Are Mathematical Explanations Causal Explanations in Disguise?
Open Access
- 22 March 2024
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Philosophy of Science
- Vol. 91 (4) , 887-905
Abstract
There is a major debate as to whether there are non-causal mathematical explanations of physical facts that show how the facts under question arise from a degree of mathematical necessity considered stronger than that of contingent causal laws. We focus on Marc Lange’s account of distinctively mathematical explanations to argue that purported mathematical explanations are essentially causal explanations in disguise and are no different from ordinary applications of mathematics. This is because these explanations work not by appealing to what the world must be like as a matter of mathematical necessity but by appealing to various contingent causal facts.Keywords
This publication has 31 references indexed in Scilit:
- On the Continuum Fallacy: Is Temperature a Continuous Function?Foundations of Physics, 2023
- Not so distinctively mathematical explanations: topology and dynamical systemsSynthese, 2022
- Mathematics and Explanatory Generality: Nothing but Cognitive SalienceErkenntnis, 2019
- A reply to Craver and Povich on the directionality of distinctively mathematical explanationsStudies in History and Philosophy of Science, 2018
- Reply to my Critics: On explanations by constraintMetascience, 2017
- The directionality of distinctively mathematical explanationsStudies in History and Philosophy of Science, 2017
- On the Motion of a Rigid Body in a Viscous Liquid: A Mathematical Analysis with Applications2002
- What Good is an Explanation?2001
- A First Course in Algebraic Topology1980
- A Third Dogma of Empiricism1977