Guido Löhr
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Guido Löhr has a total of 27 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Christian Michel
University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh, UK
4 shared publications - Jeroen Hopster
Utrecht University
4 shared publications - Philip Brey
University of Twente
2 shared publications - Anna Puzio
University of Bern, Bern, Switzerland
1 shared publication - Arthur Gwagwa
Utrecht University
1 shared publication - Bart Anthony Kamphorst
Utrecht University
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 22 April 2026
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Philosophical Psychology
- p. 1-17
Memory labels against concept eliminativism
- 22 April 2026
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Philosophical Psychology
- p. 1-17
Memory labels against concept eliminativism
- 4 April 2026
- Published by Agence Bibliographique de l'Enseignement Supérieur
Les concepts abstraits comme problème pour une théorie de la connaissance
Cette thèse cumulative défend l’idée qu’une grande partie de la littérature interdisciplinaire traitant des concepts confond les concepts avec ce qui est utilisé pour appliquer les concepts. Plus précisément, cette thèse soutient que les questions relatives au contenu (ce sur quoi porte le concept, sa sémantique) ont été confondues avec les questions relatives à notre accès épistémique à ce contenu (ce que nous savons de ce contenu). Une fois cette distinction établie, il est possible de résoudre un certain nombre de problèmes qui ont contraint la littérature conceptuelle pendant des décennies. Premièrement, il devient alors possible de noter que les types de concepts auxquels les psychologues se sont intéressés pour expliquer le problème de l’application des concepts, comme dans la catégorisation, ne doivent pas nécessairement traiter des problèmes sémantiques de la compositionnalité et de la systématicité. Deuxièmement, il devient également possible de laisser place à la possibilité empirique que des concepts abstraits, c'est-à-dire des concepts qui ne i ne s'appliquent pas à des objets physiques concrets avec lesquels nous avons un contact sensoriel direct, puissent être mieux expliqués par une approche de la cognition située ou empiriste, c’est-à- dire par des mouvements corporels, des représentations sensorimotrices, ou des représentations de situations et d'états introspectifs.
- 4 April 2026
- Published by Agence Bibliographique de l'Enseignement Supérieur
Les concepts abstraits comme problème pour une théorie de la connaissance
Cette thèse cumulative défend l’idée qu’une grande partie de la littérature interdisciplinaire traitant des concepts confond les concepts avec ce qui est utilisé pour appliquer les concepts. Plus précisément, cette thèse soutient que les questions relatives au contenu (ce sur quoi porte le concept, sa sémantique) ont été confondues avec les questions relatives à notre accès épistémique à ce contenu (ce que nous savons de ce contenu). Une fois cette distinction établie, il est possible de résoudre un certain nombre de problèmes qui ont contraint la littérature conceptuelle pendant des décennies. Premièrement, il devient alors possible de noter que les types de concepts auxquels les psychologues se sont intéressés pour expliquer le problème de l’application des concepts, comme dans la catégorisation, ne doivent pas nécessairement traiter des problèmes sémantiques de la compositionnalité et de la systématicité. Deuxièmement, il devient également possible de laisser place à la possibilité empirique que des concepts abstraits, c'est-à-dire des concepts qui ne i ne s'appliquent pas à des objets physiques concrets avec lesquels nous avons un contact sensoriel direct, puissent être mieux expliqués par une approche de la cognition située ou empiriste, c’est-à- dire par des mouvements corporels, des représentations sensorimotrices, ou des représentations de situations et d'états introspectifs.
- Open Access
- 24 March 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Philosophy & Technology
- Vol. 39 (2) , 58
Rethinking Disruptive Technologies: Benefits, Harms, and Injustices of Human Niche Construction
- 24 March 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Philosophy & Technology
- Vol. 39 (2) , 58
Open AccessRethinking Disruptive Technologies: Benefits, Harms, and Injustices of Human Niche Construction
- Open Access
- 19 January 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Philosophia
- p. 1-21
Two Concepts of Commitment
The term ‘commitment’ plays a central role in the philosophy of language, the philosophy of social sciences, philosophy of action, and social ontology. Despite its centrality, the meaning of this term is seldom made explicit. It is not always clear what different authors mean when they use the term. This lack of clarity is especially apparent when using phrases like ‘shared commitments’ or ‘mutual commitment’. I argue that the term ‘commitment’ is used in at least two ways, which I call “private commitments” and “public commitments”. These senses can be distinguished by their different types of normative product. I then explicate different notions of the term ‘shared commitment’ derived from the two main notions. Finally, I apply these distinctions to try to make sense of paradigmatic uses of the term in the literature.
