Iryna Topolyan
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Iryna Topolyan has a total of 14 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Stefano Barbieri
Department of Economics Tulane University New Orleans Louisiana USA
2 shared publications- Subhasish M. Chowdhury
University of Bath - Department of Economics
2 shared publications Xu Xu
Trustmark National Bank, MS, USA
2 shared publications- Charalambos D. Aliprantis
Department of Economics, Purdue University, West Lafayette, USA
1 shared publication Dan Kovenock
1 shared publicationDavid A. Malueg
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 1 January 2025
- Published by American Institute of Mathematical Sciences (AIMS) in Journal of Dynamics and Games
- Vol. 12 (3) , 302-325
A generalization of the backward induction method in aligned games
We show that the well-known backward induction method generalizes to a broad class of sequential games and could be applied to find the entire set of perfect Bayesian equilibria and sequential equilibria. This is a class of games whose information sets appear in a clear chronological order. The computation of locally optimal strategies and the preconsistency check are performed stage-by-stage along the game tree. The full consistency check for computing sequential equilibria needs to be applied only to the perfect Bayesian equilibria at the end, thus reducing the computational work significantly. We fully characterize the class of games in which the generalized backward induction algorithm alone, without further full consistency check, yields the entire set of sequential equilibria.
- 1 January 2025
- Published by American Institute of Mathematical Sciences (AIMS) in Journal of Dynamics and Games
- Vol. 12 (3) , 302-325
A generalization of the backward induction method in aligned games
We show that the well-known backward induction method generalizes to a broad class of sequential games and could be applied to find the entire set of perfect Bayesian equilibria and sequential equilibria. This is a class of games whose information sets appear in a clear chronological order. The computation of locally optimal strategies and the preconsistency check are performed stage-by-stage along the game tree. The full consistency check for computing sequential equilibria needs to be applied only to the perfect Bayesian equilibria at the end, thus reducing the computational work significantly. We fully characterize the class of games in which the generalized backward induction algorithm alone, without further full consistency check, yields the entire set of sequential equilibria.
- 14 November 2023
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Public Economic Theory
- Vol. 25 (6) , 1229-1250
First‐best health policy in vaccine markets with health and network externalities
This paper considers an oligopolistic market for a vaccine, characterized by negative network effects, which stem from the free‐riding behavior of individuals engaged in a vaccination game. Vaccine markets often suffer from three imperfections: high concentration, network effects, and a health externality (contagion). The first conclusion of the paper is that the negative network externality is important as a market distortion, as it may lead to significant welfare losses. The second and main part of the paper develops a two‐part per‐unit subsidy scheme that a social planner could use to target both consumers and producers of vaccines. The scope of such a subsidy scheme to induce the firms to produce the first‐best output without network effects (which is the most ambitious first‐best target) is investigated. In many cases, while the first‐best is attainable, it requires negative prices for vaccines, which amounts to rewarding consumers to induce them to vaccinate.
- 14 November 2023
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Public Economic Theory
- Vol. 25 (6) , 1229-1250
First‐best health policy in vaccine markets with health and network externalities
This paper considers an oligopolistic market for a vaccine, characterized by negative network effects, which stem from the free‐riding behavior of individuals engaged in a vaccination game. Vaccine markets often suffer from three imperfections: high concentration, network effects, and a health externality (contagion). The first conclusion of the paper is that the negative network externality is important as a market distortion, as it may lead to significant welfare losses. The second and main part of the paper develops a two‐part per‐unit subsidy scheme that a social planner could use to target both consumers and producers of vaccines. The scope of such a subsidy scheme to induce the firms to produce the first‐best output without network effects (which is the most ambitious first‐best target) is investigated. In many cases, while the first‐best is attainable, it requires negative prices for vaccines, which amounts to rewarding consumers to induce them to vaccinate.
- Open Access
- 1 January 2023
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in IZA Journal of Labor Economics
- Vol. 12 (1)
Pareto Gains from Limiting Compensation Options
We examine the effects of a single payment structure policy (SPP) that prevents an employer from offering an employee a choice among compensation structures. An SPP reduces the employer's profit and increases the employee's welfare when the employee's (privately known) ability is exogenous. In contrast, an SPP can increase both the employer's profit and the employee's welfare when the employee's ability is endogenous. An SPP secures these Pareto gains by restricting the employer's ability to limit the rent the employee earns from high ability, thereby inducing the employee to increase his human capital investment.
- 1 January 2023
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in IZA Journal of Labor Economics
- Vol. 12 (1)
Open AccessPareto Gains from Limiting Compensation Options
We examine the effects of a single payment structure policy (SPP) that prevents an employer from offering an employee a choice among compensation structures. An SPP reduces the employer's profit and increases the employee's welfare when the employee's (privately known) ability is exogenous. In contrast, an SPP can increase both the employer's profit and the employee's welfare when the employee's ability is endogenous. An SPP secures these Pareto gains by restricting the employer's ability to limit the rent the employee earns from high ability, thereby inducing the employee to increase his human capital investment.
- 1 July 2021
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Public Economic Theory
- Vol. 23 (5) , 772-800
Private‐information group contests with complementarities
We model competing groups when players' values for winning are private information, the effort complementarity is uncertain at the time efforts are exerted, and the group with the best performance wins the contest. We analyze the effects of increasing the number of team members and the anticipated complementarity of efforts. We find that the effort underprovision brought about by a larger group membership is especially severe if the complementarity is high. More generally, higher complementarity may exacerbate rather than alleviate the underprovision of effort. Members of groups that are otherwise symmetric—and only differ with respect to the anticipated complementarity of efforts—use the same equilibrium strategy. And, when groups differ only in size, members of the smaller group act more aggressively, but the smaller or larger group may be more likely to win.
