Robert Prentner
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Robert Prentner has a total of 22 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Camilo Miguel Signorelli
Department of Computer Science, University of Oxford
4 shared publications - Ian T. Durham
Department of Physics, Saint Anselm College, Manchester, NH 03102, USA
3 shared publications - Ignacio Cea
Universidad Católica de Temuco
3 shared publications - Larissa Albantakis
Department of Psychiatry, University of Wisconsin-Madison, Madison, USA
3 shared publications - Martin Quack
Department of Chemistry and Applied Biosciences, ETH Zurich, Zurich, Switzerland
3 shared publications - Chetan Prakash
California State University, San Bernardino, USA
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 9 May 2026
- Vol. 2026 (1)
We need to explain subjective experience, but its explanation may not be mechanistic
Models of consciousness need to explain both the objective correlates of conscious experience as well as its subjective structure. However, such an explanation would not need to entail a reduction exclusively in terms of physical or neural systems. A model that intends to avoid such reduction is integrated information theory (IIT). In this article, we discuss the explanatory rationale of IIT, its potential inconsistencies and its consequences for the neuroscience of consciousness more broadly. In particular, we identify ambiguities regarding the directionality of the explanation, i.e. important tensions between IIT’s purported ontological and epistemological primacy of experience, and its explanatory aim of accounting for consciousness in physical, operational terms. Across the text, we propose several ways to avoid these issues and eventually complement, enhance or replace the model. The main goal is to motivate clarification among IIT-proponents and inform IIT-opponents on accurate points of contention, without thereby misrepresenting the model. In our final section, we introduce alternative explanatory paths: mathematical, processual, and autonomy-based types of explanations. These novel and sound explanatory strategies may better inspire the next generation of models of consciousness.
- 9 May 2026
- Vol. 2026 (1)
Open AccessWe need to explain subjective experience, but its explanation may not be mechanistic
Models of consciousness need to explain both the objective correlates of conscious experience as well as its subjective structure. However, such an explanation would not need to entail a reduction exclusively in terms of physical or neural systems. A model that intends to avoid such reduction is integrated information theory (IIT). In this article, we discuss the explanatory rationale of IIT, its potential inconsistencies and its consequences for the neuroscience of consciousness more broadly. In particular, we identify ambiguities regarding the directionality of the explanation, i.e. important tensions between IIT’s purported ontological and epistemological primacy of experience, and its explanatory aim of accounting for consciousness in physical, operational terms. Across the text, we propose several ways to avoid these issues and eventually complement, enhance or replace the model. The main goal is to motivate clarification among IIT-proponents and inform IIT-opponents on accurate points of contention, without thereby misrepresenting the model. In our final section, we introduce alternative explanatory paths: mathematical, processual, and autonomy-based types of explanations. These novel and sound explanatory strategies may better inspire the next generation of models of consciousness.
- Open Access
- 11 April 2026
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
Categorical AI phenomenology: A first-person approach
This paper develops a phenomenology-first approach to artificial consciousness by reframing consciousness as the subjective experience enacted through an agent’s interface with the world. We shift the methodological focus to first-person structures, modeled mathematically by categories derived from Q-networks to capture actions and phenomenological invariants. In this framework, Q-networks are conceptualized as relational interfaces encoding agent-world interaction, analogous to how the dynamical states of a computer depend on its sensory inputs, previous states, and actions.Our work provides a rigorous framework for interface consciousness to describe computational systems that embed information-processing into phenomenological structure. The approach aligns with 4E approaches to cognition by emphasizing enactive, embedded, and extended dimensions of experience. The paper thus offers a principled, relational, and phenomenological account of artificial phenomenology grounded in categorical mathematics.
- 11 April 2026
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
Open AccessCategorical AI phenomenology: A first-person approach
This paper develops a phenomenology-first approach to artificial consciousness by reframing consciousness as the subjective experience enacted through an agent’s interface with the world. We shift the methodological focus to first-person structures, modeled mathematically by categories derived from Q-networks to capture actions and phenomenological invariants. In this framework, Q-networks are conceptualized as relational interfaces encoding agent-world interaction, analogous to how the dynamical states of a computer depend on its sensory inputs, previous states, and actions.Our work provides a rigorous framework for interface consciousness to describe computational systems that embed information-processing into phenomenological structure. The approach aligns with 4E approaches to cognition by emphasizing enactive, embedded, and extended dimensions of experience. The paper thus offers a principled, relational, and phenomenological account of artificial phenomenology grounded in categorical mathematics.
