Juha Silvanto
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Juha Silvanto has a total of 99 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Zaira Cattaneo
Department of Human and Social Sciences, University of Bergamo, 24129 Bergamo, Italy
25 shared publications Tomaso Vecchi
Brain Connectivity Center, National Neurological Institute C. Mondino, Pavia, Italy; Department of Brain and Behavioral Sciences, University of Pavia, Pavia, Italy
14 shared publicationsVincent Walsh
Institute of Cognitive Neuroscience, University College London, London, UK
12 shared publicationsSilvia Bona
Department of Psychology, University of Milano-Bicocca, 20126 Milan, Italy
10 shared publicationsZaira Cattaneo
Department of Psychology, University of Milano-Bicocca, Milan, Italy
10 shared publicationsAlvaro Pascual-Leone
Harvard Medical School, Boston, MA
8 shared publications
Latest Publications
- 16 October 2026
- Published by Elsevier in Consciousness and Cognition
- Vol. 145, 104142
Coupling of action–intention binding is reduced in aphantasia
- 16 October 2026
- Published by Elsevier in Consciousness and Cognition
- Vol. 145, 104142
Coupling of action–intention binding is reduced in aphantasia
- Open Access
- 10 July 2026
- Published by Elsevier in Trends Open
- Vol. 1 (3) , 270-282
Imagery in affective and neurodevelopmental conditions: an insula-based interoceptive framework
- 10 July 2026
- Published by Elsevier in Trends Open
- Vol. 1 (3) , 270-282
Open AccessImagery in affective and neurodevelopmental conditions: an insula-based interoceptive framework
- Open Access
- 22 May 2026
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
Interoceptive Profiling Identifies Separable Somatic and Alexithymic Contributors to Mental Health
Interoceptive dysfunction is a transdiagnostic risk factor for mental illness, yet it remains unclear whether self-reported interoceptive accuracy and attention combine into distinct configurations with separable clinical consequences. In 833 adults, k-means clustering identified three interoceptive profiles with divergent mental health outcomes. A Hypervigilant profile (high attention, moderate accuracy) showed the greatest somatic symptom burden and pain catastrophizing; an Uncertain profile (low accuracy, moderate attention) showed the highest alexithymia; and an Efficient profile (high accuracy, low attention) showed the lowest overall psychopathology. Structural equation modeling revealed a computational dissociation: alexithymia followed an additive deficit model driven primarily by low accuracy, whereas somatic symptoms followed a multiplicative amplification model in which elevated attention weakened accuracy’s protective effect. These findings suggest that mental health risk depends not on interoceptive dimensions in isolation, but on how they combine within individuals, highlighting targets for profile-specific intervention.
- 22 May 2026
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
Open AccessInteroceptive Profiling Identifies Separable Somatic and Alexithymic Contributors to Mental Health
Interoceptive dysfunction is a transdiagnostic risk factor for mental illness, yet it remains unclear whether self-reported interoceptive accuracy and attention combine into distinct configurations with separable clinical consequences. In 833 adults, k-means clustering identified three interoceptive profiles with divergent mental health outcomes. A Hypervigilant profile (high attention, moderate accuracy) showed the greatest somatic symptom burden and pain catastrophizing; an Uncertain profile (low accuracy, moderate attention) showed the highest alexithymia; and an Efficient profile (high accuracy, low attention) showed the lowest overall psychopathology. Structural equation modeling revealed a computational dissociation: alexithymia followed an additive deficit model driven primarily by low accuracy, whereas somatic symptoms followed a multiplicative amplification model in which elevated attention weakened accuracy’s protective effect. These findings suggest that mental health risk depends not on interoceptive dimensions in isolation, but on how they combine within individuals, highlighting targets for profile-specific intervention.
