The Pareto-dominant strategy-proof and fair rule for problems with indivisible goods
- 8 October 2010
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Springer Nature in Economic Theory
- Vol. 50 (2) , 463-488
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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