Steven Y. Wu
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Steven Y. Wu has a total of 18 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Brian E. Roe
Department of Agricultural, Environmental and Development Economics, Ohio State University, Columbus, USA
4 shared publications - Nisvan Erkal
Department of Economics, University of Melbourne, Victoria, Australia
2 shared publications Christina Hofmann-Stölting
Mathematics, Statistics, and Empirical Research, HTW– University of Applied Sciences Berlin, Berlin, Germany
1 shared publication- Gang Zhao
Faculty of Artificial Intelligence in Education, Central China Normal University, China
1 shared publication Hongchun Liu
1 shared publicationJacob Brindley
Department of Economics Purdue University West Lafayette Indiana USA
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 12 February 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Paying for Good Behavior: What is the Optimal Incentive Structure?
When policy makers want individuals to adopt behaviors that are individually or socially beneficial (e.g. smoking cessation, healthy eating, healthy activities, etc), one option is to offer monetary incentives. The payoff function for the policy maker in this class of problems may have the ``common values'' property from the principal-agent literature, where the principal benefits when some types of agents perform but not others. For example, in the realm of healthy eating, the principal may derive more value from unhealthy people improving their diets than people who are already healthy. When the agent type is unknown to the principal, Laffont and Martimort (2002) find that pooling incentive schemes can be optimal under a very stringent assumption on the principal's benefit function, which causes the monotonicity condition to be violated. I show that this assumption can be relaxed and pooling incentives are still optimal, suggesting that the optimality of pooling incentives is fairly robust. An implication of this finding is that monetary incentives for good behavior can be fairly simple, with no need to structure complex screening menus that try to induce agents to self-select into customized incentive plans.
- 12 February 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessPaying for Good Behavior: What is the Optimal Incentive Structure?
When policy makers want individuals to adopt behaviors that are individually or socially beneficial (e.g. smoking cessation, healthy eating, healthy activities, etc), one option is to offer monetary incentives. The payoff function for the policy maker in this class of problems may have the ``common values'' property from the principal-agent literature, where the principal benefits when some types of agents perform but not others. For example, in the realm of healthy eating, the principal may derive more value from unhealthy people improving their diets than people who are already healthy. When the agent type is unknown to the principal, Laffont and Martimort (2002) find that pooling incentive schemes can be optimal under a very stringent assumption on the principal's benefit function, which causes the monotonicity condition to be violated. I show that this assumption can be relaxed and pooling incentives are still optimal, suggesting that the optimality of pooling incentives is fairly robust. An implication of this finding is that monetary incentives for good behavior can be fairly simple, with no need to structure complex screening menus that try to induce agents to self-select into customized incentive plans.
- Open Access
- 20 February 2023
- Published by Wiley in Journal of the Agricultural and Applied Economics Association
- Vol. 2 (1) , 146-159
How does a change in outside options affect relational contracting outcomes? Experimental evidence and implications for agricultural contracting
We use experiments, guided by theory, to examine how an exogenous decrease in the value of an agent's outside option (e.g., a proxy for a reduction in alternative contracting opportunities) affects relational contracting across two institutional environments. In the pure relational contracting environment, principals respond to a reduction in agents' outside option by restructuring contracts to offer fewer payment guarantees. This exposes agents to more counter‐party risk and their actual profits fell well short of promised profits. This is mitigated when contracting institutions permit formal contracts to coexist with relational contracts. Extensive margin and intensive margin efficiency are mostly unaffected.
- 20 February 2023
- Published by Wiley in Journal of the Agricultural and Applied Economics Association
- Vol. 2 (1) , 146-159
Open AccessHow does a change in outside options affect relational contracting outcomes? Experimental evidence and implications for agricultural contracting
We use experiments, guided by theory, to examine how an exogenous decrease in the value of an agent's outside option (e.g., a proxy for a reduction in alternative contracting opportunities) affects relational contracting across two institutional environments. In the pure relational contracting environment, principals respond to a reduction in agents' outside option by restructuring contracts to offer fewer payment guarantees. This exposes agents to more counter‐party risk and their actual profits fell well short of promised profits. This is mitigated when contracting institutions permit formal contracts to coexist with relational contracts. Extensive margin and intensive margin efficiency are mostly unaffected.
