Onur Kesten
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Onur Kesten has a total of 14 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- M. Utku Unver
Department of Economics, Boston College, Boston, Massachusetts, USA
3 shared publications - Alexander S. Nesterov
WZB, Berlin, Germany
1 shared publication - Ayşe Yazıcı
Department of Economics, University of Rochester, Rochester, USA
1 shared publication - Daisuke Hirata
Department of Economics, Harvard University
1 shared publication - Huseyin Yildirim
Duke University
1 shared publication - Morimitsu Kurino
Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 24 April 2019
- Published by Springer Nature in Review of Economic Design
- Vol. 23 (1-2) , 1-2
Letter from the editors
- 24 April 2019
- Published by Springer Nature in Review of Economic Design
- Vol. 23 (1-2) , 1-2
Letter from the editors
- 5 June 2018
- Published by Springer Nature in Economic Theory
- Vol. 68 (2) , 251-283
Sequential versus simultaneous assignment systems and two applications
- 5 June 2018
- Published by Springer Nature in Economic Theory
- Vol. 68 (2) , 251-283
Sequential versus simultaneous assignment systems and two applications
- 14 June 2016
- Published by Springer Nature in Social Choice and Welfare
- Vol. 48 (1) , 31-57
Efficient lottery design
- 14 June 2016
- Published by Springer Nature in Social Choice and Welfare
- Vol. 48 (1) , 31-57
Efficient lottery design
- 1 April 2016
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Interfaces
- Vol. 46 (2) , 133-153
The Pennsylvania Adoption Exchange Improves Its Matching Process
The Pennsylvania Adoption Exchange (PAE) helps caseworkers who represent children in Pennsylvania’s child welfare system by recommending prospective families for adoption. We describe PAE’s operational challenges using caseworker surveys, and analyze child outcomes through a regression analysis of data collected over multiple years. A match recommendation spreadsheet tool implemented by PAE incorporates insights from this analysis and allows PAE managers to better utilize available information. Using a discrete-event simulation of PAE, we justify the value of a statewide adoption network, and demonstrate the importance of generating better information about family preferences for increasing the percentage of children who are successfully adopted. Finally, we detail a series of simple improvements that PAE achieved by collecting more valuable information and aligning incentives for families to provide useful preference information.
- 1 April 2016
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Interfaces
- Vol. 46 (2) , 133-153
The Pennsylvania Adoption Exchange Improves Its Matching Process
The Pennsylvania Adoption Exchange (PAE) helps caseworkers who represent children in Pennsylvania’s child welfare system by recommending prospective families for adoption. We describe PAE’s operational challenges using caseworker surveys, and analyze child outcomes through a regression analysis of data collected over multiple years. A match recommendation spreadsheet tool implemented by PAE incorporates insights from this analysis and allows PAE managers to better utilize available information. Using a discrete-event simulation of PAE, we justify the value of a statewide adoption network, and demonstrate the importance of generating better information about family preferences for increasing the percentage of children who are successfully adopted. Finally, we detail a series of simple improvements that PAE achieved by collecting more valuable information and aligning incentives for families to provide useful preference information.
