GLGuido Löhr

Guido Löhr

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article

Previous Organizations / Institutes

The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years


Guido Löhr has a total of 27 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Les concepts abstraits comme problème pour une théorie de la connaissance

    by Guido Löhr

    Cette thèse cumulative défend l’idée qu’une grande partie de la littérature interdisciplinaire traitant des concepts confond les concepts avec ce qui est utilisé pour appliquer les concepts. Plus précisément, cette thèse soutient que les questions relatives au contenu (ce sur quoi porte le concept, sa sémantique) ont été confondues avec les questions relatives à notre accès épistémique à ce contenu (ce que nous savons de ce contenu). Une fois cette distinction établie, il est possible de résoudre un certain nombre de problèmes qui ont contraint la littérature conceptuelle pendant des décennies. Premièrement, il devient alors possible de noter que les types de concepts auxquels les psychologues se sont intéressés pour expliquer le problème de l’application des concepts, comme dans la catégorisation, ne doivent pas nécessairement traiter des problèmes sémantiques de la compositionnalité et de la systématicité. Deuxièmement, il devient également possible de laisser place à la possibilité empirique que des concepts abstraits, c'est-à-dire des concepts qui ne i ne s'appliquent pas à des objets physiques concrets avec lesquels nous avons un contact sensoriel direct, puissent être mieux expliqués par une approche de la cognition située ou empiriste, c’est-à- dire par des mouvements corporels, des représentations sensorimotrices, ou des représentations de situations et d'états introspectifs.

  • Open Access

    Two Concepts of Commitment

    by Guido Löhr

    The term ‘commitment’ plays a central role in the philosophy of language, the philosophy of social sciences, philosophy of action, and social ontology. Despite its centrality, the meaning of this term is seldom made explicit. It is not always clear what different authors mean when they use the term. This lack of clarity is especially apparent when using phrases like ‘shared commitments’ or ‘mutual commitment’. I argue that the term ‘commitment’ is used in at least two ways, which I call “private commitments” and “public commitments”. These senses can be distinguished by their different types of normative product. I then explicate different notions of the term ‘shared commitment’ derived from the two main notions. Finally, I apply these distinctions to try to make sense of paradigmatic uses of the term in the literature.

  • Open Access

    Prudential reasons for designing entitled chatbots: How robot

    by Guido Löhr, Matthew Dennis

    Can robots or chatbots be moral patients? The question of robot rights is often linked to moral reasons like precautionary principles or the ability to suffer. We argue that we have prudential reasons for building robots that can at least hold us accountable (criticize us etc.) and that we have prudential reasons to build robots that can demand that we treat them with respect. This proposal aims to add nuance to the robot rights debate by answering a key question: Why should we want to build robots that could have rights in the first place? We argue that some degree of accountability in our social relationships contributes to our well-being and flourishing. The normativity ascribed to robots will increase their social and non-social functionalities from action coordination to more meaningful relationships. Having a robot that has a certain “standing” to hold us accountable can improve our epistemic standing and satisfy our desire for recognition.

  • Open Access

    Two kinds of failure in joint action: On disrespect and directed duties

    by Guido Löhr

    I identify two kinds of failure in joint action. First, we can fail to ‘do our part’, that is, fail to contribute to fulfilling the joint intention. Second, we can fail to respect our collaborators. Recognizing the distinct natures of both normative relations helps us overcome a key challenge to a reductionist theory of collective intentionality posed by Margaret Gilbert. According to this objection, we have obligations towards others even in immoral joint actions – a claim that was recently supported experimentally. Except for a handful of experimental papers, work on the normativity in joint intention has stagnated. I hope the distinction breathes fresh air into the theoretical and empirical debate.


  • Open Access

    Socially Disruptive Technologies and Conceptual Engineering

    by Herman Veluwenkamp, Jeroen Hopster, Sebastian Köhler, Guido Löhr

    In this special issue, we focus on the connection between conceptual engineering and the philosophy of technology. Conceptual engineering is the enterprise of introducing, eliminating, or revising words and concepts. The philosophy of technology examines the nature and significance of technology. We investigate how technologies such as AI and genetic engineering (so-called “socially disruptive technologies”) disrupt our practices and concepts, and how conceptual engineering can address these disruptions. We also consider how conceptual engineering can enhance the practice of ethical design. The issue features seven articles that discuss a range of topics, including trust in blockchain applications and the evolving concept of nature. These articles highlight that as technology changes the world and our concepts, conceptual engineering provides invaluable tools and frameworks to reflect on these changes and adapt accordingly.


  • Open Access

    What does it mean for a duty to be directed in joint action?

    by Guido Löhr

    It is often stated that joint actions are linked to so-called directed duties. It is not just that we should “do our part” in a joint action simply because it is the right thing to do or because it is in our best interest. Instead, we “owe” it to the other participants. Despite its prima facie plausibility, this claim is not well understood. Is it true that duties in joint action are directed? Which notion of directedness is relevant to understanding the normativity of joint action? I first argue that we can characterize the notion of directed duties in joint action in terms of a network of inferentially related normative relations and practices. I apply this analysis to show that duties in joint action are directed. This analysis supports the view that the normativity in joint action is special as it involves what Stephen Darwall calls “individual authority” without entailing “representative authority”. A perhaps surprising conclusion derived from this account is that actions in joint action are owed to everyone involved in the group equally. This supports Margaret Gilbert’s joint commitment account of joint intention.