- 1 February 2022
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Experimental Economics
- Vol. 25 (1) , 140
Correction to: Putting relational contract theory to the test: experimental evidence
A correction to this paper has been published: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-021-09712-z
- 1 February 2022
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Experimental Economics
- Vol. 25 (1) , 140
Correction to: Putting relational contract theory to the test: experimental evidence
A correction to this paper has been published: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-021-09712-z
- 1 February 2022
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Experimental Economics
- Vol. 25 (1) , 111-139
Putting relational contract theory to the test: experimental evidence
We investigate a number of canonical predictions that arise from relational contract theory. Employing an experimental design with endogenous choice of contract type, we find considerable experimental support for several well-established predictions, including the importance of self-enforcement and individual rationality constraints for contractual performance; a preference for informal agreements when third-party verification of performance is coarse; and a tendency toward strategic ambiguity (Bernheim and Whinston Am Econ Rev 88(4):902–932, 1998). However, two findings that appear to be inconsistent with theory are that (1) contractually specified performance levels do not appear to respond to the discount factor though realized performance does; and (2) subjects often apply inefficient punishments following a deviation. By providing evidence on the strengths and weaknesses of standard relational contract theory, our study shows where there is room for improvement. We conjecture that incorporating social preferences and semi-grim strategies (Breitmoser Am Econ Rev 105(9):2882–2910, 2015) can potentially address the observed weaknesses.
- 1 February 2022
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Experimental Economics
- Vol. 25 (1) , 111-139
Putting relational contract theory to the test: experimental evidence
We investigate a number of canonical predictions that arise from relational contract theory. Employing an experimental design with endogenous choice of contract type, we find considerable experimental support for several well-established predictions, including the importance of self-enforcement and individual rationality constraints for contractual performance; a preference for informal agreements when third-party verification of performance is coarse; and a tendency toward strategic ambiguity (Bernheim and Whinston Am Econ Rev 88(4):902–932, 1998). However, two findings that appear to be inconsistent with theory are that (1) contractually specified performance levels do not appear to respond to the discount factor though realized performance does; and (2) subjects often apply inefficient punishments following a deviation. By providing evidence on the strengths and weaknesses of standard relational contract theory, our study shows where there is room for improvement. We conjecture that incorporating social preferences and semi-grim strategies (Breitmoser Am Econ Rev 105(9):2882–2910, 2015) can potentially address the observed weaknesses.
- Open Access
- 14 May 2021
- Published by Wiley in The FASEB Journal
- Vol. 35 (S1)
Small Stakes Assessments Contribute to Increasing Average Total Scores for Physiology and Biomedical Engineering Majors
Principles of Physiology (PHSL3061/5061) is a required course for Physiology and Biomedical Engineering Majors. This is a team‐taught course covering the major areas of physiology: Cell, Muscle, Endocrine, Reproduction, Cardiovascular, Respiratory, Gastrointestinal, Metabolism, and Renal. Instructors are generally teaching in their area(s) of expertise. In 2018, there was a significant gap in overall average total scores between physiology (72.7%) and biomedical engineering (79.8%) majors, we believe in part due to higher admission requirements for the biomedical engineering major. Physiology majors do not take a lower level physiology course prior to taking PHSL3061/5061. Moreover, about 25% of physiology majors achieved a non‐passing grade. Up to 2018, only four exams were given as assessments. Given this performance disparity between physiology and biomedical engineering majors, we incorporated additional activities with the intension of narrowing the academic performance gap. Starting in 2019 small stakes assessments (quizzes and practice exams) were added. The gap narrowed (73.42% for physiology majors, 78.16% for biomedical engineering majors) but widened in 2020 (76.25% for physiology majors, 83.67% for biomedical engineering majors). Further analysis of grade distribution revealed that the percentage of bioengineering majors with total scores of 85% or above went from 30% in 2019 to 60% in 2020. Physiology majors earning a non‐passing grade was reduced to 10%. Taken together, the addition of small stakes assessments contributed to increasing average total scores for both physiology and biomedical engineering majors. Future considerations to improve outcomes for physiology students include the addition of a required lower level physiology course and lab to prepare students for this upper level physiology course.
