Andrea Pawliczek
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Andrea Pawliczek has a total of 10 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- A. Nicole Skinner
University of Colorado Boulder
3 shared publications - Sarah L. C. Zechman
University of Colorado Boulder
3 shared publications Ashley Nicole Skinner
2 shared publicationsA. Nicole Skinner
University of Colorado at Boulder, Leeds School of Business, Department of Accounting, Students
1 shared publicationAlan D. Jagolinzer
Stanford University - Graduate School of Business; University of Cambridge Judge Business School; University of Colorado - Leeds School of Business
1 shared publicationChris S. Armstrong
Stanford Graduate School of Business
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 1 August 2026
- Published by American Accounting Association in Journal of Management Accounting Research
- p. 1-24
Extracting Information from Compensation Actually Paid: Stock Price Effects versus Other Signals
“Compensation actually paid” (CAP) in the SEC’s “Pay versus Performance” disclosure represents a rare but significant update to required compensation disclosure. We provide a method for estimating the predictable portion of CAP using publicly available information based on the executives’ equity portfolio and stock price changes during the year. Our estimate explains 75 percent of the variation in actual CAP. We then consider whether the unexplained portion contains new information not previously available to investors, such as changes in firms’ expectations about future performance share payouts. We find some evidence that this unexplained portion is associated with future operating and stock performance in firms where CAP is more likely to be informative (e.g., cases where the executive has a performance-vested equity portfolio). Our methodology can be used by investors and researchers to identify CAP disclosures that may warrant further investigation. Data Availability: All data are available from public sources. JEL Classifications: J33; M12; M52.
- 1 August 2026
- Published by American Accounting Association in Journal of Management Accounting Research
- p. 1-24
Extracting Information from Compensation Actually Paid: Stock Price Effects versus Other Signals
“Compensation actually paid” (CAP) in the SEC’s “Pay versus Performance” disclosure represents a rare but significant update to required compensation disclosure. We provide a method for estimating the predictable portion of CAP using publicly available information based on the executives’ equity portfolio and stock price changes during the year. Our estimate explains 75 percent of the variation in actual CAP. We then consider whether the unexplained portion contains new information not previously available to investors, such as changes in firms’ expectations about future performance share payouts. We find some evidence that this unexplained portion is associated with future operating and stock performance in firms where CAP is more likely to be informative (e.g., cases where the executive has a performance-vested equity portfolio). Our methodology can be used by investors and researchers to identify CAP disclosures that may warrant further investigation. Data Availability: All data are available from public sources. JEL Classifications: J33; M12; M52.
- Open Access
- 1 January 2025
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Does Corporate Governance Disclosure Provide Context for Investors' Trading Decisions?
We evaluate patterns in proxy statement download activity throughout the year to provide insight into when investors acquire governance information to provide context around trading decisions. While prior research often assumes that investors primarily rely on corporate governance disclosures to inform voting decisions and monitor management, theory predicts that governance information should also provide useful context for investors concerned about agency issues and trading around firm information events. Consistent with this prediction, we provide robust evidence that proxy statement downloads increase around M&A announcements, extreme bad earnings news, and governance incidents. We further document a positive relation between proxy statement acquisition and intraperiod timeliness around these information events, controlling for financial statement download activity and other firm and event characteristics. Collectively, our evidence suggests governance disclosures provide useful context around investors’ trading decisions, particularly when concerns around agency conflicts are more salient.
- 1 January 2025
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessDoes Corporate Governance Disclosure Provide Context for Investors' Trading Decisions?
We evaluate patterns in proxy statement download activity throughout the year to provide insight into when investors acquire governance information to provide context around trading decisions. While prior research often assumes that investors primarily rely on corporate governance disclosures to inform voting decisions and monitor management, theory predicts that governance information should also provide useful context for investors concerned about agency issues and trading around firm information events. Consistent with this prediction, we provide robust evidence that proxy statement downloads increase around M&A announcements, extreme bad earnings news, and governance incidents. We further document a positive relation between proxy statement acquisition and intraperiod timeliness around these information events, controlling for financial statement download activity and other firm and event characteristics. Collectively, our evidence suggests governance disclosures provide useful context around investors’ trading decisions, particularly when concerns around agency conflicts are more salient.
- Open Access
- 5 February 2024
- Published by American Accounting Association in The Accounting Review
- Vol. 99 (2) , 395-419
Signing Blank Checks: The Roles of Disclosure and Reputation in the Face of Limited Information
We examine how disclosure and manager reputation influence capital raised when there is no commercial substance underlying the investment. Special Purpose Acquisition Companies (SPACs or “blank check” companies) do not have operations or substantive assets at the IPO but promise to use the funds raised to acquire a private firm, generally within two years. Given the lack of commercial substance and historically poor ex post performance, it is unclear what SPACs disclose at the IPO and why investors invest. Although disclosure is important in traditional IPOs, the underlying information available differs for SPACs. Nonetheless, our evidence suggests disclosures are useful to SPAC investors, although differently than for traditional IPO investors. We also examine manager reputation and find prior SPAC or CEO experience and celebrity status are associated with funds raised. Even when an investment lacks commercial substance, disclosure and reputation are important for investing decisions. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text. JEL Classifications: G24; G34; M41; M50.