- Open Access
How the Body Shapes the Mind’s Eye: Cardiac vagal reactivity predicts visual imagery vividness
Mental imagery is known to be accompanied by autonomic responses, traditionally viewed as merely downstream consequences of imagery. Recent theoretical work has challenged this view, proposing that mental imagery requires the integration of cortical sensory representations with ascending interoceptive signals supplied by the autonomic nervous system. These two views make opposite predictions: if autonomic activity is only a consequence of imagery, then the responsiveness of the autonomic nervous system should not predict imagery vividness. If instead autonomic input shapes the generation of mental images, individuals with greater autonomic responsiveness should experience more vivid imagery. The present study tested these competing predictions by examining whether individual differences in cardiac vagal reactivity predict self-reported visual imagery vividness, with imagery assessed at a separate time point from the paced breathing protocol. Cardiac vagal reactivity significantly predicted VVIQ scores after controlling for factors such as resting HRV, respiratory amplitude, age and negative affect (b = 13.75, p = .022; model R 2 = 0.12), whereas neither baseline HRV nor fast-breathing evoked HRV change were linked to imagery, suggesting the effect is specific to the capacity to enter a high parasympathetic state rather than reflecting general autonomic capacity. Self-reported interoceptive noticing (MAIA Noticing) was significantly associated with both delta HRV and VVIQ, suggesting that cardiac vagal reactivity and imagery vividness are linked through a broader individual difference in interoceptive function. These findings indicate that the vividness of mental imagery is not exclusively central in origin but also appears to be shaped by the capacity of the autonomic nervous system to enter a high parasympathetic state. Imagery thus likely involves bidirectional interaction between cortical and autonomic processes, with descending efferent pathways activating autonomic responses while ascending interoceptive signals contributing to the construction of mental images.
Open AccessHow the Body Shapes the Mind’s Eye: Cardiac vagal reactivity predicts visual imagery vividness
Mental imagery is known to be accompanied by autonomic responses, traditionally viewed as merely downstream consequences of imagery. Recent theoretical work has challenged this view, proposing that mental imagery requires the integration of cortical sensory representations with ascending interoceptive signals supplied by the autonomic nervous system. These two views make opposite predictions: if autonomic activity is only a consequence of imagery, then the responsiveness of the autonomic nervous system should not predict imagery vividness. If instead autonomic input shapes the generation of mental images, individuals with greater autonomic responsiveness should experience more vivid imagery. The present study tested these competing predictions by examining whether individual differences in cardiac vagal reactivity predict self-reported visual imagery vividness, with imagery assessed at a separate time point from the paced breathing protocol. Cardiac vagal reactivity significantly predicted VVIQ scores after controlling for factors such as resting HRV, respiratory amplitude, age and negative affect (b = 13.75, p = .022; model R 2 = 0.12), whereas neither baseline HRV nor fast-breathing evoked HRV change were linked to imagery, suggesting the effect is specific to the capacity to enter a high parasympathetic state rather than reflecting general autonomic capacity. Self-reported interoceptive noticing (MAIA Noticing) was significantly associated with both delta HRV and VVIQ, suggesting that cardiac vagal reactivity and imagery vividness are linked through a broader individual difference in interoceptive function. These findings indicate that the vividness of mental imagery is not exclusively central in origin but also appears to be shaped by the capacity of the autonomic nervous system to enter a high parasympathetic state. Imagery thus likely involves bidirectional interaction between cortical and autonomic processes, with descending efferent pathways activating autonomic responses while ascending interoceptive signals contributing to the construction of mental images.
- Open Access
- 21 April 2026
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
Action–Intention Binding Coupling Reveals Agency Architecture and Breaks Down in Aphantasia
The sense of agency (the feeling of being the cause of one's own actions) involves both anticipatory and retrospective processes. Whether these are coordinated within a single integrated system or operate independently remains unknown. Using the Libet clock intentional binding task in 578 participants spanning the aphantasia-to-hyperphantasia spectrum, we show that the correlation between action binding and intention binding constitutes a novel index of this coordination, with negative coupling reflecting mutual calibration between anticipatory and retrospective contributions to agency. Negative coupling was present in typical imagers (r = −0.27, p <.001), but broke down specifically in core aphantasia, where voluntary visual imagery is entirely absent (r = −0.05, p =.44), despite binding components themselves not differing significantly from typical imagers. Individuals with weak but present imagery (hypophantasia) showed a distinct binding profile, with intention binding exceeding action binding magnitude, a pattern absent in all other groups. Together these findings indicate that it is the integrity of the coupling architecture, rather than the strength of individual binding components, that distinguishes those with and without voluntary imagery.
- 21 April 2026
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
Open AccessAction–Intention Binding Coupling Reveals Agency Architecture and Breaks Down in Aphantasia
The sense of agency (the feeling of being the cause of one's own actions) involves both anticipatory and retrospective processes. Whether these are coordinated within a single integrated system or operate independently remains unknown. Using the Libet clock intentional binding task in 578 participants spanning the aphantasia-to-hyperphantasia spectrum, we show that the correlation between action binding and intention binding constitutes a novel index of this coordination, with negative coupling reflecting mutual calibration between anticipatory and retrospective contributions to agency. Negative coupling was present in typical imagers (r = −0.27, p <.001), but broke down specifically in core aphantasia, where voluntary visual imagery is entirely absent (r = −0.05, p =.44), despite binding components themselves not differing significantly from typical imagers. Individuals with weak but present imagery (hypophantasia) showed a distinct binding profile, with intention binding exceeding action binding magnitude, a pattern absent in all other groups. Together these findings indicate that it is the integrity of the coupling architecture, rather than the strength of individual binding components, that distinguishes those with and without voluntary imagery.
