Douglas Campbell
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Douglas Campbell has a total of 9 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Aditya Jha
School of Mathematics and Statistics, University of Canterbury, Christchurch, New Zealand
3 shared publications - Clemency Montelle
University of Canterbury
3 shared publications - Phillip L. Wilson
School of Mathematics and Statistics, University of Canterbury, Christchurch, New Zealand
3 shared publications Cristian Calude
1 shared publicationDoru Ştefănescu
1 shared publicationJack Copeland
University of Canterbury, New Zealand
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 22 March 2024
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Philosophy of Science
- Vol. 91 (4) , 887-905
Are Mathematical Explanations Causal Explanations in Disguise?
There is a major debate as to whether there are non-causal mathematical explanations of physical facts that show how the facts under question arise from a degree of mathematical necessity considered stronger than that of contingent causal laws. We focus on Marc Lange’s account of distinctively mathematical explanations to argue that purported mathematical explanations are essentially causal explanations in disguise and are no different from ordinary applications of mathematics. This is because these explanations work not by appealing to what the world must be like as a matter of mathematical necessity but by appealing to various contingent causal facts.
- 22 March 2024
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Philosophy of Science
- Vol. 91 (4) , 887-905
Open AccessAre Mathematical Explanations Causal Explanations in Disguise?
There is a major debate as to whether there are non-causal mathematical explanations of physical facts that show how the facts under question arise from a degree of mathematical necessity considered stronger than that of contingent causal laws. We focus on Marc Lange’s account of distinctively mathematical explanations to argue that purported mathematical explanations are essentially causal explanations in disguise and are no different from ordinary applications of mathematics. This is because these explanations work not by appealing to what the world must be like as a matter of mathematical necessity but by appealing to various contingent causal facts.
- Open Access
- 30 July 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in Foundations of Physics
- Vol. 53 (4) , 1-29
On the Continuum Fallacy: Is Temperature a Continuous Function?
It is often argued that the indispensability of continuum models comes from their empirical adequacy despite their decoupling from the microscopic details of the modelled physical system. There is thus a commonly held misconception that temperature varying across a region of space or time can always be accurately represented as a continuous function. We discuss three inter-related cases of temperature modelling — in phase transitions, thermal boundary resistance and slip flows — and show that the continuum view is fallacious on the ground that the microscopic details of a physical system are not necessarily decoupled from continuum models. We show how temperature discontinuities are present in both data (experiments and simulations) and phenomena (theory and models) and how discontinuum models of temperature variation may have greater empirical adequacy and explanatory power. The conclusions of our paper are: a) continuum idealisations are not indispensable to modelling physical phenomena and both continuous and discontinuous representations of phenomena work depending on the context; b) temperature is not necessarily a continuously defined function in our best scientific representations of the world; and c) that its continuity, where applicable, is a contingent matter. We also raise a question as to whether discontinuous representations should be considered truly de-idealised descriptions of physical phenomena.
- 30 July 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in Foundations of Physics
- Vol. 53 (4) , 1-29
Open AccessOn the Continuum Fallacy: Is Temperature a Continuous Function?
It is often argued that the indispensability of continuum models comes from their empirical adequacy despite their decoupling from the microscopic details of the modelled physical system. There is thus a commonly held misconception that temperature varying across a region of space or time can always be accurately represented as a continuous function. We discuss three inter-related cases of temperature modelling — in phase transitions, thermal boundary resistance and slip flows — and show that the continuum view is fallacious on the ground that the microscopic details of a physical system are not necessarily decoupled from continuum models. We show how temperature discontinuities are present in both data (experiments and simulations) and phenomena (theory and models) and how discontinuum models of temperature variation may have greater empirical adequacy and explanatory power. The conclusions of our paper are: a) continuum idealisations are not indispensable to modelling physical phenomena and both continuous and discontinuous representations of phenomena work depending on the context; b) temperature is not necessarily a continuously defined function in our best scientific representations of the world; and c) that its continuity, where applicable, is a contingent matter. We also raise a question as to whether discontinuous representations should be considered truly de-idealised descriptions of physical phenomena.
- Open Access
- 5 December 2022
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 2
A very simple design for a very intelligent machine (but with a catch)
- 5 December 2022
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 2
Open AccessA very simple design for a very intelligent machine (but with a catch)
- 3 May 2022
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Ethics, Policy & Environment
- Vol. 25 (2) , 109-112
Why Katz is Wrong: A Lab-Created Creature Can Still Have an Ancient Evolutionary History
Katz denies that organisms created in a lab as part of a de-extinction attempt will be authentic members of the extinct species, on the basis that they will lack the original species’ defining biological and evolutionary history. Against Katz, I note that an evolutionary lineage is conferred on an organism though its inheriting genes from forebears already possessed of such a lineage, and that de-extinction amounts to a delayed, human-assisted reproductive process, in which genes are inherited from forebears long dead. My conclusion is that de-extinct organisms can perfectly well have an ancient evolutionary history, contrary to Katz’s assumption.
- 3 May 2022
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Ethics, Policy & Environment
- Vol. 25 (2) , 109-112
Why Katz is Wrong: A Lab-Created Creature Can Still Have an Ancient Evolutionary History
Katz denies that organisms created in a lab as part of a de-extinction attempt will be authentic members of the extinct species, on the basis that they will lack the original species’ defining biological and evolutionary history. Against Katz, I note that an evolutionary lineage is conferred on an organism though its inheriting genes from forebears already possessed of such a lineage, and that de-extinction amounts to a delayed, human-assisted reproductive process, in which genes are inherited from forebears long dead. My conclusion is that de-extinct organisms can perfectly well have an ancient evolutionary history, contrary to Katz’s assumption.
