Costly sanctions and the treatment of frequent violators in regulatory settings
Authors:
- Jay P. ShimshackJSJay P. Shimshack
- Michael B. WardMWMichael B. Ward
- 30 September 2022
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Environmental Economics and Management
- Vol. 116
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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