Bargaining over communal endowments after prior interaction: experimental evidence
Authors:
- 4 June 2025
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Springer Nature in Economic Theory
- Vol. 81 (1-2) , 577-624
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
Funding Information
- Economic and Social Research Council (ES/K002201/1)
- Economic and Social Research Council (ES/P008976/1)
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