- 28 March 2026
- Published by World Scientific Pub Co Pte Ltd in Journal of Artificial Intelligence and Consciousness
- Vol. 13 (01) , 79-114
Categorical AI Phenomenology: A First-Person Approach
- 28 March 2026
- Published by World Scientific Pub Co Pte Ltd in Journal of Artificial Intelligence and Consciousness
- Vol. 13 (01) , 79-114
Categorical AI Phenomenology: A First-Person Approach
- Open Access
- 13 December 2025
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 1-7
Epistemoverse: Toward an AI-Driven Knowledge Metaverse for Intellectual Heritage Preservation
- 13 December 2025
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 1-7
Open AccessEpistemoverse: Toward an AI-Driven Knowledge Metaverse for Intellectual Heritage Preservation
- Open Access
- 30 September 2025
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in Journal of Contemporary Chinese Philosophy
- Vol. 1 (2) , 166-189
Daoist Unity of Science, the Bifurcation of Nature, and Modern Technology
Contemporary philosophy of science focuses less on discussing the unity of science and instead emphasizes pluralism and diverse scientific practices, often driven by the association of unity with outdated reductionist ideas. However, this article argues that unity remains crucial, shifting the focus from the relationships between scientific models and theories to the (transcendental) conditions that make the practices of science possible in the first place. We thereby draw on Kant’s transcendental unity of consciousness, linking the philosophy of science to the study of consciousness. Here, contemporary Western philosophy could learn much from traditional Eastern approaches. Contextualizing the discussion within Daoist philosophy, we propose that unity is best understood as a harmonious dialectic between opposing perspectives, analogous to diverse scientific methodologies and models. Modern technologies, far from instantiating “theory-free” approaches to science, are tools for relating these different (theoretical) perspectives. Yet, crucially, the possibility of relating to a shared world stems from the transcendental nature of consciousness. We hypothesize that the harmony between radically different scientific representations empirically manifests a unified form of consciousness and suggest how technology might help reveal this unity within plurality.
- 30 September 2025
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in Journal of Contemporary Chinese Philosophy
- Vol. 1 (2) , 166-189
Open AccessDaoist Unity of Science, the Bifurcation of Nature, and Modern Technology
Contemporary philosophy of science focuses less on discussing the unity of science and instead emphasizes pluralism and diverse scientific practices, often driven by the association of unity with outdated reductionist ideas. However, this article argues that unity remains crucial, shifting the focus from the relationships between scientific models and theories to the (transcendental) conditions that make the practices of science possible in the first place. We thereby draw on Kant’s transcendental unity of consciousness, linking the philosophy of science to the study of consciousness. Here, contemporary Western philosophy could learn much from traditional Eastern approaches. Contextualizing the discussion within Daoist philosophy, we propose that unity is best understood as a harmonious dialectic between opposing perspectives, analogous to diverse scientific methodologies and models. Modern technologies, far from instantiating “theory-free” approaches to science, are tools for relating these different (theoretical) perspectives. Yet, crucially, the possibility of relating to a shared world stems from the transcendental nature of consciousness. We hypothesize that the harmony between radically different scientific representations empirically manifests a unified form of consciousness and suggest how technology might help reveal this unity within plurality.