- 19 January 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Philosophia
- p. 1-21
Open AccessTwo Concepts of Commitment
The term ‘commitment’ plays a central role in the philosophy of language, the philosophy of social sciences, philosophy of action, and social ontology. Despite its centrality, the meaning of this term is seldom made explicit. It is not always clear what different authors mean when they use the term. This lack of clarity is especially apparent when using phrases like ‘shared commitments’ or ‘mutual commitment’. I argue that the term ‘commitment’ is used in at least two ways, which I call “private commitments” and “public commitments”. These senses can be distinguished by their different types of normative product. I then explicate different notions of the term ‘shared commitment’ derived from the two main notions. Finally, I apply these distinctions to try to make sense of paradigmatic uses of the term in the literature.
- Open Access
- 4 July 2025
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Inquiry
- p. 1-31
What is pragmatist conceptual engineering?
- 4 July 2025
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Inquiry
- p. 1-31
Open AccessWhat is pragmatist conceptual engineering?
- Open Access
- 17 February 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in AI and Ethics
- Vol. 5 (4) , 3791-3802
Prudential reasons for designing entitled chatbots: How robot
Can robots or chatbots be moral patients? The question of robot rights is often linked to moral reasons like precautionary principles or the ability to suffer. We argue that we have prudential reasons for building robots that can at least hold us accountable (criticize us etc.) and that we have prudential reasons to build robots that can demand that we treat them with respect. This proposal aims to add nuance to the robot rights debate by answering a key question: Why should we want to build robots that could have rights in the first place? We argue that some degree of accountability in our social relationships contributes to our well-being and flourishing. The normativity ascribed to robots will increase their social and non-social functionalities from action coordination to more meaningful relationships. Having a robot that has a certain “standing” to hold us accountable can improve our epistemic standing and satisfy our desire for recognition.
- 17 February 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in AI and Ethics
- Vol. 5 (4) , 3791-3802
Open AccessPrudential reasons for designing entitled chatbots: How robot
Can robots or chatbots be moral patients? The question of robot rights is often linked to moral reasons like precautionary principles or the ability to suffer. We argue that we have prudential reasons for building robots that can at least hold us accountable (criticize us etc.) and that we have prudential reasons to build robots that can demand that we treat them with respect. This proposal aims to add nuance to the robot rights debate by answering a key question: Why should we want to build robots that could have rights in the first place? We argue that some degree of accountability in our social relationships contributes to our well-being and flourishing. The normativity ascribed to robots will increase their social and non-social functionalities from action coordination to more meaningful relationships. Having a robot that has a certain “standing” to hold us accountable can improve our epistemic standing and satisfy our desire for recognition.
- Open Access
- 2 October 2024
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Analysis
- Vol. 84 (4) , 749-757
Two kinds of failure in joint action: On disrespect and directed duties
I identify two kinds of failure in joint action. First, we can fail to ‘do our part’, that is, fail to contribute to fulfilling the joint intention. Second, we can fail to respect our collaborators. Recognizing the distinct natures of both normative relations helps us overcome a key challenge to a reductionist theory of collective intentionality posed by Margaret Gilbert. According to this objection, we have obligations towards others even in immoral joint actions – a claim that was recently supported experimentally. Except for a handful of experimental papers, work on the normativity in joint intention has stagnated. I hope the distinction breathes fresh air into the theoretical and empirical debate.
- 2 October 2024
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Analysis
- Vol. 84 (4) , 749-757
Open AccessTwo kinds of failure in joint action: On disrespect and directed duties
I identify two kinds of failure in joint action. First, we can fail to ‘do our part’, that is, fail to contribute to fulfilling the joint intention. Second, we can fail to respect our collaborators. Recognizing the distinct natures of both normative relations helps us overcome a key challenge to a reductionist theory of collective intentionality posed by Margaret Gilbert. According to this objection, we have obligations towards others even in immoral joint actions – a claim that was recently supported experimentally. Except for a handful of experimental papers, work on the normativity in joint intention has stagnated. I hope the distinction breathes fresh air into the theoretical and empirical debate.
