We need to explain subjective experience, but its explanation may not be mechanistic
Open Access
- 9 May 2026
- journal article
- Vol. 2026 (1)
Abstract
Models of consciousness need to explain both the objective correlates of conscious experience as well as its subjective structure. However, such an explanation would not need to entail a reduction exclusively in terms of physical or neural systems. A model that intends to avoid such reduction is integrated information theory (IIT). In this article, we discuss the explanatory rationale of IIT, its potential inconsistencies and its consequences for the neuroscience of consciousness more broadly. In particular, we identify ambiguities regarding the directionality of the explanation, i.e. important tensions between IIT’s purported ontological and epistemological primacy of experience, and its explanatory aim of accounting for consciousness in physical, operational terms. Across the text, we propose several ways to avoid these issues and eventually complement, enhance or replace the model. The main goal is to motivate clarification among IIT-proponents and inform IIT-opponents on accurate points of contention, without thereby misrepresenting the model. In our final section, we introduce alternative explanatory paths: mathematical, processual, and autonomy-based types of explanations. These novel and sound explanatory strategies may better inspire the next generation of models of consciousness.Keywords
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