Putting relational contract theory to the test: experimental evidence
- 1 February 2022
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Experimental Economics
- Vol. 25 (1) , 111-139
Abstract
We investigate a number of canonical predictions that arise from relational contract theory. Employing an experimental design with endogenous choice of contract type, we find considerable experimental support for several well-established predictions, including the importance of self-enforcement and individual rationality constraints for contractual performance; a preference for informal agreements when third-party verification of performance is coarse; and a tendency toward strategic ambiguity (Bernheim and Whinston Am Econ Rev 88(4):902–932, 1998). However, two findings that appear to be inconsistent with theory are that (1) contractually specified performance levels do not appear to respond to the discount factor though realized performance does; and (2) subjects often apply inefficient punishments following a deviation. By providing evidence on the strengths and weaknesses of standard relational contract theory, our study shows where there is room for improvement. We conjecture that incorporating social preferences and semi-grim strategies (Breitmoser Am Econ Rev 105(9):2882–2910, 2015) can potentially address the observed weaknesses.Keywords
Funding Information
- National Institute of Food and Agriculture (2010-65400-20430 and Hatch IND010580)
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