Abstract
Citizens express evaluative or critical trust in institutions when their trust results from assessing institutional performance against their own normative benchmarks. Yet empirical evidence on how such benchmarks shape evaluations is inconclusive. Three key limitations account for this ambiguity: prior research has focused on personal rather than injunctive norms, on consensual rather than contentious norms, and on prescriptive rather than descriptive norms. To address these gaps, we introduce and test a comprehensive model with three innovations. First, we conceptualize norms as preferences over normative trade-offs – choices between competing values – rather than as simple endorsements of universally supported principles. This approach better captures realistic moral reasoning while reducing ceiling effects. Second, we extend the focus beyond personal norms to incorporate perceived injunctive norms, thereby accounting for the broader normative environment in which citizens are embedded. Third, we theorize and test the effects of prescriptive norms (what individuals or groups believe politicians should do) and descriptive norms (what individuals perceive political elites actually do). This framework allows us to examine whether citizens benchmark their evaluations not only against the performance they desire but also against the performance they are used to observing. We test this model using a between-subjects vignette experiment embedded in a two-wave panel study with 13,462 respondents across eight European countries. Our results provide novel evidence in favor of the role of norms - especially personal norms – in the evaluative model of political trust.