Counterfactuals and downward causation: a reply to Zhong
- 1 June 2012
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Analysis
- Vol. 72 (3) , 513-517
Abstract
Lei Zhong (2012. Counterfactuals, regularity and the autonomy approach. Analysis 72: 75–85) argues that non-reductive physicalists cannot establish the autonomy of mental causation by adopting a counterfactual theory of causation since such a theory supports a so-called downward causation argument which rules out mental-to-mental causation. We respond that non-reductive physicalists can consistently resist Zhong's downward causation argument as it equivocates between two familiar notions of a physical realizer.Keywords
This publication has 2 references indexed in Scilit:
- Counterfactuals, regularity and the autonomy approachAnalysis, 2011
- Some Varieties of FunctionalismPhilosophical Topics, 1981