- 5 February 2024
- Published by American Accounting Association in The Accounting Review
- Vol. 99 (2) , 395-419
Open AccessSigning Blank Checks: The Roles of Disclosure and Reputation in the Face of Limited Information
We examine how disclosure and manager reputation influence capital raised when there is no commercial substance underlying the investment. Special Purpose Acquisition Companies (SPACs or “blank check” companies) do not have operations or substantive assets at the IPO but promise to use the funds raised to acquire a private firm, generally within two years. Given the lack of commercial substance and historically poor ex post performance, it is unclear what SPACs disclose at the IPO and why investors invest. Although disclosure is important in traditional IPOs, the underlying information available differs for SPACs. Nonetheless, our evidence suggests disclosures are useful to SPAC investors, although differently than for traditional IPO investors. We also examine manager reputation and find prior SPAC or CEO experience and celebrity status are associated with funds raised. Even when an investment lacks commercial substance, disclosure and reputation are important for investing decisions. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text. JEL Classifications: G24; G34; M41; M50.
- Open Access
- 1 January 2024
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Human and Intellectual Capital Spending Efficiency and Efficacy: Evidence from U.S. Universities
We analyze the efficiency and efficacy of human and intellectual capital investment to better understand the effects of social investment. Existing literature in the corporate setting lacks analysis regarding the impact of human and intellectual capital investment, likely due to data scarcity. We use universities as our research setting because they regularly report standardized data, have many similarities with for-profit corporations in terms of size and oversight, and directly support corporate ESG initiatives related to workforce diversity. We find that (1) private donations and government grants increase in human and intellectual capital spending efficiency, (2) graduation rates are higher at universities with more efficient spending for underrepresented students in the lowest quantiles of the graduation rate distribution, and (3) post-graduate income is higher for students from the lowest parental income quintile at universities with higher spending efficiency. Collectively, our evidence suggests that more efficient investment in human and intellectual capital can generate improvements in multiple important ESG outcomes.
- 1 January 2024
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessHuman and Intellectual Capital Spending Efficiency and Efficacy: Evidence from U.S. Universities
We analyze the efficiency and efficacy of human and intellectual capital investment to better understand the effects of social investment. Existing literature in the corporate setting lacks analysis regarding the impact of human and intellectual capital investment, likely due to data scarcity. We use universities as our research setting because they regularly report standardized data, have many similarities with for-profit corporations in terms of size and oversight, and directly support corporate ESG initiatives related to workforce diversity. We find that (1) private donations and government grants increase in human and intellectual capital spending efficiency, (2) graduation rates are higher at universities with more efficient spending for underrepresented students in the lowest quantiles of the graduation rate distribution, and (3) post-graduate income is higher for students from the lowest parental income quintile at universities with higher spending efficiency. Collectively, our evidence suggests that more efficient investment in human and intellectual capital can generate improvements in multiple important ESG outcomes.
- 19 July 2022
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Accounting Research
- Vol. 60 (5) , 1651-1693
Facilitating Tacit Collusion Through Voluntary Disclosure: Evidence from Common Ownership
We examine whether voluntary disclosure is associated with incentives for firms to collude. Public disclosure can facilitate collusion by aiding with coordination and monitoring for defections. Using common ownership (investors holding stock in competing firms) to identify reduced incentives to compete, we find a positive association between public disclosure and these incentives. We also find that common ownership is positively associated with measures of disclosure that are likely to facilitate tacit collusion and that this association is stronger in industries where collusion is easier. Our study expands the literature on disclosure and competition among firms by showing that public disclosure is positively associated with incentives for tacit collusion. This finding is consistent with managers facilitating anticompetitive outcomes using voluntary disclosure.
- 19 July 2022
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Accounting Research
- Vol. 60 (5) , 1651-1693
Facilitating Tacit Collusion Through Voluntary Disclosure: Evidence from Common Ownership
We examine whether voluntary disclosure is associated with incentives for firms to collude. Public disclosure can facilitate collusion by aiding with coordination and monitoring for defections. Using common ownership (investors holding stock in competing firms) to identify reduced incentives to compete, we find a positive association between public disclosure and these incentives. We also find that common ownership is positively associated with measures of disclosure that are likely to facilitate tacit collusion and that this association is stronger in industries where collusion is easier. Our study expands the literature on disclosure and competition among firms by showing that public disclosure is positively associated with incentives for tacit collusion. This finding is consistent with managers facilitating anticompetitive outcomes using voluntary disclosure.
