Michal Smetana
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Michal Smetana has a total of 22 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Marek Vranka
Charles University
7 shared publicationsOndrej Rosendorf
Charles University
4 shared publications- Ondrej Rosendorf
Charles University
4 shared publications - Jan Ludvik
Charles University
3 shared publications - Marek Vranka
Charles University
3 shared publications Michal Onderco
Erasmus University Rotterdam
3 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 2 September 2026
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in APSA Preprints
Let’s Get Reel: The Limits of AI Video for Experimental International Relations
Generative AI tools promise to make IR survey experiments more immersive by delivering treatments through realistic videos. But would these novel designs offer real methodological gains over traditional text-based vignettes? To address this question, we conducted a preregistered experiment testing the relative effectiveness of four “communication modalities”: an AI-generated video, long text with AI-generated images, plain long text, and a short-text vignette. Contrary to our expectations, the AI-generated video did not elicit the strongest affective responses nor the largest shifts in policy preferences; its effects were statistically indistinguishable from plain long-form text and even marginally weaker than the text-with-images treatment. All three long-form modalities outperformed the short vignette across all measures except attentiveness. The findings suggest that we should be cautious about the promise of AI-generated videos for IR experiments, whereas designs combining engaging text-based descriptions with AI-generated images may offer a cost-effective alternative to the traditional short plain-text vignettes.
- 2 September 2026
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in APSA Preprints
Open AccessLet’s Get Reel: The Limits of AI Video for Experimental International Relations
Generative AI tools promise to make IR survey experiments more immersive by delivering treatments through realistic videos. But would these novel designs offer real methodological gains over traditional text-based vignettes? To address this question, we conducted a preregistered experiment testing the relative effectiveness of four “communication modalities”: an AI-generated video, long text with AI-generated images, plain long text, and a short-text vignette. Contrary to our expectations, the AI-generated video did not elicit the strongest affective responses nor the largest shifts in policy preferences; its effects were statistically indistinguishable from plain long-form text and even marginally weaker than the text-with-images treatment. All three long-form modalities outperformed the short vignette across all measures except attentiveness. The findings suggest that we should be cautious about the promise of AI-generated videos for IR experiments, whereas designs combining engaging text-based descriptions with AI-generated images may offer a cost-effective alternative to the traditional short plain-text vignettes.
- Open Access
- 1 April 2026
- Published by SAGE Publications in Research & Politics
- Vol. 13 (2)
Allied commitments and public support for military interventions: A cross-national experiment
Recent survey experiments have found that the public in NATO member states is more supportive of intervening militarily on behalf of formal allies than non-allies. However, we lack empirical evidence on whether this effect of alliance treaties generalizes to non-NATO and non-Western countries. To fill this gap, we conducted a preregistered cross-national survey experiment on population samples ( N = 7200) in two Western NATO countries (the United States and the United Kingdom) and four non-Western regional powers (Russia, China, India, and Brazil). The results of our experiment show that while allied commitments increase public support for military interventions globally, their effect is comparatively weaker in non-Western, non-NATO countries. Our findings contribute to the scholarly debates on the microfoundations of collective defense and the generalizability of IR experiments beyond the Western context.
- 1 April 2026
- Published by SAGE Publications in Research & Politics
- Vol. 13 (2)
Open AccessAllied commitments and public support for military interventions: A cross-national experiment
Recent survey experiments have found that the public in NATO member states is more supportive of intervening militarily on behalf of formal allies than non-allies. However, we lack empirical evidence on whether this effect of alliance treaties generalizes to non-NATO and non-Western countries. To fill this gap, we conducted a preregistered cross-national survey experiment on population samples ( N = 7200) in two Western NATO countries (the United States and the United Kingdom) and four non-Western regional powers (Russia, China, India, and Brazil). The results of our experiment show that while allied commitments increase public support for military interventions globally, their effect is comparatively weaker in non-Western, non-NATO countries. Our findings contribute to the scholarly debates on the microfoundations of collective defense and the generalizability of IR experiments beyond the Western context.
