Private‐information group contests with complementarities
Authors:
- 1 July 2021
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Public Economic Theory
- Vol. 23 (5) , 772-800
Abstract
We model competing groups when players' values for winning are private information, the effort complementarity is uncertain at the time efforts are exerted, and the group with the best performance wins the contest. We analyze the effects of increasing the number of team members and the anticipated complementarity of efforts. We find that the effort underprovision brought about by a larger group membership is especially severe if the complementarity is high. More generally, higher complementarity may exacerbate rather than alleviate the underprovision of effort. Members of groups that are otherwise symmetric—and only differ with respect to the anticipated complementarity of efforts—use the same equilibrium strategy. And, when groups differ only in size, members of the smaller group act more aggressively, but the smaller or larger group may be more likely to win.Keywords
This publication has 38 references indexed in Scilit:
- Voluntary public good provision with private information using order statisticsEconomics Letters, 2017
- Private-information group contests: Best-shot competitionGames and Economic Behavior, 2016
- Equilibrium existence in group contestsEconomic Theory Bulletin, 2015
- The best-shot all-pay (group) auction with complete informationEconomic Theory, 2014
- Group efforts when performance is determined by the “best shot”Economic Theory, 2013
- Contests with group-specific public-good prizesSocial Choice and Welfare, 2007
- Bidding for a group-specific public-good prizeJournal of Public Economics, 2001
- The all-pay auction with complete informationEconomic Theory, 1996
- Asymmetric All-Pay Auctions with Incomplete Information: The Two-Player CaseGames and Economic Behavior, 1996
- Effort levels in contestsEconomics Letters, 1993