A non-causalist account of the explanatory autonomy in the psychological sciences
Authors:
Open Access
- 27 August 2024
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Springer Nature in Synthese
- Vol. 204 (3) , 1-27
Abstract
It has been often claimed that physicalism challenges the explanatory autonomy of psychological sciences. Most who advocate for such explanatory autonomy and do not want to renounce to physicalism, presuppose a causalist account of explanatoriness and try to demonstrate that, adequately construed, (causal) psychological explanations are compatible with (some sufficient version of) physicalism. In Sect. 1 we summarize the different theses and assumptions involved in the seeming conflict between explanatory autonomy and physicalism. In Sect. 2 we review the main attempts to make them compatible assuming a causalist account of explanation and argue that none succeeds. In Sect. 3 we introduce a recent, non-causalist account of scientific explanation as ampliative, specialized embedding (ASE) that has been successfully applied to other fields. In Sect. 4 we apply ASE to elucidate two paradigmatic cognitive explanations of psychological phenomena: déjà vu and action production. We conclude that ASE elucidates well the autonomy of the cognitive explanations of these phenomena independently of what finally happens with the causal exclusion problem and that it may be generalized to other psychological explanations.Keywords
Funding Information
- Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovación (PID2020-115114GB-I00, CEX2021-001169-M, PID2021-127046NA-I00)
- Universitat de Barcelona
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