- Open Access
- 11 November 2025
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in European Journal of International Security
- Vol. 11 (4) , 707-727
Atomic responsiveness: How public opinion shapes elite beliefs and preferences on nuclear weapon use
A recent wave of survey experiments has advanced scholarly understanding of public attitudes towards the use of nuclear weapons. In this article, we address the central question: can public opinion influence decision-makers’ views on nuclear weapon use? We bridge this critical gap in the literature with a survey experiment conducted on samples of UK parliamentarians and US and UK government employees in official policy roles. We varied public support for nuclear strikes in realistic scenarios to examine participants’ responsiveness to public preferences when considering nuclear first use, nuclear retaliation, and third-party nuclear threats. We show that high public support notably increases willingness to endorse nuclear first use against non-nuclear adversaries. Furthermore, public backing shapes beliefs about national leaders’ willingness to order nuclear strikes. However, the effect of public opinion is weaker in nuclear retaliation contexts, suggesting that different considerations become prominent when the ‘nuclear taboo’ has been breached. Importantly, sympathetic public opinion strongly influences perceptions of the credibility of third-party nuclear threats, carrying implications for the practice of nuclear deterrence. Our findings highlight the role of public opinion as both an enabling and constraining force on nuclear use and provide new theoretical and empirical insights into elite decision-making in nuclear politics.
- 11 November 2025
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in European Journal of International Security
- Vol. 11 (4) , 707-727
Open AccessAtomic responsiveness: How public opinion shapes elite beliefs and preferences on nuclear weapon use
A recent wave of survey experiments has advanced scholarly understanding of public attitudes towards the use of nuclear weapons. In this article, we address the central question: can public opinion influence decision-makers’ views on nuclear weapon use? We bridge this critical gap in the literature with a survey experiment conducted on samples of UK parliamentarians and US and UK government employees in official policy roles. We varied public support for nuclear strikes in realistic scenarios to examine participants’ responsiveness to public preferences when considering nuclear first use, nuclear retaliation, and third-party nuclear threats. We show that high public support notably increases willingness to endorse nuclear first use against non-nuclear adversaries. Furthermore, public backing shapes beliefs about national leaders’ willingness to order nuclear strikes. However, the effect of public opinion is weaker in nuclear retaliation contexts, suggesting that different considerations become prominent when the ‘nuclear taboo’ has been breached. Importantly, sympathetic public opinion strongly influences perceptions of the credibility of third-party nuclear threats, carrying implications for the practice of nuclear deterrence. Our findings highlight the role of public opinion as both an enabling and constraining force on nuclear use and provide new theoretical and empirical insights into elite decision-making in nuclear politics.
- Open Access
- 13 July 2025
- Published by SAGE Publications in European Journal of International Relations
- Vol. 32 (1) , 30-58
Public support for arms control in the third nuclear age: cross-national survey and elite cues experiment in NATO countries
Scholars argue that the world has entered the “third nuclear age,” defined by profound technological change, destabilizing arms races among great powers, and the unraveling of existing arms control structures. In this paper, we introduce a new theory of the sources and strength of public attitudes toward nuclear arms control in this new era of global nuclear politics. We propose that, due to the complex and overly technicist nature of arms control practices, the public generally exhibits low levels of awareness and domain-specific knowledge. As a result, (1) the general public relies on simplified heuristic frames to build an internally consistent attitude toward individual arms control treaties, and (2) public opinion on arms control tends to be elastic and susceptible to “elite cues” from experts and politicians who build on these heuristic frames in their messaging to shape mass attitudes in this domain. We test our theoretical expectations empirically through two studies: a cross-national survey of public attitudes toward arms control in the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and Poland, and a follow-up survey experiment investigating the impact of elite cues on public opinion in the United States and the United Kingdom. Our findings contribute to the scholarly literature on public opinion on foreign policy and inform the current debates on the feasibility and desirability of strategic arms control in the third nuclear age.
