs or “blank check” companies) do not have operations or substantive assets at the IPO but promise to use the funds raised to acquire a private firm, generally within two years. Given the lack of commercial substance and historically poor ex post performance, it is unclear what SPACs disclose at the IPO and why investors invest. Although disclosure is important in traditional IPOs, the underlying information available differs for SPACs. Nonetheless, our evidence suggests disclosures are useful to SPAC investors, although differently than for traditional IPO investors. We also examine manager reputation and find prior SPAC or CEO experience and celebrity status are associated with funds raised. Even when an investment lacks commercial substance, disclosure and reputation are important for investing decisions. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text. JEL Classifications: G24; G34; M41; M50.Keywords
This publication has 37 references indexed in Scilit:
- The impact of narrative disclosure readability on bond ratings and the cost of debtReview of Accounting Studies, 2017
- Perverse incentives of special purpose acquisition companies, the “poor man's private equity funds”Journal of Accounting and Economics, 2017
- Going public via special purpose acquisition companies: Frogs do not turn into princesJournal of Corporate Finance, 2016
- The benefits of specific risk-factor disclosuresReview of Accounting Studies, 2016
- Textual analysis and international financial reporting: Large sample evidenceJournal of Accounting and Economics, 2015
- The effect of manager-specific optimism on the tone of earnings conference callsReview of Accounting Studies, 2014
- The information content of mandatory risk factor disclosures in corporate filingsReview of Accounting Studies, 2013
- Capital market consequences of managers' voluntary disclosure stylesJournal of Accounting and Economics, 2012
- Venture capital reputation and investment performance☆Journal of Financial Economics, 2008
- Management quality, certification, and initial public offeringsJournal of Financial Economics, 2005