On the least square prenucleolus for games with externalities
Open Access
- 22 May 2024
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Springer Nature in Optimization Letters
- Vol. 19 (2) , 347-365
Abstract
In this paper we address the problem of determining the least square prenucleolus for games with externalities. Specifically, this solution is based on the minimization of the variance of the excess vectors that can be associated to any allocation vector over the set of all embedded coalitions using a least square criterion. From a theoretical point of view, an axiomatization of this solution is provided. Besides, we analyse its relations with other proposals of solution in the game-theoretical literature.Keywords
Funding Information
- Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovación (PID2021-124030NB-C33, PID2021- 124030NB-C32)
- Xunta de Galicia (ED431C-2020/03, ED431C 2021/24)
- Universidade de Vigo
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