- 13 July 2025
- Published by SAGE Publications in European Journal of International Relations
- Vol. 32 (1) , 30-58
Open AccessPublic support for arms control in the third nuclear age: cross-national survey and elite cues experiment in NATO countries
Scholars argue that the world has entered the “third nuclear age,” defined by profound technological change, destabilizing arms races among great powers, and the unraveling of existing arms control structures. In this paper, we introduce a new theory of the sources and strength of public attitudes toward nuclear arms control in this new era of global nuclear politics. We propose that, due to the complex and overly technicist nature of arms control practices, the public generally exhibits low levels of awareness and domain-specific knowledge. As a result, (1) the general public relies on simplified heuristic frames to build an internally consistent attitude toward individual arms control treaties, and (2) public opinion on arms control tends to be elastic and susceptible to “elite cues” from experts and politicians who build on these heuristic frames in their messaging to shape mass attitudes in this domain. We test our theoretical expectations empirically through two studies: a cross-national survey of public attitudes toward arms control in the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and Poland, and a follow-up survey experiment investigating the impact of elite cues on public opinion in the United States and the United Kingdom. Our findings contribute to the scholarly literature on public opinion on foreign policy and inform the current debates on the feasibility and desirability of strategic arms control in the third nuclear age.
- Top Cited PapersOpen Access
- 3 April 2025
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Journal of Global Security Studies
- Vol. 10 (3)
“Hope the Russians Love Their Children Too”: Russian Public Support for the Use of Nuclear Weapons after the Invasion of Ukraine
Following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, experts have expressed concerns that Moscow’s nuclear saber-rattling may have eroded the “nuclear taboo” and led to increased support for the use of nuclear weapons in Russian society. To investigate public attitudes toward nuclear use in Russia, we conducted a preregistered survey experiment on a representative sample of the Russian population. Our results show that despite significant shifts in the regional security environment, the Kremlin’s belligerent rhetoric, and calls for nuclear strikes from politicians, experts, and journalists, public support for using nuclear weapons against NATO has remained virtually unchanged post-invasion. We suggest that this remarkable stability of the “atomic aversion” may stem from two countervailing factors: normalization of the idea of nuclear use in Russian society and deterrence through heightened concerns about NATO’s retaliation. Our findings also demonstrate that Russian citizens disapprove of nuclear weapon use similarly in scenarios involving a conflict over Crimea with Ukraine and a Russia–NATO conflict in the Baltics. However, we observed a somewhat stronger public approval of a demonstrative nuclear explosion, a policy option recently proposed by Russian military experts. Our findings contribute to the scholarly literature on the strength of the nuclear nonuse norm in non-Western countries and to ongoing policy debates regarding domestic constraints on the Kremlin’s decision to use nuclear weapons to achieve foreign policy objectives.
- 3 April 2025
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Journal of Global Security Studies
- Vol. 10 (3)
Top Cited PapersOpen Access“Hope the Russians Love Their Children Too”: Russian Public Support for the Use of Nuclear Weapons after the Invasion of Ukraine
Following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, experts have expressed concerns that Moscow’s nuclear saber-rattling may have eroded the “nuclear taboo” and led to increased support for the use of nuclear weapons in Russian society. To investigate public attitudes toward nuclear use in Russia, we conducted a preregistered survey experiment on a representative sample of the Russian population. Our results show that despite significant shifts in the regional security environment, the Kremlin’s belligerent rhetoric, and calls for nuclear strikes from politicians, experts, and journalists, public support for using nuclear weapons against NATO has remained virtually unchanged post-invasion. We suggest that this remarkable stability of the “atomic aversion” may stem from two countervailing factors: normalization of the idea of nuclear use in Russian society and deterrence through heightened concerns about NATO’s retaliation. Our findings also demonstrate that Russian citizens disapprove of nuclear weapon use similarly in scenarios involving a conflict over Crimea with Ukraine and a Russia–NATO conflict in the Baltics. However, we observed a somewhat stronger public approval of a demonstrative nuclear explosion, a policy option recently proposed by Russian military experts. Our findings contribute to the scholarly literature on the strength of the nuclear nonuse norm in non-Western countries and to ongoing policy debates regarding domestic constraints on the Kremlin’s decision to use nuclear weapons to achieve foreign policy objectives.
