María Gloria Fiestras-Janeiro
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
María Gloria Fiestras-Janeiro has a total of 21 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Ignacio García-Jurado
Universidade da Coruña
9 shared publications - Manuel A. Mosquera
Universidade de Vigo
9 shared publications - Jose Maria Alonso-Meijide
MODESTYA Research Group, Department of Statistics, Mathematical Analysis and Optimisation, Faculty of Sciences, University of Santiago de Compostela, Lugo, Spain
8 shared publications - Ana Meca
I. U. Centro de Investigación Operativa, Universidad Miguel Hernández de Elche, Elche, Spain
6 shared publications - Andres Jimenez-Losada
Department of Applied Mathematics II, University of Seville, Seville, Spain
5 shared publications - Balbina Casas-Méndez
University of Santiago de Compostela
4 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 23 October 2026
- Published by Elsevier in Socio-Economic Planning Sciences
- Vol. 107
A contemporary approach on revisited cost allocation using airport games: The effects of code-sharing
- 23 October 2026
- Published by Elsevier in Socio-Economic Planning Sciences
- Vol. 107
Open AccessA contemporary approach on revisited cost allocation using airport games: The effects of code-sharing
- Open Access
- 25 July 2024
- Published by Wiley in International Transactions in Operational Research
- Vol. 32 (3) , 1620-1640
Sequencing situations with position‐dependent effects under cooperation
This paper innovatively addresses the effect of cooperation on sequencing situations with position‐dependent effects. Specifically, we ensure the convexity of the associated sequencing games under the fulfillment of certain conditions related to the neighbor switching gains. Additionally, we propose two families of allocation rules based on sharing the neighbor switching gains under two distinct procedures, each providing a path from the initial order to an optimal order. From a theoretical point of view, an axiomatization of both families of allocations is provided, and their stability is also ensured under the conditions related to convexity.
- 25 July 2024
- Published by Wiley in International Transactions in Operational Research
- Vol. 32 (3) , 1620-1640
Open AccessSequencing situations with position‐dependent effects under cooperation
This paper innovatively addresses the effect of cooperation on sequencing situations with position‐dependent effects. Specifically, we ensure the convexity of the associated sequencing games under the fulfillment of certain conditions related to the neighbor switching gains. Additionally, we propose two families of allocation rules based on sharing the neighbor switching gains under two distinct procedures, each providing a path from the initial order to an optimal order. From a theoretical point of view, an axiomatization of both families of allocations is provided, and their stability is also ensured under the conditions related to convexity.
- Open Access
- 22 May 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Optimization Letters
- Vol. 19 (2) , 347-365
On the least square prenucleolus for games with externalities
In this paper we address the problem of determining the least square prenucleolus for games with externalities. Specifically, this solution is based on the minimization of the variance of the excess vectors that can be associated to any allocation vector over the set of all embedded coalitions using a least square criterion. From a theoretical point of view, an axiomatization of this solution is provided. Besides, we analyse its relations with other proposals of solution in the game-theoretical literature.
- 22 May 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Optimization Letters
- Vol. 19 (2) , 347-365
Open AccessOn the least square prenucleolus for games with externalities
In this paper we address the problem of determining the least square prenucleolus for games with externalities. Specifically, this solution is based on the minimization of the variance of the excess vectors that can be associated to any allocation vector over the set of all embedded coalitions using a least square criterion. From a theoretical point of view, an axiomatization of this solution is provided. Besides, we analyse its relations with other proposals of solution in the game-theoretical literature.
- Open Access
- 3 April 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Economic Theory
- Vol. 79 (1) , 181-199
Two families of values for global cooperative games
A global (cooperative) game describes the utility that the whole set of players generates depending on the coalition structure they form. These games were introduced by Gilboa and Lehrer (Int J Game Theory 20:129–147, 1991) who proposed and characterized a generalization of the Shapley value. We introduce two families of point valued solutions that contain the Gilboa–Lehrer value. We characterize each family by means of reasonable properties, which are related to the ones used by Gilboa and Lehrer.
- 3 April 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Economic Theory
- Vol. 79 (1) , 181-199
Open AccessTwo families of values for global cooperative games
A global (cooperative) game describes the utility that the whole set of players generates depending on the coalition structure they form. These games were introduced by Gilboa and Lehrer (Int J Game Theory 20:129–147, 1991) who proposed and characterized a generalization of the Shapley value. We introduce two families of point valued solutions that contain the Gilboa–Lehrer value. We characterize each family by means of reasonable properties, which are related to the ones used by Gilboa and Lehrer.