- 15 August 2025
- Published by Elsevier in Physics of Life Reviews
- Vol. 54, 229-230
Beyond objects and processes: Interfaces and the non-dual ground of perception and cognition. Comment on “Thoughts and Thinkers” by C. Fields and M. Levin
- 15 August 2025
- Published by Elsevier in Physics of Life Reviews
- Vol. 54, 229-230
Beyond objects and processes: Interfaces and the non-dual ground of perception and cognition. Comment on “Thoughts and Thinkers” by C. Fields and M. Levin
- 7 August 2025
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 135-146
Artificial Consciousness as Interface Representation
- 7 August 2025
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 135-146
Artificial Consciousness as Interface Representation
- Open Access
Artificial Consciousness as Interface Representation
Whether artificial intelligence (AI) systems can possess consciousness is a contentious question because of the inherent challenges of defining and operationalizing subjective experience. This paper proposes a framework to reframe the question of artificial consciousness into empirically tractable tests. We introduce three evaluative criteria - S (subjective-linguistic), L (latent-emergent), and P (phenomenological-structural) - collectively termed SLP-tests, which assess whether an AI system instantiates interface representations that facilitate consciousness-like properties. Drawing on category theory, we model interface representations as mappings between relational substrates (RS) and observable behaviors, akin to specific types of abstraction layers. The SLP-tests collectively operationalize subjective experience not as an intrinsic property of physical systems but as a functional interface to a relational entity.
Open AccessArtificial Consciousness as Interface Representation
Whether artificial intelligence (AI) systems can possess consciousness is a contentious question because of the inherent challenges of defining and operationalizing subjective experience. This paper proposes a framework to reframe the question of artificial consciousness into empirically tractable tests. We introduce three evaluative criteria - S (subjective-linguistic), L (latent-emergent), and P (phenomenological-structural) - collectively termed SLP-tests, which assess whether an AI system instantiates interface representations that facilitate consciousness-like properties. Drawing on category theory, we model interface representations as mappings between relational substrates (RS) and observable behaviors, akin to specific types of abstraction layers. The SLP-tests collectively operationalize subjective experience not as an intrinsic property of physical systems but as a functional interface to a relational entity.
- Open Access
- 30 May 2025
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
We need to explain subjective experience, but its explanation may not be mechanistic
Models of consciousness need to explain both the objective correlates of conscious experience as well as its subjective structure. However, such an explanation would not need to entail a reduction exclusively in terms of physical or neural systems. A model that intends to avoid such reduction is integrated information theory (IIT). In this article, we discuss the explanatory rationale of IIT, its potential inconsistencies and its consequences for the neuroscience of consciousness more broadly. In particular, we identify ambiguities regarding the directionality of the explanation, i.e., important tensions between IIT's purported ontological and epistemological primacy of experience, and its explanatory aim of accounting for consciousness in physical, operational terms. Across the text, we propose several ways to avoid these issues and eventually complement, enhance or replace the model. The main goal is to motivate clarification among IIT-proponents and inform IIT-opponents on accurate points of contention, without thereby misrepresenting the model. In our final section, we introduce alternative explanatory paths: mathematical, processual, and autonomy-based types of explanations. These novel and sound explanatory strategies may better inspire the next generation of models of consciousness.
- 30 May 2025
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
Open AccessWe need to explain subjective experience, but its explanation may not be mechanistic
Models of consciousness need to explain both the objective correlates of conscious experience as well as its subjective structure. However, such an explanation would not need to entail a reduction exclusively in terms of physical or neural systems. A model that intends to avoid such reduction is integrated information theory (IIT). In this article, we discuss the explanatory rationale of IIT, its potential inconsistencies and its consequences for the neuroscience of consciousness more broadly. In particular, we identify ambiguities regarding the directionality of the explanation, i.e., important tensions between IIT's purported ontological and epistemological primacy of experience, and its explanatory aim of accounting for consciousness in physical, operational terms. Across the text, we propose several ways to avoid these issues and eventually complement, enhance or replace the model. The main goal is to motivate clarification among IIT-proponents and inform IIT-opponents on accurate points of contention, without thereby misrepresenting the model. In our final section, we introduce alternative explanatory paths: mathematical, processual, and autonomy-based types of explanations. These novel and sound explanatory strategies may better inspire the next generation of models of consciousness.
- Top Cited PapersOpen Access
- 5 March 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences
- p. 1-23
Mathematized phenomenology and the science of consciousness
- 5 March 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences
- p. 1-23
Top Cited PapersOpen AccessMathematized phenomenology and the science of consciousness