Katherine Silz Carson
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Katherine Silz Carson has a total of 17 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- W. George. Hutchinson
Queen’s University
4 shared publications Anthony C. Burton
Ministry of Social Development , New Zealand
3 shared publicationsSusan M. Chilton
Newcastle University Business School – Economics
3 shared publications- Susan M. Chilton
University of Newcastle upon Tyne Business School–Economics Ridley Building , Queen Victoria Road, Newcastle upon Tyne, UK, NE1 7RU, UK
2 shared publications C. Lucy Malakar
Department of Economics, Lorain County Community College, Elyria, OH, USA
1 shared publicationCraig Heinicke
Department of Economics, Robins School of Business, University of Richmond, Richmond, VA, USA
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 17 June 2021
- Published by Taylor & Francis in The Journal of Economic Education
- Vol. 52 (3) , 241-248
Challenges and lessons: Design and implementation of a multi-site evaluation of team-based learning
The authors of this article describe the design and implementation of a multi-site randomized controlled trial of team-based learning (TBL) application exercises (AE) in introductory economics courses that use TBL. For each of the four study modules that are common across sites, a site is assigned to either the treatment or control version of the module. This design enables the use of a fixed effects model to estimate the effect of treatment on student learning and control for student characteristics. The methodology demonstrates how to extract the benefits of multi-site randomized controlled designs using a minimum of resources. The authors also discuss the challenges and the lessons learned in this study.
- 17 June 2021
- Published by Taylor & Francis in The Journal of Economic Education
- Vol. 52 (3) , 241-248
Challenges and lessons: Design and implementation of a multi-site evaluation of team-based learning
The authors of this article describe the design and implementation of a multi-site randomized controlled trial of team-based learning (TBL) application exercises (AE) in introductory economics courses that use TBL. For each of the four study modules that are common across sites, a site is assigned to either the treatment or control version of the module. This design enables the use of a fixed effects model to estimate the effect of treatment on student learning and control for student characteristics. The methodology demonstrates how to extract the benefits of multi-site randomized controlled designs using a minimum of resources. The authors also discuss the challenges and the lessons learned in this study.
- 17 October 2019
- Published by Springer Nature in Public Choice
- Vol. 185 (1-2) , 1-19
Public resource allocation, strategic behavior, and status quo bias in choice experiments
- 17 October 2019
- Published by Springer Nature in Public Choice
- Vol. 185 (1-2) , 1-19
Public resource allocation, strategic behavior, and status quo bias in choice experiments
- 28 February 2013
- Published by Edward Elgar Publishing
Incentive compatible mechanisms for providing environmental public goods
- 28 February 2013
- Published by Edward Elgar Publishing
Incentive compatible mechanisms for providing environmental public goods
- Open Access
- 2 January 2011
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Rank, Social Group Identity, and Punishment in a Public Goods Game: Preliminary Results
This paper investigates whether an individual’s identity as a member of a social group and relative position in that group affects willingness to punish free-ri
- 2 January 2011
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessRank, Social Group Identity, and Punishment in a Public Goods Game: Preliminary Results
This paper investigates whether an individual’s identity as a member of a social group and relative position in that group affects willingness to punish free-ri
- 28 December 2010
- Published by Edward Elgar Publishing
Formative Assessment in Economics Courses
- 1 December 2009
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Applied Economics
- Vol. 41 (27) , 3561-3569
Why do people non-demand reveal in hypothetical double referenda for public goods?
Hypothetical contingent valuation surveys used to elicit values for environmental and other public goods often employ variants of the referendum mechanism due to the cognitive simplicity and familiarity of respondents with this voting format. One variant, the double referendum mechanism, requires respondents to state twice how they would vote for a given policy proposal given their cost of the good. Data from these surveys often exhibit anomalies inconsistent with standard economic models of consumer preferences. There are a number of published explanations for these anomalies, mostly focusing on problems with the second vote. This article investigates which aspects of the hypothetical task affect the degree of nondemand revelation and takes an individual-based approach to identifying people most likely to non-demand reveal. A clear profile emerges from our model of a person who faces a negative surplus i.e. a net loss in the second vote and invokes non self-interested, non financial motivations during the decision process.
- 1 December 2009
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Applied Economics
- Vol. 41 (27) , 3561-3569
Why do people non-demand reveal in hypothetical double referenda for public goods?
Hypothetical contingent valuation surveys used to elicit values for environmental and other public goods often employ variants of the referendum mechanism due to the cognitive simplicity and familiarity of respondents with this voting format. One variant, the double referendum mechanism, requires respondents to state twice how they would vote for a given policy proposal given their cost of the good. Data from these surveys often exhibit anomalies inconsistent with standard economic models of consumer preferences. There are a number of published explanations for these anomalies, mostly focusing on problems with the second vote. This article investigates which aspects of the hypothetical task affect the degree of nondemand revelation and takes an individual-based approach to identifying people most likely to non-demand reveal. A clear profile emerges from our model of a person who faces a negative surplus i.e. a net loss in the second vote and invokes non self-interested, non financial motivations during the decision process.
- 1 March 2009
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Environmental Economics and Management
- Vol. 57 (2) , 219-225
Necessary conditions for demand revelation in double referenda
- 1 March 2009
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Environmental Economics and Management
- Vol. 57 (2) , 219-225
Necessary conditions for demand revelation in double referenda
- 12 April 2007
- Published by Springer Nature in Environmental and Resource Economics
- Vol. 38 (4) , 513-525
Resolving questions about bias in real and hypothetical referenda
- 12 April 2007
- Published by Springer Nature in Environmental and Resource Economics
- Vol. 38 (4) , 513-525
Resolving questions about bias in real and hypothetical referenda
- 30 November 2003
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Environmental Economics and Management
- Vol. 46 (3) , 472-489
An experimental investigation of explanations for inconsistencies in responses to second offers in double referenda
- 30 November 2003
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Environmental Economics and Management
- Vol. 46 (3) , 472-489
An experimental investigation of explanations for inconsistencies in responses to second offers in double referenda