- Open Access
- 27 August 2021
- Published by Springer Nature in Review of Accounting Studies
- Vol. 26 (3) , 1088-1136
A new take on voice: the influence of BlackRock’s ‘Dear CEO’ letters
We examine whether broad-based public engagement by institutional investors influences the behavior of portfolio firms. We investigate this question in the context of BlackRock’s annual Dear CEO letter, which in recent years has called for portfolio firms to acknowledge and quantify the impact of environmental and regulatory factors on their firms. We find that portfolio firms’ disclosures during the post-letter period reflect topics similar to those discussed in the letters, controlling for a variety of firm and disclosure characteristics and the occurrence of private engagements. Moreover, BlackRock appears to value these additional disclosures, as it more often votes with management on shareholder proposals during subsequent annual shareholder meetings. Finally, motivated by BlackRock’s attempts to mobilize firms toward its specific policy recommendations, we also provide some evidence that firms’ lobbying efforts during the post-letter period become more aligned with the issues highlighted in the letter, especially when firms’ share BlackRock’s policy preferences ex ante. Taken together, our evidence suggests that portfolio firms are responsive to BlackRock’s public engagement efforts.
- 27 August 2021
- Published by Springer Nature in Review of Accounting Studies
- Vol. 26 (3) , 1088-1136
Open AccessA new take on voice: the influence of BlackRock’s ‘Dear CEO’ letters
We examine whether broad-based public engagement by institutional investors influences the behavior of portfolio firms. We investigate this question in the context of BlackRock’s annual Dear CEO letter, which in recent years has called for portfolio firms to acknowledge and quantify the impact of environmental and regulatory factors on their firms. We find that portfolio firms’ disclosures during the post-letter period reflect topics similar to those discussed in the letters, controlling for a variety of firm and disclosure characteristics and the occurrence of private engagements. Moreover, BlackRock appears to value these additional disclosures, as it more often votes with management on shareholder proposals during subsequent annual shareholder meetings. Finally, motivated by BlackRock’s attempts to mobilize firms toward its specific policy recommendations, we also provide some evidence that firms’ lobbying efforts during the post-letter period become more aligned with the issues highlighted in the letter, especially when firms’ share BlackRock’s policy preferences ex ante. Taken together, our evidence suggests that portfolio firms are responsive to BlackRock’s public engagement efforts.
- 12 October 2020
- Published by American Accounting Association in The Accounting Review
- Vol. 96 (5) , 337-364
Performance-Vesting Share Award Outcomes and CEO Incentives
I investigate the incentives provided by performance-vested stock awards (PVSAs) and the accuracy of ex ante PVSA valuations. In PVSAs, the number of shares awarded to the CEO varies based on how firm performance compares to target performance levels. The incentives provided by PVSAs and their valuations depend on the difficulty of the performance targets, which cannot be easily determined using ex ante disclosures. Using a hand-collected dataset of PVSA outcomes, I find that target difficulty is such that CEOs have incentives to earn additional shares from improved firm performance in 75 percent of PVSAs. In contrast, findings in prior studies using methodologies that rely on comparisons of PVSA targets to similarly named financial statement metrics suggest only 12 percent of awards provide such incentives. I further find that, on average, PVSAs pay out 115 percent of shares disclosed in ex ante valuations, suggesting the valuations of awards are understated. Data Availability: Data are available from sources cited in the text. PVSA outcome data are available upon request from the author. JEL Classifications: G34; J33; M12.
- 12 October 2020
- Published by American Accounting Association in The Accounting Review
- Vol. 96 (5) , 337-364
Performance-Vesting Share Award Outcomes and CEO Incentives
I investigate the incentives provided by performance-vested stock awards (PVSAs) and the accuracy of ex ante PVSA valuations. In PVSAs, the number of shares awarded to the CEO varies based on how firm performance compares to target performance levels. The incentives provided by PVSAs and their valuations depend on the difficulty of the performance targets, which cannot be easily determined using ex ante disclosures. Using a hand-collected dataset of PVSA outcomes, I find that target difficulty is such that CEOs have incentives to earn additional shares from improved firm performance in 75 percent of PVSAs. In contrast, findings in prior studies using methodologies that rely on comparisons of PVSA targets to similarly named financial statement metrics suggest only 12 percent of awards provide such incentives. I further find that, on average, PVSAs pay out 115 percent of shares disclosed in ex ante valuations, suggesting the valuations of awards are understated. Data Availability: Data are available from sources cited in the text. PVSA outcome data are available upon request from the author. JEL Classifications: G34; J33; M12.