- Open Access
- 1 May 2015
- Published by The Econometric Society in Theoretical Economics
- Vol. 10 (2) , 543-595
A theory of school-choice lotteries
A new mechanism was introduced in New York City and Boston to assign students to public schools. This mechanism was advocated for its superior fairness property, besides others. We introduce a new framework for school-choice problems and two notions of fairness in lottery design based on ex-ante stability. This framework unifies known many-to-one and one-sided matching models. We show that the NYC/Boston mechanism fails to satisfy these fairness properties. We then propose two new mechanisms, one that is ordinally Pareto-dominant within the class of strongly ex-ante stable mechanisms and one that satisfies ex-ante stability, equal treatment, and constrained ordinal-Pareto-efficiency
- 1 May 2015
- Published by The Econometric Society in Theoretical Economics
- Vol. 10 (2) , 543-595
Open AccessA theory of school-choice lotteries
A new mechanism was introduced in New York City and Boston to assign students to public schools. This mechanism was advocated for its superior fairness property, besides others. We introduce a new framework for school-choice problems and two notions of fairness in lottery design based on ex-ante stability. This framework unifies known many-to-one and one-sided matching models. We show that the NYC/Boston mechanism fails to satisfy these fairness properties. We then propose two new mechanisms, one that is ordinally Pareto-dominant within the class of strongly ex-ante stable mechanisms and one that satisfies ex-ante stability, equal treatment, and constrained ordinal-Pareto-efficiency
- 8 April 2015
- Published by Springer Nature in International Journal of Game Theory
- Vol. 45 (3) , 655-674
An equilibrium analysis of the probabilistic serial mechanism
- 8 April 2015
- Published by Springer Nature in International Journal of Game Theory
- Vol. 45 (3) , 655-674
An equilibrium analysis of the probabilistic serial mechanism
- Open Access
- 1 January 2014
- Published by The Econometric Society in Theoretical Economics
- Vol. 9 (1) , 253-277
Two axiomatic approaches to the probabilistic serial mechanism
This paper studies the problem of assigning a set of indivisible objects to a set of agents when monetary transfers are not allowed and agents reveal only ordinal preferences, but random assignments are possible. We offer two characterizations of the probabilistic serial mechanism, which assigns lotteries over objects. We show that it is the only mechanism satisfying non-wastefulness and ordinal fairness and the only mechanism satisfying sd-efficiency, sd-envy-freeness, and weak invariance or weak truncation robustness (where \u201csd\u201d stands for first-order stochastic dominance)
- 1 January 2014
- Published by The Econometric Society in Theoretical Economics
- Vol. 9 (1) , 253-277
Open AccessTwo axiomatic approaches to the probabilistic serial mechanism
This paper studies the problem of assigning a set of indivisible objects to a set of agents when monetary transfers are not allowed and agents reveal only ordinal preferences, but random assignments are possible. We offer two characterizations of the probabilistic serial mechanism, which assigns lotteries over objects. We show that it is the only mechanism satisfying non-wastefulness and ordinal fairness and the only mechanism satisfying sd-efficiency, sd-envy-freeness, and weak invariance or weak truncation robustness (where \u201csd\u201d stands for first-order stochastic dominance)
- 25 July 2012
- Published by Wiley in International Economic Review
- Vol. 53 (3) , 1027-1046
MATCHING MARKETS WITH MIXED OWNERSHIP: THE CASE FOR A REAL‐LIFE ASSIGNMENT MECHANISM*
We consider a common indivisible good allocation problem whose popular applications include on‐campus housing, kidney exchange, and school choice. We show that the so‐called New House 4 (NH4) mechanism, which has been in use at MIT since the 1980s, is equivalent to a natural adaptation of the well‐known Gale–Shapley (GS) mechanism. We run two experiments comparing NH4 with the prominently advocated Top Trading Cycles (TTC) mechanism and NH4 with GS. We find that under NH4, the participation rate is significantly higher than under TTC. Based on a new ordinal test of efficiency, NH4 is more likely to Pareto dominate TTC.
- 25 July 2012
- Published by Wiley in International Economic Review
- Vol. 53 (3) , 1027-1046
MATCHING MARKETS WITH MIXED OWNERSHIP: THE CASE FOR A REAL‐LIFE ASSIGNMENT MECHANISM*
We consider a common indivisible good allocation problem whose popular applications include on‐campus housing, kidney exchange, and school choice. We show that the so‐called New House 4 (NH4) mechanism, which has been in use at MIT since the 1980s, is equivalent to a natural adaptation of the well‐known Gale–Shapley (GS) mechanism. We run two experiments comparing NH4 with the prominently advocated Top Trading Cycles (TTC) mechanism and NH4 with GS. We find that under NH4, the participation rate is significantly higher than under TTC. Based on a new ordinal test of efficiency, NH4 is more likely to Pareto dominate TTC.
- 2 April 2011
- Published by Springer Nature in Economic Theory
- Vol. 51 (3) , 677-693
On two kinds of manipulation for school choice problems
- 2 April 2011
- Published by Springer Nature in Economic Theory
- Vol. 51 (3) , 677-693
On two kinds of manipulation for school choice problems
- 8 October 2010
- Published by Springer Nature in Economic Theory
- Vol. 50 (2) , 463-488
The Pareto-dominant strategy-proof and fair rule for problems with indivisible goods
- 8 October 2010
- Published by Springer Nature in Economic Theory
- Vol. 50 (2) , 463-488
The Pareto-dominant strategy-proof and fair rule for problems with indivisible goods