Rank, Social Group Identity, and Punishment in a Public Goods Game: Preliminary Results
Preprint
- 2 January 2011
- preprint
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Abstract
This paper investigates whether an individual’s identity as a member of a social group and relative position in that group affects willingness to punish free-riKeywords
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