Jesper Kallestrup
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Jesper Kallestrup has a total of 17 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Duncan Pritchard
Department of Philosophy, University of Stirling, Stirling, FK9 4LA, UK
2 shared publications - Duncan Pritchard
University of California, Irvine, USA
2 shared publications - Chris Ranalli
The University of Edinburgh
1 shared publication Gary Ebbs
1 shared publicationGila Sher
1 shared publicationIgor Douven
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 12 March 2019
- Published by Wiley in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
- Vol. 101 (1) , 150-174
The Epistemology of Testimonal Trust
According to a strong assurance view of testimonial trust, a speaker's assurance thatpgrounds a reason for the hearer to believep. While the strong view offers a genuinely inter‐personal account of testimony, it faces a problem about bootstrapping: how can trust generate epistemic reasons when trust can obtain between unreliable speakers and hearers? In contrast, a weaker assurance view holds that a speaker's assurance thatpgrounds a reason for the hearer to believeponly if the speaker is reliable. While the weaker view offers an epistemic account of testimony, it faces a problem about redundancy: how can trust play any epistemic role when the speaker's reliability seems to pre‐empt any contribution that trust may make towards such epistemic reason? This paper argues that neither horn of this dilemma is convincing once proponents of assurance views avail themselves of an epistemic distinction between reasons of rationality as a guide to reasonable belief and reasons of justification as a guide to true belief. Whereas testimonial assurance grounds rational reasons, which need not make probable the beliefs they make reasonable, testimonial reliability grounds justificatory reasons, which need not make reasonable the beliefs they make probable.
- 12 March 2019
- Published by Wiley in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
- Vol. 101 (1) , 150-174
The Epistemology of Testimonal Trust
According to a strong assurance view of testimonial trust, a speaker's assurance thatpgrounds a reason for the hearer to believep. While the strong view offers a genuinely inter‐personal account of testimony, it faces a problem about bootstrapping: how can trust generate epistemic reasons when trust can obtain between unreliable speakers and hearers? In contrast, a weaker assurance view holds that a speaker's assurance thatpgrounds a reason for the hearer to believeponly if the speaker is reliable. While the weaker view offers an epistemic account of testimony, it faces a problem about redundancy: how can trust play any epistemic role when the speaker's reliability seems to pre‐empt any contribution that trust may make towards such epistemic reason? This paper argues that neither horn of this dilemma is convincing once proponents of assurance views avail themselves of an epistemic distinction between reasons of rationality as a guide to reasonable belief and reasons of justification as a guide to true belief. Whereas testimonial assurance grounds rational reasons, which need not make probable the beliefs they make reasonable, testimonial reliability grounds justificatory reasons, which need not make reasonable the beliefs they make probable.
- 1 February 2016
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
- p. 31-50
Dispositional Robust Virtue Epistemology versus Anti-luck Virtue Epistemology
The previous chapter offers a distinctive virtue-theoretic account of knowledge, which the chapter describes as dispositional robust virtue epistemology. It is argued that this view is ultimately untenable because it cannot accommodate what we refer to as the epistemic dependence of knowledge. This point is motivated by employing what we call an epistemic Twin Earth argument, and also by appealing to some familiar claims in the epistemology of testimony. In addition, it is claimed that there is an alternative proposal available, which we refer to as anti-luck virtue epistemology, that can accommodate epistemic dependence and which can thus offer a more satisfactory account of knowledge.
- 1 February 2016
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
- p. 31-50
Dispositional Robust Virtue Epistemology versus Anti-luck Virtue Epistemology
The previous chapter offers a distinctive virtue-theoretic account of knowledge, which the chapter describes as dispositional robust virtue epistemology. It is argued that this view is ultimately untenable because it cannot accommodate what we refer to as the epistemic dependence of knowledge. This point is motivated by employing what we call an epistemic Twin Earth argument, and also by appealing to some familiar claims in the epistemology of testimony. In addition, it is claimed that there is an alternative proposal available, which we refer to as anti-luck virtue epistemology, that can accommodate epistemic dependence and which can thus offer a more satisfactory account of knowledge.
- 31 December 2015
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP)
The Brain in a Vat
The scenario of the brain in a vat, first aired thirty-five years ago in Hilary Putnam's classic paper, has been deeply influential in philosophy of mind and language, epistemology, and metaphysics. This collection of new essays examines the scenario and its philosophical ramifications and applications, as well as the challenges which it has faced. The essays review historical applications of the brain-in-a-vat scenario and consider its impact on contemporary debates. They explore a diverse range of philosophical issues, from intentionality, external-world scepticism, and the nature of truth, to the extended mind hypothesis, reference magnetism, and new versions of realism. The volume will be a rich and valuable resource for advanced students in metaphysics, epistemology, and philosophy of mind and language, as well as anyone interested in the relations between language, thought and the world.