- 14 May 2021
- Published by Wiley in The FASEB Journal
- Vol. 35 (S1)
Open AccessSmall Stakes Assessments Contribute to Increasing Average Total Scores for Physiology and Biomedical Engineering Majors
Principles of Physiology (PHSL3061/5061) is a required course for Physiology and Biomedical Engineering Majors. This is a team‐taught course covering the major areas of physiology: Cell, Muscle, Endocrine, Reproduction, Cardiovascular, Respiratory, Gastrointestinal, Metabolism, and Renal. Instructors are generally teaching in their area(s) of expertise. In 2018, there was a significant gap in overall average total scores between physiology (72.7%) and biomedical engineering (79.8%) majors, we believe in part due to higher admission requirements for the biomedical engineering major. Physiology majors do not take a lower level physiology course prior to taking PHSL3061/5061. Moreover, about 25% of physiology majors achieved a non‐passing grade. Up to 2018, only four exams were given as assessments. Given this performance disparity between physiology and biomedical engineering majors, we incorporated additional activities with the intension of narrowing the academic performance gap. Starting in 2019 small stakes assessments (quizzes and practice exams) were added. The gap narrowed (73.42% for physiology majors, 78.16% for biomedical engineering majors) but widened in 2020 (76.25% for physiology majors, 83.67% for biomedical engineering majors). Further analysis of grade distribution revealed that the percentage of bioengineering majors with total scores of 85% or above went from 30% in 2019 to 60% in 2020. Physiology majors earning a non‐passing grade was reduced to 10%. Taken together, the addition of small stakes assessments contributed to increasing average total scores for both physiology and biomedical engineering majors. Future considerations to improve outcomes for physiology students include the addition of a required lower level physiology course and lab to prepare students for this upper level physiology course.
- 1 January 2021
- Published by American Concrete Institute
- Vol. 348, 19-34
Innovative Retrofit of a Steam Turbine Generator Foundation to Mitigate Settlement
- 1 January 2021
- Published by American Concrete Institute
- Vol. 348, 19-34
Innovative Retrofit of a Steam Turbine Generator Foundation to Mitigate Settlement
- 18 September 2018
- Published by Springer Nature in Environmental and Resource Economics
- Vol. 73 (3) , 743-758
Subject Pools and Deception in Agricultural and Resource Economics Experiments
- 18 September 2018
- Published by Springer Nature in Environmental and Resource Economics
- Vol. 73 (3) , 743-758
Subject Pools and Deception in Agricultural and Resource Economics Experiments
- 3 July 2017
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of Media Economics
- Vol. 30 (3) , 143-171
Sales Forecasting of New Entertainment Media Products
Managers predict the sales of new entertainment products prior to their release using comparables, such as similar books from the same author or movies with the same actors. In this study, the authors analyze whether diffusion models for media products provide helpful support in the management task of predicting prelaunch sales of the first distribution channel for three different product categories. They compare the performance of predictions based on (a) simple success factor regressions (OLS) and (b) diffusion models against real management predictions. Based on samples covering the German music, film, and the literary market, we show that model-based forecasts outperform the forecasts of management teams for the majority of the products. In contrast, management is superior in forecasting top sellers. This is due to unobserved factors arising from more management attention attached towards super stars. The authors do not find substantial prediction differences between simple success factor regressions and more complex diffusion models. Thus, managers interested in total sales estimates can easily rely on OLS based success factor predictions. Advertising and product differentiation factors with respect to quality (e.g., star power, critics, or country of origin) are across all 3 industries highly relevant for sales predictions, whereas others variables (e.g., price, distribution power, season, or competition) differ across industries.