- Open Access
- 3 May 2019
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Facilitating Tacit Collusion: A New Perspective on Common Ownership and Voluntary Disclosure
Investors increasingly hold stock in multiple firms that compete in the same product market (“common ownership”), and this ownership structure is positively associated with voluntary disclosure. We posit that common owners want managers to take coordinated anti-competitive actions (i.e., tacitly collude) across commonly owned firms to increase profits. Increased disclosure aids in coordinating and monitoring compliance with such strategies. Results show the common ownership-disclosure relation is diminished when tacit collusion is less feasible (industries with many firms, variable demand, and variable cost structures) and varies in the presence of alternative communication channels (overlapping directors, trade associations). This study broadens our understanding of the forces underlying the positive common ownership-disclosure relation, and expands the economics literature in this area by showing how managers facilitate anti-competitive outcomes in the presence of common ownership.
- 3 May 2019
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessFacilitating Tacit Collusion: A New Perspective on Common Ownership and Voluntary Disclosure
Investors increasingly hold stock in multiple firms that compete in the same product market (“common ownership”), and this ownership structure is positively associated with voluntary disclosure. We posit that common owners want managers to take coordinated anti-competitive actions (i.e., tacitly collude) across commonly owned firms to increase profits. Increased disclosure aids in coordinating and monitoring compliance with such strategies. Results show the common ownership-disclosure relation is diminished when tacit collusion is less feasible (industries with many firms, variable demand, and variable cost structures) and varies in the presence of alternative communication channels (overlapping directors, trade associations). This study broadens our understanding of the forces underlying the positive common ownership-disclosure relation, and expands the economics literature in this area by showing how managers facilitate anti-competitive outcomes in the presence of common ownership.
- Open Access
- 22 January 2018
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Common Ownership and Voluntary Disclosure
Investors increasingly hold stock in multiple firms that compete in the same product market (i.e., “common ownership” or “horizontal shareholding”). Taking market share from peers no longer maximizes shareholder value under common ownership, and this incentivizes managers to implement less competitive strategies (Azar, 2016). In this paper, we examine how common ownership affects disclosure behavior. Consistent with the existence of a negative relation between competition and disclosure, we predict and find that common ownership is associated with increased voluntary disclosure. We also show the result is diminished for firms in which there are direct communication channels and for industries with low barriers to entry. Lastly, we examine an exogenous shock to common ownership to support our assertion that common ownership causes managers to change their disclosure behavior. Our paper contributes to the literature regarding the influence of shareholder preferences on disclosure, demonstrating that common ownership affects such decisions. Our results also suggest there are spillover effects from horizontal shareholding to other shareholders in the form of increased disclosure.
- 22 January 2018
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessCommon Ownership and Voluntary Disclosure
Investors increasingly hold stock in multiple firms that compete in the same product market (i.e., “common ownership” or “horizontal shareholding”). Taking market share from peers no longer maximizes shareholder value under common ownership, and this incentivizes managers to implement less competitive strategies (Azar, 2016). In this paper, we examine how common ownership affects disclosure behavior. Consistent with the existence of a negative relation between competition and disclosure, we predict and find that common ownership is associated with increased voluntary disclosure. We also show the result is diminished for firms in which there are direct communication channels and for industries with low barriers to entry. Lastly, we examine an exogenous shock to common ownership to support our assertion that common ownership causes managers to change their disclosure behavior. Our paper contributes to the literature regarding the influence of shareholder preferences on disclosure, demonstrating that common ownership affects such decisions. Our results also suggest there are spillover effects from horizontal shareholding to other shareholders in the form of increased disclosure.
- Open Access
- 13 June 2016
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Inside Debt and Recoveries in Bankruptcy
I examine the theoretical prediction that executive inside debt results in higher recoveries in bankruptcy. Using a sample of bankrupt firms, I find that supplemental executive retirement plans are positively associated with recoveries to unsecured debt in bankruptcy. Firms where CEOs have inside debt at the sample mean experience $0.053 greater recoveries per dollar of debt in the event of bankruptcy relative to firms where the CEO does not have inside debt. Consistent with theory, I also document that inside debt is positively related to efforts to preserve liquidity as bankruptcy approaches (e.g., cuts to R&D expenditures).
- 13 June 2016
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessInside Debt and Recoveries in Bankruptcy
I examine the theoretical prediction that executive inside debt results in higher recoveries in bankruptcy. Using a sample of bankrupt firms, I find that supplemental executive retirement plans are positively associated with recoveries to unsecured debt in bankruptcy. Firms where CEOs have inside debt at the sample mean experience $0.053 greater recoveries per dollar of debt in the event of bankruptcy relative to firms where the CEO does not have inside debt. Consistent with theory, I also document that inside debt is positively related to efforts to preserve liquidity as bankruptcy approaches (e.g., cuts to R&D expenditures).