- Open Access
- 24 October 2024
- Published by Taylor & Francis in East European Politics
- Vol. 41 (1) , 142-158
Elite-public gaps in attitudes towards Israel and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict: new evidence from a survey of Czech parliamentarians and citizens
- 24 October 2024
- Published by Taylor & Francis in East European Politics
- Vol. 41 (1) , 142-158
Open AccessElite-public gaps in attitudes towards Israel and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict: new evidence from a survey of Czech parliamentarians and citizens
- Open Access
- 1 July 2024
- Published by SAGE Publications in Research & Politics
- Vol. 11 (3)
Elite-public gaps in support for nuclear and chemical strikes: New evidence from a survey of British parliamentarians and citizens
In this research article, we provide empirical evidence for the hypothesis that there are substantial elite-public gaps in attitudes toward the military use of nuclear and chemical weapons. We designed and preregistered an original survey investigating support for nuclear and chemical strikes in a hypothetical scenario and fielded it to representative samples of British citizens and parliamentarians. Our results provide strong empirical support for the elite-public gap hypothesis, with the parliamentarians expressing a significantly stronger aversion to nuclear and chemical use than the public respondents. These findings contribute to contemporary scholarly debates on the nature and strength of nuclear and chemical weapon “taboos” in world politics.
- 1 July 2024
- Published by SAGE Publications in Research & Politics
- Vol. 11 (3)
Open AccessElite-public gaps in support for nuclear and chemical strikes: New evidence from a survey of British parliamentarians and citizens
In this research article, we provide empirical evidence for the hypothesis that there are substantial elite-public gaps in attitudes toward the military use of nuclear and chemical weapons. We designed and preregistered an original survey investigating support for nuclear and chemical strikes in a hypothetical scenario and fielded it to representative samples of British citizens and parliamentarians. Our results provide strong empirical support for the elite-public gap hypothesis, with the parliamentarians expressing a significantly stronger aversion to nuclear and chemical use than the public respondents. These findings contribute to contemporary scholarly debates on the nature and strength of nuclear and chemical weapon “taboos” in world politics.
- Open Access
- 19 February 2024
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Journal of Peace Research
- Vol. 62 (2) , 278-294
Microfoundations of domestic audience costs in nondemocratic regimes: Experimental evidence from Putin’s Russia
Do leaders in nondemocratic regimes face public backlash when they threaten to use military force and back down? Whether citizens disapprove of empty threats is central to studying the domestic ‘audience costs’ in international crisis bargaining, but there is little experimental evidence of this phenomenon from autocracies. In this research article, I present the results of an original survey experiment investigating the microfoundations of domestic audience costs in the Russian Federation. My findings showed that even in Putin’s Russia, the citizens expressed attitudes in line with the audience costs theory. However, I also demonstrate that the effect of audience costs treatments was significantly stronger for the opponents of the current Russian leadership than for the supporters. The results of this study represent an important contribution to the existing literature by providing micro-level empirical evidence from a personalist nondemocratic regime.
