Share the gain, share the pain? Almost transferable utility, changes in production possibilities, and bargaining solutions
Authors:
- Elisabeth GuglEGElisabeth Gugl
- Justin LerouxJLJustin Leroux
- 30 November 2011
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Mathematical Social Sciences
- Vol. 62 (3) , 133-143
Abstract
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