- Open Access
- 28 September 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Ethics and Information Technology
- Vol. 26 (4) , 1-6
Socially Disruptive Technologies and Conceptual Engineering
In this special issue, we focus on the connection between conceptual engineering and the philosophy of technology. Conceptual engineering is the enterprise of introducing, eliminating, or revising words and concepts. The philosophy of technology examines the nature and significance of technology. We investigate how technologies such as AI and genetic engineering (so-called “socially disruptive technologies”) disrupt our practices and concepts, and how conceptual engineering can address these disruptions. We also consider how conceptual engineering can enhance the practice of ethical design. The issue features seven articles that discuss a range of topics, including trust in blockchain applications and the evolving concept of nature. These articles highlight that as technology changes the world and our concepts, conceptual engineering provides invaluable tools and frameworks to reflect on these changes and adapt accordingly.
- 28 September 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Ethics and Information Technology
- Vol. 26 (4) , 1-6
Open AccessSocially Disruptive Technologies and Conceptual Engineering
In this special issue, we focus on the connection between conceptual engineering and the philosophy of technology. Conceptual engineering is the enterprise of introducing, eliminating, or revising words and concepts. The philosophy of technology examines the nature and significance of technology. We investigate how technologies such as AI and genetic engineering (so-called “socially disruptive technologies”) disrupt our practices and concepts, and how conceptual engineering can address these disruptions. We also consider how conceptual engineering can enhance the practice of ethical design. The issue features seven articles that discuss a range of topics, including trust in blockchain applications and the evolving concept of nature. These articles highlight that as technology changes the world and our concepts, conceptual engineering provides invaluable tools and frameworks to reflect on these changes and adapt accordingly.
- 13 September 2024
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH
- p. 161-180
What’s the Relation between Conceptual Ethics and Ethics? An Instrumentalist Defense of Conceptual Engineering
- 13 September 2024
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH
- p. 161-180
What’s the Relation between Conceptual Ethics and Ethics? An Instrumentalist Defense of Conceptual Engineering
- Open Access
- 31 July 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Synthese
- Vol. 204 (2) , 1-18
What does it mean for a duty to be directed in joint action?
It is often stated that joint actions are linked to so-called directed duties. It is not just that we should “do our part” in a joint action simply because it is the right thing to do or because it is in our best interest. Instead, we “owe” it to the other participants. Despite its prima facie plausibility, this claim is not well understood. Is it true that duties in joint action are directed? Which notion of directedness is relevant to understanding the normativity of joint action? I first argue that we can characterize the notion of directed duties in joint action in terms of a network of inferentially related normative relations and practices. I apply this analysis to show that duties in joint action are directed. This analysis supports the view that the normativity in joint action is special as it involves what Stephen Darwall calls “individual authority” without entailing “representative authority”. A perhaps surprising conclusion derived from this account is that actions in joint action are owed to everyone involved in the group equally. This supports Margaret Gilbert’s joint commitment account of joint intention.
- 31 July 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Synthese
- Vol. 204 (2) , 1-18
Open AccessWhat does it mean for a duty to be directed in joint action?
It is often stated that joint actions are linked to so-called directed duties. It is not just that we should “do our part” in a joint action simply because it is the right thing to do or because it is in our best interest. Instead, we “owe” it to the other participants. Despite its prima facie plausibility, this claim is not well understood. Is it true that duties in joint action are directed? Which notion of directedness is relevant to understanding the normativity of joint action? I first argue that we can characterize the notion of directed duties in joint action in terms of a network of inferentially related normative relations and practices. I apply this analysis to show that duties in joint action are directed. This analysis supports the view that the normativity in joint action is special as it involves what Stephen Darwall calls “individual authority” without entailing “representative authority”. A perhaps surprising conclusion derived from this account is that actions in joint action are owed to everyone involved in the group equally. This supports Margaret Gilbert’s joint commitment account of joint intention.