Preventing Zombie Lending
- 8 October 2013
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in The Review of Financial Studies
- Vol. 27 (3) , 923-956
Abstract
Because of limited liability, insolvent banks have an incentive to continue lending to insolvent borrowers, in order to hide losses and gamble for resurrection, even though this is socially inefficient. We suggest a scheme that regulators could use to solve this problem. The scheme would induce banks to reveal their bad loans, which can then be dealt with. Bank participation in the scheme would be voluntary. Even though banks have private information on the quantity of bad loans on their balance sheets, the scheme avoids creating windfall gains for bank equity holders. In addition, some losses can be imposed on debt holders.Keywords
This publication has 24 references indexed in Scilit:
- Fear of Fire Sales, Illiquidity Seeking, and Credit Freezes *The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2011
- Bank Bailout MenusSSRN Electronic Journal, 2010
- Stabilizing Large Financial Institutions with Contingent Capital CertificatesSSRN Electronic Journal, 2009
- Zombie Lending and Depressed Restructuring in JapanAmerican Economic Review, 2008
- Managerial incentives, capital reallocation, and the business cycleJournal of Financial Economics, 2008
- Demand–Deposit Contracts and the Probability of Bank RunsThe Journal of Finance, 2005
- Banking Crises and Bank Rescues: The Effect of ReputationJournal of Money, Credit and Banking, 2000
- Optimal Debt Structure and the Number of CreditorsJournal of Political Economy, 1996
- The Resolution of Financial DistressThe Review of Financial Studies, 1989
- Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown CostsEconometrica, 1982