DVDavid Chelsom Vogt

David Chelsom Vogt

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  • Other criminal justice reforms

    by David Chelsom Vogt

    This chapter looks at other reforms of criminal justice, beyond those considered in previous chapters, that may serve to remedy the social inequality of criminal justice. First, it discusses lowering punishment levels generally or for low-status crimes in particular. The chapter argues that lower punishment levels would decrease the impact of the social disparity in the incarceration rate but that this goal should not be pursued beyond the point where equal freedom would be undermined by further decreases. Second, the chapter discusses prison reforms, arguing that incarceration should be made less punitive and less degrading for inmates, while facilitating the rehabilitation and future prospects of inmates upon release. Such prison reforms would diminish the impact of the social inequality of criminal justice. Finally, the chapter discusses restorative justice processes as alternatives or supplements to criminal trials and punishment. The chapter argues that restorative justice can under certain conditions achieve the aims of criminal justice in a nonpunitive way and that this type of process may be better suited for dealing with the criminogenic effects of social deprivation.

  • Severe deprivation mitigation

    by David Chelsom Vogt

    The chapter considers whether severe deprivation may be a legitimate mitigating circumstance in sentencing. Such mitigation is currently allowed in some jurisdictions but prohibited in others. The approach of the chapter is to ask whether social deprivation may in some cases be a reason why lower than normal punishment is suitable and necessary to attain the goals of punishment (promotion and instantiation of equal freedom – or simply, crime prevention and upholding law). With this framing, the question is in part a matter of whether the social deprivation of an offender alters the meaning of the crime (its expressive content) compared to normal cases, and whether the expressive function of the sanction can then be served with less punishment. It is also in part a question of whether the offender’s lack of power and resources may imply that less than the normal amount of punishment is required. To both questions, the chapter argues that the answer is sometimes yes, and that a severe deprivation mitigation is then legitimate.

  • Severe deprivation as excuse

    by David Chelsom Vogt

    The chapter discusses whether severe deprivation may constitute grounds for excuse. The issue concerns whether severe deprivation may block criminal responsibility because the crime cannot properly be attributed to the offender. That would either be the case if severe deprivation hinders the development of those character traits that are necessary for making a responsible choice or if severe deprivation creates situations of hard choice. The chapter concludes that criminal responsibility requires only a basic capacity for acting according to reasons, which almost all severely deprived persons retain. Severe deprivation is strongly correlated with mental illness, which sometimes excuses. But in such cases, it will be the insanity defense that does the normative work and not a specific severe deprivation excuse. There may, however, be some situations of hard choice that pertain especially to severely deprived persons, in which case their special circumstances are proper grounds for excuse.

  • Severe deprivation as justification

    by David Chelsom Vogt

    The chapter considers whether social deprivation may provide justification for acts that would normally constitute crimes. While a necessity defense clearly applies to acute emergency situations, it is more controversial whether long-term poverty and other forms of deprivation provide grounds for justification in some cases. On the freedom theory of criminal law, the relevant question is whether the act in question is necessary for protecting the agent’s equal right to freedom. That is the case, the chapter argues, when the law is itself a hindrance to the offender’s right to freedom, which it is when it prohibits actions that are necessary to ensure that right, such as prohibitions on squatting and begging in public applied to homeless persons.

  • Standing to punish the severely deprived

    by David Chelsom Vogt

    The chapter considers whether the state’s own responsibility for social injustice can cause it to lose the moral right to punish severely deprived offenders. The notion is a familiar one in private moral relations, where a blamer’s hypocrisy, complicity, or meddling is commonly thought to undermine their moral standing to blame. In such cases, the blame is flawed because of an issue pertaining to the source of the blame, rather than the content of the blame or the blamed person’s capacity to be blamed. Ultimately, the chapter offers a conceptual argument against the notion that there is an equivalent source-based reason that precludes justified punishment of severely deprived offenders. The concept of a valid criminal law does not permit the possibility that the state can lack the right to uphold the law. Therefore, as long as severely deprived offenders are bound by the law, the standing requirement adds nothing to the consideration. The issues of complicity and exclusion are possibly relevant to the offender’s culpability, but they are not source-based reasons.

  • Unjust societies

    by David Chelsom Vogt

    The chapter discusses why socially deprived offenders tend to commit more crime than others. It distinguishes between criminogenic material, cultural, and psychological aspects of social deprivation. To account for the latter, the chapter presents what may be termed “a recognition theory of criminal behavior”. The theory sees an individual’s need for mutual recognition as providing a motive for both economic and violent crimes, for instance to achieve a valued social goal or to counteract humiliation. The chapter then compares this theory of criminal motivation with empirical data on the characteristics of those who commit most crimes: Being young, being male, being poor, living in cities, having weaker-than-normal ties to school, work, neighborhood, family, and more. This group disproportionately lacks arenas for gaining mutual recognition, which may help explain why they might be more inclined to seek recognition through crime.

  • Unjust law

    by David Chelsom Vogt

  • Conclusion

    by David Chelsom Vogt

  • Introduction

    by David Chelsom Vogt

    The chapter introduces the main problems discussed in the book, namely, whether social injustice undermines criminal justice and whether the criminal justice system can be reformed to address social injustice in ways that are consistent with its fundamental normative commitments. The chapter presents research on prison populations in several countries showing that socioeconomically disadvantaged individuals are greatly overrepresented among inmates. Two main causes of this social gap in incarceration rates are introduced: (1) Socially deprived persons have an increased risk of being prosecuted and punished, even when controlling for the amount of criminal wrongdoing the group commits; and (2) socially deprived persons tend to commit more crimes, thereby increasing their likelihood of going to prison. The chapter introduces the forthcoming discussion on whether these two sources of inequality in the incarceration rate constitute injustices. It clarifies that the discussion in the book will be limited to clear instances of unjust social deprivation, for which it will use the term severe deprivation. Finally, the introduction gives an overview of the chapters of the book.