- Open Access
Evaluating the impact of items and cooperation in inventory models with exemptable ordering costs
In this paper we introduce and analyse, from a game theoretical perspective, several multi-agent or multi-item continuous review inventory models in which the buyers are exempted from ordering costs if the price of their orders is greater than or equal to a certain amount. For all models we obtain the optimal ordering policy. We first analyse a simple model with one firm and one item. Then, we study a model with one firm and several items, for which we design a procedure based on cooperative game theory to evaluate the impact of each item on the total cost. Then, we deal with a model with several firms and one item for each firm, for which we characterise a rule to allocate the total cost among the firms in a coalitionally stable way. Finally, we discuss a model with several firms and several items, for which we characterise a rule to allocate the total cost among the firms in a coalitionally stable way and to evaluate the impact of each item on the cost that would be payable to each firm when using the allocation rule. All the concepts and results of this article are illustrated using data from a case study.
Open AccessEvaluating the impact of items and cooperation in inventory models with exemptable ordering costs
In this paper we introduce and analyse, from a game theoretical perspective, several multi-agent or multi-item continuous review inventory models in which the buyers are exempted from ordering costs if the price of their orders is greater than or equal to a certain amount. For all models we obtain the optimal ordering policy. We first analyse a simple model with one firm and one item. Then, we study a model with one firm and several items, for which we design a procedure based on cooperative game theory to evaluate the impact of each item on the total cost. Then, we deal with a model with several firms and one item for each firm, for which we characterise a rule to allocate the total cost among the firms in a coalitionally stable way. Finally, we discuss a model with several firms and several items, for which we characterise a rule to allocate the total cost among the firms in a coalitionally stable way and to evaluate the impact of each item on the cost that would be payable to each firm when using the allocation rule. All the concepts and results of this article are illustrated using data from a case study.
- Open Access
On benefits of cooperation under strategic power
We introduce a new model involving TU-games and exogenous structures. Specifically, we consider that each player in a population can choose an element in a strategy set and that, for every possible strategy profile, a TU-game is associated with the population. This is what we call a TU-game with strategies. We propose and characterize the maxmin procedure to map every game with strategies to a TU-game. We also study whether or not the relevant properties of TU-games are transmitted by applying the maxmin procedure. Finally, we examine two relevant classes of TU-games with strategies: airport and simple games with strategies.
Open AccessOn benefits of cooperation under strategic power
We introduce a new model involving TU-games and exogenous structures. Specifically, we consider that each player in a population can choose an element in a strategy set and that, for every possible strategy profile, a TU-game is associated with the population. This is what we call a TU-game with strategies. We propose and characterize the maxmin procedure to map every game with strategies to a TU-game. We also study whether or not the relevant properties of TU-games are transmitted by applying the maxmin procedure. Finally, we examine two relevant classes of TU-games with strategies: airport and simple games with strategies.
- Open Access
- 9 January 2024
- Published by Elsevier in International Journal of Production Economics
- Vol. 269
Evaluating the impact of items and cooperation in inventory models with exemptable ordering costs
- 9 January 2024
- Published by Elsevier in International Journal of Production Economics
- Vol. 269
Open AccessEvaluating the impact of items and cooperation in inventory models with exemptable ordering costs
- Open Access
- 7 August 2021
- Published by Springer Nature in Mathematical Methods of Operations Research
- Vol. 94 (1) , 99-121
Marginality and convexity in partition function form games
In this paper an order on the set of embedded coalitions is studied in detail. This allows us to define new notions of superaddivity and convexity of games in partition function form which are compared to other proposals in the literature. The main results are two characterizations of convexity. The first one uses non-decreasing contributions to coalitions of increasing size and can thus be considered parallel to the classic result for cooperative games without externalities. The second one is based on the standard convexity of associated games without externalities that we define using a partition of the player set. Using the later result, we can conclude that some of the generalizations of the Shapley value to games in partition function form lie within the cores of specific classic games when the original game is convex.
- 7 August 2021
- Published by Springer Nature in Mathematical Methods of Operations Research
- Vol. 94 (1) , 99-121
Open AccessMarginality and convexity in partition function form games
In this paper an order on the set of embedded coalitions is studied in detail. This allows us to define new notions of superaddivity and convexity of games in partition function form which are compared to other proposals in the literature. The main results are two characterizations of convexity. The first one uses non-decreasing contributions to coalitions of increasing size and can thus be considered parallel to the classic result for cooperative games without externalities. The second one is based on the standard convexity of associated games without externalities that we define using a partition of the player set. Using the later result, we can conclude that some of the generalizations of the Shapley value to games in partition function form lie within the cores of specific classic games when the original game is convex.
- 4 June 2021
- Published by Springer Nature in Economic Theory
- Vol. 74 (1) , 265-292
On convexity in cooperative games with externalities
- 4 June 2021
- Published by Springer Nature in Economic Theory
- Vol. 74 (1) , 265-292
On convexity in cooperative games with externalities
- 7 May 2020
- Published by Springer Nature in Annals of Operations Research
- Vol. 301 (1-2) , 199-223
Sampling methods to estimate the Banzhaf–Owen value
- 7 May 2020
- Published by Springer Nature in Annals of Operations Research
- Vol. 301 (1-2) , 199-223
Sampling methods to estimate the Banzhaf–Owen value