The “Commitment Trap” Revisited: Experimental Evidence on Ambiguous Nuclear Threats
Authors:
Open Access
- 10 March 2023
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Journal of Experimental Political Science
- Vol. 11 (1) , 64-77
Abstract
In this paper, we provide an empirical test for the theoretical claim that ambiguous nuclear threats create a “commitment trap” for American leaders: when deterrence fails, supposedly they are more likely to order the use of nuclear weapons to avoid domestic audience costs for backing down. We designed an original survey experiment and fielded it to a sample of 1,000 U.S. citizens. We found no evidence of a commitment trap when ambiguous nuclear threats are made. Unlike explicit threats, ambiguous ones did not generate domestic disapproval when the leader backed down; the decision to employ nuclear weapons led to more public backlash for the leader than being caught bluffing; and the threats did not influence public preference for nuclear use across our scenarios. Our findings contribute to the scholarly literature on nuclear crisis bargaining and policy debates over the future of US declaratory policy.Keywords
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