- Open Access
- 3 May 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in Synthese
- Vol. 200 (3) , 1-40
Not so distinctively mathematical explanations: topology and dynamical systems
So-called ‘distinctively mathematical explanations’ (DMEs) are said to explain physical phenomena, not in terms of contingent causal laws, but rather in terms of mathematical necessities that constrain the physical system in question. Lange argues that the existence of four or more equilibrium positions of any double pendulum has a DME. Here we refute both Lange’s claim itself and a strengthened and extended version of the claim that would pertain to any n-tuple pendulum system on the ground that such explanations are actually causal explanations in disguise and their associated modal conditionals are not general enough to explain the said features of such dynamical systems. We argue and show that if circumscribing the antecedent for a necessarily true conditional in such explanations involves making a causal analysis of the problem, then the resulting explanation is not distinctively mathematical or non-causal. Our argument generalises to other dynamical systems that may have purported DMEs analogous to the one proposed by Lange, and even to some other counterfactual accounts of non-causal explanation given by Reutlinger and Rice.
- 3 May 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in Synthese
- Vol. 200 (3) , 1-40
Open AccessNot so distinctively mathematical explanations: topology and dynamical systems
So-called ‘distinctively mathematical explanations’ (DMEs) are said to explain physical phenomena, not in terms of contingent causal laws, but rather in terms of mathematical necessities that constrain the physical system in question. Lange argues that the existence of four or more equilibrium positions of any double pendulum has a DME. Here we refute both Lange’s claim itself and a strengthened and extended version of the claim that would pertain to any n-tuple pendulum system on the ground that such explanations are actually causal explanations in disguise and their associated modal conditionals are not general enough to explain the said features of such dynamical systems. We argue and show that if circumscribing the antecedent for a necessarily true conditional in such explanations involves making a causal analysis of the problem, then the resulting explanation is not distinctively mathematical or non-causal. Our argument generalises to other dynamical systems that may have purported DMEs analogous to the one proposed by Lange, and even to some other counterfactual accounts of non-causal explanation given by Reutlinger and Rice.
- 31 May 2019
- Published by Springer Nature in Synthese
- Vol. 198 (4) , 3203-3220
Does the solar system compute the laws of motion?
- 31 May 2019
- Published by Springer Nature in Synthese
- Vol. 198 (4) , 3203-3220
Does the solar system compute the laws of motion?
- 20 June 2018
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Australasian Journal of Philosophy
- Vol. 97 (3) , 634-635
The Fragmentation of Being
(2019). The Fragmentation of Being. Australasian Journal of Philosophy. Ahead of Print.
- 20 June 2018
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Australasian Journal of Philosophy
- Vol. 97 (3) , 634-635
The Fragmentation of Being
(2019). The Fragmentation of Being. Australasian Journal of Philosophy. Ahead of Print.
- 8 November 2016
- Published by Springer Nature in Synthese
- Vol. 195 (3) , 1139-1161
Doxastic desire and Attitudinal Monism
- 8 November 2016
- Published by Springer Nature in Synthese
- Vol. 195 (3) , 1139-1161
Doxastic desire and Attitudinal Monism
- 28 October 2016
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in The Philosophical Quarterly
- p. pqw066
The Inconceivable Popularity of Conceivability Arguments
Famous examples of conceivability arguments include (i) Descartes’ argument for mind-body dualism, (ii) Kripke's ‘modal argument’ against psychophysical identity theory, (iii) Chalmers’ ‘zombie argument’ against materialism, and (iv) modal versions of the ontological argument for theism. In this paper, we show that for any such conceivability argument, C, there is a corresponding ‘mirror argument’, M. M is deductively valid and has a conclusion that contradicts C's conclusion. Hence, a proponent of C—henceforth, a ‘conceivabilist’—can be warranted in holding that C's premises are conjointly true only if she can find fault with one of M's premises. But M's premises are modelled on a pair of C's premises. The same reasoning that supports the latter supports the former. For this reason, a conceivabilist can repudiate M's premises only on pain of severely undermining C's premises. We conclude on this basis that all conceivability arguments, including each of (i)–(iv), are fallacious.
- 28 October 2016
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in The Philosophical Quarterly
- p. pqw066
The Inconceivable Popularity of Conceivability Arguments
Famous examples of conceivability arguments include (i) Descartes’ argument for mind-body dualism, (ii) Kripke's ‘modal argument’ against psychophysical identity theory, (iii) Chalmers’ ‘zombie argument’ against materialism, and (iv) modal versions of the ontological argument for theism. In this paper, we show that for any such conceivability argument, C, there is a corresponding ‘mirror argument’, M. M is deductively valid and has a conclusion that contradicts C's conclusion. Hence, a proponent of C—henceforth, a ‘conceivabilist’—can be warranted in holding that C's premises are conjointly true only if she can find fault with one of M's premises. But M's premises are modelled on a pair of C's premises. The same reasoning that supports the latter supports the former. For this reason, a conceivabilist can repudiate M's premises only on pain of severely undermining C's premises. We conclude on this basis that all conceivability arguments, including each of (i)–(iv), are fallacious.
- 5 August 2016
- Published by Springer Nature in Biology & Philosophy
- Vol. 31 (5) , 747-759
A case for resurrecting lost species—review essay of Beth Shapiro’s, “How to Clone a Mammoth: The Science of De-extinction”
- 5 August 2016
- Published by Springer Nature in Biology & Philosophy
- Vol. 31 (5) , 747-759
A case for resurrecting lost species—review essay of Beth Shapiro’s, “How to Clone a Mammoth: The Science of De-extinction”