- 31 December 2015
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP)
The Brain in a Vat
The scenario of the brain in a vat, first aired thirty-five years ago in Hilary Putnam's classic paper, has been deeply influential in philosophy of mind and language, epistemology, and metaphysics. This collection of new essays examines the scenario and its philosophical ramifications and applications, as well as the challenges which it has faced. The essays review historical applications of the brain-in-a-vat scenario and consider its impact on contemporary debates. They explore a diverse range of philosophical issues, from intentionality, external-world scepticism, and the nature of truth, to the extended mind hypothesis, reference magnetism, and new versions of realism. The volume will be a rich and valuable resource for advanced students in metaphysics, epistemology, and philosophy of mind and language, as well as anyone interested in the relations between language, thought and the world.
- 17 March 2015
- Published by Springer Nature in Review of Philosophy and Psychology
- Vol. 7 (1) , 35-54
Counteractuals, Counterfactuals and Semantic Intuitions
- 17 March 2015
- Published by Springer Nature in Review of Philosophy and Psychology
- Vol. 7 (1) , 35-54
Counteractuals, Counterfactuals and Semantic Intuitions
- 18 September 2013
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Analysis
- Vol. 73 (4) , 809-811
Scepticism and Reliable Belief * By JOSE ZALABARDO
- 18 September 2013
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Analysis
- Vol. 73 (4) , 809-811
Scepticism and Reliable Belief * By JOSE ZALABARDO
- 18 June 2013
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Inquiry
- Vol. 58 (5) , 486-512
Two Notions of Circularity
Crispin Wright’s epistemic response to McKinsey’s paradox is to argue that introspective knowledge of the first premise fails to transmit across the semantic externalist entailment in the second premise to the conclusion that one has such untoward knowledge of the external world. This paper argues first that Stewart Cohen and Jonathan Vogel’s bootstrapping arguments suffer from a novel kind of epistemic circularity, which triggers failure of transmission but allows for the possibility of basic perceptual knowledge. It is then argued that McKinsey’s paradox falls out as a special case of this template for transmission failure. The circularity in play is semantic: the paradox illicitly imports semantically relevant properties of knowledge-individuating sources into the contents of the knowledge states that those sources individuate by instantiating those properties. Importantly, this diagnosis permits the possibility of basic introspective knowledge as propounded by Tyler Burge and other semantic externalists.
- 18 June 2013
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Inquiry
- Vol. 58 (5) , 486-512
Two Notions of Circularity
Crispin Wright’s epistemic response to McKinsey’s paradox is to argue that introspective knowledge of the first premise fails to transmit across the semantic externalist entailment in the second premise to the conclusion that one has such untoward knowledge of the external world. This paper argues first that Stewart Cohen and Jonathan Vogel’s bootstrapping arguments suffer from a novel kind of epistemic circularity, which triggers failure of transmission but allows for the possibility of basic perceptual knowledge. It is then argued that McKinsey’s paradox falls out as a special case of this template for transmission failure. The circularity in play is semantic: the paradox illicitly imports semantically relevant properties of knowledge-individuating sources into the contents of the knowledge states that those sources individuate by instantiating those properties. Importantly, this diagnosis permits the possibility of basic introspective knowledge as propounded by Tyler Burge and other semantic externalists.
- 19 March 2013
- Published by Springer Nature in Synthese
- Vol. 190 (13) , 2573-2593
The epistemology of absence-based inference
- 19 March 2013
- Published by Springer Nature in Synthese
- Vol. 190 (13) , 2573-2593
The epistemology of absence-based inference
- 1 June 2012
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Analysis
- Vol. 72 (3) , 513-517
Counterfactuals and downward causation: a reply to Zhong
Lei Zhong (2012. Counterfactuals, regularity and the autonomy approach. Analysis 72: 75–85) argues that non-reductive physicalists cannot establish the autonomy of mental causation by adopting a counterfactual theory of causation since such a theory supports a so-called downward causation argument which rules out mental-to-mental causation. We respond that non-reductive physicalists can consistently resist Zhong's downward causation argument as it equivocates between two familiar notions of a physical realizer.
- 1 June 2012
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Analysis
- Vol. 72 (3) , 513-517
Counterfactuals and downward causation: a reply to Zhong
Lei Zhong (2012. Counterfactuals, regularity and the autonomy approach. Analysis 72: 75–85) argues that non-reductive physicalists cannot establish the autonomy of mental causation by adopting a counterfactual theory of causation since such a theory supports a so-called downward causation argument which rules out mental-to-mental causation. We respond that non-reductive physicalists can consistently resist Zhong's downward causation argument as it equivocates between two familiar notions of a physical realizer.
- 1 January 2012
- Published by Verein philosophie.ch in Dialectica
- Vol. 66 (1) , 5-21
Actually-Rigidified Descriptivism Revisited
- 1 January 2012
- Published by Verein philosophie.ch in Dialectica
- Vol. 66 (1) , 5-21
Actually-Rigidified Descriptivism Revisited
- 21 December 2011
- Published by Wiley in European Journal of Philosophy
- Vol. 22 (3) , 335-357
Virtue Epistemology and Epistemic Twin Earth
- 21 December 2011
- Published by Wiley in European Journal of Philosophy
- Vol. 22 (3) , 335-357
Virtue Epistemology and Epistemic Twin Earth