Abstract
The chapter considers whether the state’s own responsibility for social injustice can cause it to lose the moral right to punish severely deprived offenders. The notion is a familiar one in private moral relations, where a blamer’s hypocrisy, complicity, or meddling is commonly thought to undermine their moral standing to blame. In such cases, the blame is flawed because of an issue pertaining to the source of the blame, rather than the content of the blame or the blamed person’s capacity to be blamed. Ultimately, the chapter offers a conceptual argument against the notion that there is an equivalent source-based reason that precludes justified punishment of severely deprived offenders. The concept of a valid criminal law does not permit the possibility that the state can lack the right to uphold the law. Therefore, as long as severely deprived offenders are bound by the law, the standing requirement adds nothing to the consideration. The issues of complicity and exclusion are possibly relevant to the offender’s culpability, but they are not source-based reasons.