- 19 February 2024
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Journal of Peace Research
- Vol. 62 (2) , 278-294
Open AccessMicrofoundations of domestic audience costs in nondemocratic regimes: Experimental evidence from Putin’s Russia
Do leaders in nondemocratic regimes face public backlash when they threaten to use military force and back down? Whether citizens disapprove of empty threats is central to studying the domestic ‘audience costs’ in international crisis bargaining, but there is little experimental evidence of this phenomenon from autocracies. In this research article, I present the results of an original survey experiment investigating the microfoundations of domestic audience costs in the Russian Federation. My findings showed that even in Putin’s Russia, the citizens expressed attitudes in line with the audience costs theory. However, I also demonstrate that the effect of audience costs treatments was significantly stronger for the opponents of the current Russian leadership than for the supporters. The results of this study represent an important contribution to the existing literature by providing micro-level empirical evidence from a personalist nondemocratic regime.
- Open Access
- 10 March 2023
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Journal of Experimental Political Science
- Vol. 11 (1) , 64-77
The “Commitment Trap” Revisited: Experimental Evidence on Ambiguous Nuclear Threats
In this paper, we provide an empirical test for the theoretical claim that ambiguous nuclear threats create a “commitment trap” for American leaders: when deterrence fails, supposedly they are more likely to order the use of nuclear weapons to avoid domestic audience costs for backing down. We designed an original survey experiment and fielded it to a sample of 1,000 U.S. citizens. We found no evidence of a commitment trap when ambiguous nuclear threats are made. Unlike explicit threats, ambiguous ones did not generate domestic disapproval when the leader backed down; the decision to employ nuclear weapons led to more public backlash for the leader than being caught bluffing; and the threats did not influence public preference for nuclear use across our scenarios. Our findings contribute to the scholarly literature on nuclear crisis bargaining and policy debates over the future of US declaratory policy.
- 10 March 2023
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Journal of Experimental Political Science
- Vol. 11 (1) , 64-77
Open AccessThe “Commitment Trap” Revisited: Experimental Evidence on Ambiguous Nuclear Threats
In this paper, we provide an empirical test for the theoretical claim that ambiguous nuclear threats create a “commitment trap” for American leaders: when deterrence fails, supposedly they are more likely to order the use of nuclear weapons to avoid domestic audience costs for backing down. We designed an original survey experiment and fielded it to a sample of 1,000 U.S. citizens. We found no evidence of a commitment trap when ambiguous nuclear threats are made. Unlike explicit threats, ambiguous ones did not generate domestic disapproval when the leader backed down; the decision to employ nuclear weapons led to more public backlash for the leader than being caught bluffing; and the threats did not influence public preference for nuclear use across our scenarios. Our findings contribute to the scholarly literature on nuclear crisis bargaining and policy debates over the future of US declaratory policy.
- Top Cited PapersOpen Access
- 13 February 2023
- Published by Wiley in Global Policy
- Vol. 14 (2) , 305-317
Hawks in the making? European public views on nuclear weaponspost‐Ukraine
In the past, the European public has not been enthusiastic about nuclear deterrence and the stationing of US American nuclear weapons in Europe. Has the Russian invasion of Ukraine changed that aversion? We conducted a unique study, surveying the same population of respondents at two points in time—in September 2020 and in June 2022. We find that European respondents became much more hawkish after the invasion: nuclear deterrence was viewed more favourably, the willingness to use nuclear weapons increased, and support for the withdrawal of nuclear weapons dropped significantly. The paper draws a number of policy implications from these results.
- 13 February 2023
- Published by Wiley in Global Policy
- Vol. 14 (2) , 305-317
Top Cited PapersOpen AccessHawks in the making? European public views on nuclear weaponspost‐Ukraine
In the past, the European public has not been enthusiastic about nuclear deterrence and the stationing of US American nuclear weapons in Europe. Has the Russian invasion of Ukraine changed that aversion? We conducted a unique study, surveying the same population of respondents at two points in time—in September 2020 and in June 2022. We find that European respondents became much more hawkish after the invasion: nuclear deterrence was viewed more favourably, the willingness to use nuclear weapons increased, and support for the withdrawal of nuclear weapons dropped significantly. The paper draws a number of policy implications from these results.