Abstract
The sense of agency (the feeling of being the cause of one's own actions) involves both anticipatory and retrospective processes. Whether these are coordinated within a single integrated system or operate independently remains unknown. Using the Libet clock intentional binding task in 578 participants spanning the aphantasia-to-hyperphantasia spectrum, we show that the correlation between action binding and intention binding constitutes a novel index of this coordination, with negative coupling reflecting mutual calibration between anticipatory and retrospective contributions to agency. Negative coupling was present in typical imagers (r = −0.27, p <.001), but broke down specifically in core aphantasia, where voluntary visual imagery is entirely absent (r = −0.05, p =.44), despite binding components themselves not differing significantly from typical imagers. Individuals with weak but present imagery (hypophantasia) showed a distinct binding profile, with intention binding exceeding action binding magnitude, a pattern absent in all other groups. Together these findings indicate that it is the integrity of the coupling architecture, rather than the strength of individual binding components, that distinguishes those with and without voluntary imagery.