- Open Access
- 23 March 2026
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
Simulation Before Vision: Interoceptive Origins of Offline Simulation and the Evolution of Mental Imagery
How did mental imagery evolve, and what adaptive problem did it solve? Research tradition has carried an implicit and largely unexamined assumption that mental imagery evolved from sensory systems. Using visual imagery as my primary case, I argue instead that its origins lie not in sensory cortex but in interoceptive systems. A simulation system with no means of evaluating outcomes has no basis for selecting between them; interoception is what converts predicted outcomes into reasons to act. Drawing on comparative neuroanatomy, paleontological evidence, and the cognitive neuroscience of offline simulation, I argue that this interoceptive architecture was established before elaborated visual cortex existed, with motor simulation constituting its earliest form. During the nocturnal bottleneck (a prolonged period during which early mammals had substantially reduced visual systems) the simulation architecture matured under olfactory and interoceptive dominance, independently of high-acuity vision. Vision assumed its dominant role only after this bottleneck, recruited to solve a discriminability problem that coarse interoceptive signals alone could not resolve. This synthesis reconceptualises mental imagery not as an extension of visual perception but as a component of a broader simulation system whose organisational logic was shaped from the outset by the demands of predicting and evaluating bodily states.
- 23 March 2026
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
Open AccessSimulation Before Vision: Interoceptive Origins of Offline Simulation and the Evolution of Mental Imagery
How did mental imagery evolve, and what adaptive problem did it solve? Research tradition has carried an implicit and largely unexamined assumption that mental imagery evolved from sensory systems. Using visual imagery as my primary case, I argue instead that its origins lie not in sensory cortex but in interoceptive systems. A simulation system with no means of evaluating outcomes has no basis for selecting between them; interoception is what converts predicted outcomes into reasons to act. Drawing on comparative neuroanatomy, paleontological evidence, and the cognitive neuroscience of offline simulation, I argue that this interoceptive architecture was established before elaborated visual cortex existed, with motor simulation constituting its earliest form. During the nocturnal bottleneck (a prolonged period during which early mammals had substantially reduced visual systems) the simulation architecture matured under olfactory and interoceptive dominance, independently of high-acuity vision. Vision assumed its dominant role only after this bottleneck, recruited to solve a discriminability problem that coarse interoceptive signals alone could not resolve. This synthesis reconceptualises mental imagery not as an extension of visual perception but as a component of a broader simulation system whose organisational logic was shaped from the outset by the demands of predicting and evaluating bodily states.
- Top Cited PapersOpen Access
- 19 March 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Scientific Reports
- Vol. 16 (1)
Interoception predicts mental imagery vividness: exploring a key relationship
Interoception, the sense of the internal state of the body, plays a fundamental role in emotional awareness and self-referential processing. Recently, interoception has been linked to the experience of mental imagery. However, this association has not been empirically characterized. We therefore tested how task-based and self-reported measures of interoception predict individual differences in task-based and self-reported measures of mental imagery. Participants ( N = 104) completed two heartbeat detection tasks (heartbeat tracking and heartbeat discrimination; assessing objective (behavioural) interoceptive performance accuracy), and the Multidimensional Assessment of Interoceptive Awareness (MAIA) questionnaire, assessing subjective (self-reported) dimensions of interoceptive experience. Behavioural and self-reported aspects of mental imagery were assessed respectively from performance of a mental rotation task and from scores on the Vividness of Visual Imagery Questionnaire (VVIQ). Results revealed that, across participants, interoceptive (heartbeat discrimination performance) accuracy predicted mental rotation ability. In contrast, both heartbeat tracking accuracy and self-reported interoceptive awareness (MAIA) predicted self-reported vividness of mental imagery (VVIQ). Interoceptive measures did not predict performance on a control task (2-back working memory task). Together, these findings suggest that distinct components of interoception underpin different aspects of mental imagery: Heightened (cardioceptive) physiological sensitivity facilitates the active deployment of imagery in mental rotation and enhances the vividness of imagery experience. Moreover, people reporting more subjective sensitivity to interoceptive state also perceive greater vividness of mental imagery. These new results underscore the influence of bodily representation in shaping conscious experience through both controlled and spontaneous expressions of mental simulation.
