DYNAMIC PRICE DISCRIMINATION WITH ASYMMETRIC FIRMS*
Author:
- 22 December 2008
- journal article
- Published by Wiley in The Journal of Industrial Economics
- Vol. 56 (4) , 729-751
Abstract
This paper considers variants of a dynamic duopoly model where one firm has a stronger market position than its competitor. Consumers' past purchases may reveal their different valuations for the two firms' products. Price discrimination based on purchase histories tends to benefit consumers if it does not cause the weaker firm to exit; otherwise it can harm consumers. The effect of price discrimination also depends on firms' cost differences, market competitiveness, and consumers' time horizon. The stronger firm may price below cost in the presence of consumer switching costs, with the purpose and effect of eliminating competition.Keywords
This publication has 13 references indexed in Scilit:
- Marketing InnovationJournal of Economics & Management Strategy, 2006
- Supplier Surfing: Competition and Consumer Behavior in Subscription MarketsThe RAND Journal of Economics, 2003
- Customer Poaching and Brand SwitchingThe RAND Journal of Economics, 2000
- Dynamic Competition with Customer RecognitionThe RAND Journal of Economics, 1999
- Third-Degree Price Discrimination in Oligopoly: All-Out Competition and Strategic CommitmentThe RAND Journal of Economics, 1998
- Paying Customers to SwitchJournal of Economics & Management Strategy, 1997
- Paying Customers to SwitchJournal of Economics & Management Strategy, 1997
- Dynamic Competition with Switching CostsThe RAND Journal of Economics, 1988
- The Competitiveness of Markets with Switching CostsThe RAND Journal of Economics, 1987
- Entry Deterrence in Markets with Consumer Switching CostsThe Economic Journal, 1987