- 1 July 2021
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Public Economic Theory
- Vol. 23 (5) , 772-800
Private‐information group contests with complementarities
We model competing groups when players' values for winning are private information, the effort complementarity is uncertain at the time efforts are exerted, and the group with the best performance wins the contest. We analyze the effects of increasing the number of team members and the anticipated complementarity of efforts. We find that the effort underprovision brought about by a larger group membership is especially severe if the complementarity is high. More generally, higher complementarity may exacerbate rather than alleviate the underprovision of effort. Members of groups that are otherwise symmetric—and only differ with respect to the anticipated complementarity of efforts—use the same equilibrium strategy. And, when groups differ only in size, members of the smaller group act more aggressively, but the smaller or larger group may be more likely to win.
- 1 November 2019
- Published by Elsevier in Games and Economic Behavior
- Vol. 118, 382-411
Group contests with private information and the “Weakest Link”
- 1 November 2019
- Published by Elsevier in Games and Economic Behavior
- Vol. 118, 382-411
Group contests with private information and the “Weakest Link”
- 4 May 2019
- Published by Springer Nature in Dynamic Games and Applications
- Vol. 10 (1) , 183-201
On Common Belief in Future Rationality in Games with Ambiguous Orderings of Information Sets
- 4 May 2019
- Published by Springer Nature in Dynamic Games and Applications
- Vol. 10 (1) , 183-201
On Common Belief in Future Rationality in Games with Ambiguous Orderings of Information Sets
- 5 December 2018
- Published by SAGE Publications in Journal of Interdisciplinary Economics
- Vol. 31 (2) , 143-164
Beliefs about the Benefits of Breastfeeding: Formation and Effects on Breastfeeding Intention and Persistence
Using data from the Infant Feeding Practices Survey (IFPS) II, we investigate whether women’s beliefs about the benefits of breastfeeding significantly affect breastfeeding intention and breastfeeding persistence. We uncover factors that affect women’s beliefs about the benefits of breastfeeding. Our model allows for the endogenous belief formation and could be extended to study a wide range of situations, including beliefs about the benefits of exercise, organic versus conventional food consumption and so on. We find that beliefs have a highly statistically significant effect on breastfeeding intention and the likelihood of breastfeeding at the third and sixth month, which suggests the potential usefulness of educational campaigns aimed at raising breastfeeding awareness. Beliefs are indeed endogenous in the model of breastfeeding intention but not of breastfeeding persistence. JEL: D13, I10, I18, J13
- 5 December 2018
- Published by SAGE Publications in Journal of Interdisciplinary Economics
- Vol. 31 (2) , 143-164
Beliefs about the Benefits of Breastfeeding: Formation and Effects on Breastfeeding Intention and Persistence
Using data from the Infant Feeding Practices Survey (IFPS) II, we investigate whether women’s beliefs about the benefits of breastfeeding significantly affect breastfeeding intention and breastfeeding persistence. We uncover factors that affect women’s beliefs about the benefits of breastfeeding. Our model allows for the endogenous belief formation and could be extended to study a wide range of situations, including beliefs about the benefits of exercise, organic versus conventional food consumption and so on. We find that beliefs have a highly statistically significant effect on breastfeeding intention and the likelihood of breastfeeding at the third and sixth month, which suggests the potential usefulness of educational campaigns aimed at raising breastfeeding awareness. Beliefs are indeed endogenous in the model of breastfeeding intention but not of breastfeeding persistence. JEL: D13, I10, I18, J13
- 7 October 2016
- Published by Springer Nature in Social Choice and Welfare
- Vol. 47 (4) , 959-971
Best-shot versus weakest-link in political lobbying: an application of group all-pay auction
- 7 October 2016
- Published by Springer Nature in Social Choice and Welfare
- Vol. 47 (4) , 959-971
Best-shot versus weakest-link in political lobbying: an application of group all-pay auction
- 21 September 2016
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Applied Economics
- Vol. 49 (23) , 2216-2225
Differential effects of mother’s and child’s postnatal WIC participation on breastfeeding
We evaluate the effect of postnatal participation in the Women, Infants, and Children (WIC) programme on breastfeeding decisions using the data from the IFPS II. We find that the infant’s WIC participation positively affects the hazard of discontinuing breastfeeding, both partial and exclusive (and is thus associated with abbreviated breastfeeding duration). No significant association is found between the mother’s participation and the hazards of stopping exclusive or partial breastfeeding. Such differential effects might be a result of the programme’s policy, according to which the infant, but not the mother needs to be enrolled to receive free formula.
- 21 September 2016
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Applied Economics
- Vol. 49 (23) , 2216-2225
Differential effects of mother’s and child’s postnatal WIC participation on breastfeeding
We evaluate the effect of postnatal participation in the Women, Infants, and Children (WIC) programme on breastfeeding decisions using the data from the IFPS II. We find that the infant’s WIC participation positively affects the hazard of discontinuing breastfeeding, both partial and exclusive (and is thus associated with abbreviated breastfeeding duration). No significant association is found between the mother’s participation and the hazards of stopping exclusive or partial breastfeeding. Such differential effects might be a result of the programme’s policy, according to which the infant, but not the mother needs to be enrolled to receive free formula.
- 9 February 2016
- Published by Wiley in Southern Economic Journal
- Vol. 83 (1) , 105-125
The Max-Min Group Contest: Weakest-link (Group) All-Pay Auction
- 9 February 2016
- Published by Wiley in Southern Economic Journal
- Vol. 83 (1) , 105-125
The Max-Min Group Contest: Weakest-link (Group) All-Pay Auction