- 3 July 2017
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of Media Economics
- Vol. 30 (3) , 143-171
Sales Forecasting of New Entertainment Media Products
Managers predict the sales of new entertainment products prior to their release using comparables, such as similar books from the same author or movies with the same actors. In this study, the authors analyze whether diffusion models for media products provide helpful support in the management task of predicting prelaunch sales of the first distribution channel for three different product categories. They compare the performance of predictions based on (a) simple success factor regressions (OLS) and (b) diffusion models against real management predictions. Based on samples covering the German music, film, and the literary market, we show that model-based forecasts outperform the forecasts of management teams for the majority of the products. In contrast, management is superior in forecasting top sellers. This is due to unobserved factors arising from more management attention attached towards super stars. The authors do not find substantial prediction differences between simple success factor regressions and more complex diffusion models. Thus, managers interested in total sales estimates can easily rely on OLS based success factor predictions. Advertising and product differentiation factors with respect to quality (e.g., star power, critics, or country of origin) are across all 3 industries highly relevant for sales predictions, whereas others variables (e.g., price, distribution power, season, or competition) differ across industries.
- Open Access
- 1 January 2014
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Strategic Incomplete Contracts: Theory and Experiments
We develop a model of strategic contractual incompleteness that identifies conditions under which principals might omit even costlessly verifiable terms. We then use experiments to test comparative statics predictions of the model. While it is well known that verifiability imperfections can limit complete contracting, researchers know less about how the degree of imperfection affects endogenous incompleteness, particularly with repeat trading.In our baseline treatment with perfect verifiability, subjects overwhelmingly used complete contracts to conduct trades, achieving nearly first best outcomes. In our partial verifiability treatment with a reduced set of verifiable performance levels, the results reversed and parties relied heavily on incomplete contracts that omitted even costlessly verifiable terms. However, the efficacy of incomplete contracts in outperforming available complete contracts depends critically on the continuation probability of repeat trading. With a small continuation probability, incomplete contracts did no better than complete contracts while exposing parties to considerable strategic uncertainty.
- 1 January 2014
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessStrategic Incomplete Contracts: Theory and Experiments
We develop a model of strategic contractual incompleteness that identifies conditions under which principals might omit even costlessly verifiable terms. We then use experiments to test comparative statics predictions of the model. While it is well known that verifiability imperfections can limit complete contracting, researchers know less about how the degree of imperfection affects endogenous incompleteness, particularly with repeat trading.In our baseline treatment with perfect verifiability, subjects overwhelmingly used complete contracts to conduct trades, achieving nearly first best outcomes. In our partial verifiability treatment with a reduced set of verifiable performance levels, the results reversed and parties relied heavily on incomplete contracts that omitted even costlessly verifiable terms. However, the efficacy of incomplete contracts in outperforming available complete contracts depends critically on the continuation probability of repeat trading. With a small continuation probability, incomplete contracts did no better than complete contracts while exposing parties to considerable strategic uncertainty.
- Open Access
- 1 January 2012
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Testing Canonical Tournament Theory: On the Impact of Risk, Social Preferences and Utility Structure
We use experiments to test comparative statics predictions of canonical tournament theory. Both the roles of principal and agent are populated by human subjects, allowing us to test predictions for both incentive responses and optimal tournament design. Consistent with theory, we observed an incentive effect from raising the winner's prize. However, we also observed several empirical puzzles that appeared to contradict theory. Controlling for social preferences did not resolve the puzzles, although social preferences do influence behavior. It turns out that the puzzles can be explained by the canonical model once the textbook assumption of separable agent utility is relaxed.
- 1 January 2012
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessTesting Canonical Tournament Theory: On the Impact of Risk, Social Preferences and Utility Structure
We use experiments to test comparative statics predictions of canonical tournament theory. Both the roles of principal and agent are populated by human subjects, allowing us to test predictions for both incentive responses and optimal tournament design. Consistent with theory, we observed an incentive effect from raising the winner's prize. However, we also observed several empirical puzzles that appeared to contradict theory. Controlling for social preferences did not resolve the puzzles, although social preferences do influence behavior. It turns out that the puzzles can be explained by the canonical model once the textbook assumption of separable agent utility is relaxed.