Two kinds of failure in joint action: On disrespect and directed duties
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Open Access
- 2 October 2024
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Analysis
- Vol. 84 (4) , 749-757
Abstract
I identify two kinds of failure in joint action. First, we can fail to ‘do our part’, that is, fail to contribute to fulfilling the joint intention. Second, we can fail to respect our collaborators. Recognizing the distinct natures of both normative relations helps us overcome a key challenge to a reductionist theory of collective intentionality posed by Margaret Gilbert. According to this objection, we have obligations towards others even in immoral joint actions – a claim that was recently supported experimentally. Except for a handful of experimental papers, work on the normativity in joint intention has stagnated. I hope the distinction breathes fresh air into the theoretical and empirical debate.Keywords
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