Partial Coercion, Conditional Cooperation, and Self-Commitment in Voluntary Contributions to Public Goods
Authors:
- Elena CettolinECElena Cettolin
- Arno RiedlARArno Riedl
- 22 May 2014
- book chapter
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- p. 300-334
Abstract
Coercion and Social Welfare in Public Finance - May 2014Keywords
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