Efficient Prior-Free Mechanisms for No-Regret Agents
Open Access
- 8 July 2024
- conference paper
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 511-541
Abstract
No abstract availableAll Related Versions
Funding Information
- NSF (National Science Foundation) (FAI-2147212, CCF-2217062)
This publication has 36 references indexed in Scilit:
- Learning Approximately Optimal Contracts2022
- Combinatorial Contracts2022
- Smooth calibration, leaky forecasts, finite recall, and Nash dynamicsGames and Economic Behavior, 2018
- Lower bounds on individual sequence regretMachine Learning, 2015
- Commitment Without Regrets2015
- Adaptive contract design for crowdsourcing markets2014
- Regret minimization and the price of total anarchy2008
- Deterministic calibration and Nash equilibriumJournal of Computer and System Sciences, 2008
- Regret in the On-Line Decision ProblemGames and Economic Behavior, 1999
- Asymptotic calibrationBiometrika, 1998