- 19 March 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Scientific Reports
- Vol. 16 (1)
Top Cited PapersOpen AccessInteroception predicts mental imagery vividness: exploring a key relationship
Interoception, the sense of the internal state of the body, plays a fundamental role in emotional awareness and self-referential processing. Recently, interoception has been linked to the experience of mental imagery. However, this association has not been empirically characterized. We therefore tested how task-based and self-reported measures of interoception predict individual differences in task-based and self-reported measures of mental imagery. Participants ( N = 104) completed two heartbeat detection tasks (heartbeat tracking and heartbeat discrimination; assessing objective (behavioural) interoceptive performance accuracy), and the Multidimensional Assessment of Interoceptive Awareness (MAIA) questionnaire, assessing subjective (self-reported) dimensions of interoceptive experience. Behavioural and self-reported aspects of mental imagery were assessed respectively from performance of a mental rotation task and from scores on the Vividness of Visual Imagery Questionnaire (VVIQ). Results revealed that, across participants, interoceptive (heartbeat discrimination performance) accuracy predicted mental rotation ability. In contrast, both heartbeat tracking accuracy and self-reported interoceptive awareness (MAIA) predicted self-reported vividness of mental imagery (VVIQ). Interoceptive measures did not predict performance on a control task (2-back working memory task). Together, these findings suggest that distinct components of interoception underpin different aspects of mental imagery: Heightened (cardioceptive) physiological sensitivity facilitates the active deployment of imagery in mental rotation and enhances the vividness of imagery experience. Moreover, people reporting more subjective sensitivity to interoceptive state also perceive greater vividness of mental imagery. These new results underscore the influence of bodily representation in shaping conscious experience through both controlled and spontaneous expressions of mental simulation.
- Open Access
- 10 March 2026
- Published by Frontiers Media SA in Frontiers in Psychology
- Vol. 17, 1807114
The interoceptive origins of mental imagery: an evolutionary account
Contemporary theories suggest that mental imagery evolved to enable prospective simulation of future events for planning and decision-making (Suddendorf & Corballis, 2007;Schacter et al., 2008). Imagery allows organisms to construct hypothetical scenarios, enabling them to test alternative courses of action before acting (Moulton & Kosslyn, 2009). But how did mental imagery emerge from an evolutionary perspective? I propose that imagery's origins lie in interoceptive processing, the phylogenetically ancient system linking internal bodily states to valence, emotion, and motivational salience (Craig, 2009;Barrett, 2017). Interoception is the necessary foundation for any planning system because planning requires knowing what to plan for; which bodily and emotional states to pursue or avoid. Motor imagery emerged first, by extending forward models offline while inheriting interoceptive integration from survival-relevant actions. However, as social complexity increased, organisms needed to simulate scenarios involving others (e.g. rival alliances, dominance conflicts, mating competitors) and here interoceptive signals alone proved insufficient, since the same autonomic arousal pattern can demand entirely different behavioral responses depending on context. Visual imagery evolved to solve this discriminability problem by binding distinctive sensory features with interoceptive states, creating multimodal representations where affective significance is constitutive of the image itself rather than a subsequent response to neutral sensory content.Interoceptive processing emerged early in animal evolution (Ceunen et al., 2016) due to its foundational role in linking internal bodily states to valence and motivational importance. Nutritional resources are valued through hunger signaling, threats through autonomic arousal, reproductive opportunities through sexual arousal. With the evolution of more complex nervous systems, interoceptive processing came to constitute the foundation of emotions, emerging when interoceptive signals are integrated with contextual appraisal (Craig, 2009;Barrett, 2017). Because organisms act on what is survival-relevant rather than neutral information, any system evolved for prospective planning must be grounded in these interoceptive signals.Motor simulation (the capacity to imagine actions before performing them for offline motor planning; Jeannerod, 2001) arguably represented the first form of imagery to emerge for two reasons. Firstly, motor actions most directly determine survival outcomes; selecting between fight or flight, pursuit or withdrawal, approach or avoidance carries immediate consequences. Secondly, motor imagery could build upon forward models already under selection for online motor control, the predictive systems that estimate sensory consequences of motor commands (Wolpert & Flanagan, 2001). Importantly, survival-relevant motor actions inherently involve interoceptive states such as cardiovascular arousal, respiratory load, autonomic preparation for fight, flight, or pursuit. Forward models for survival-relevant actions must predict both proprioceptive components (movement trajectories, body boundaries as points of contact) and interoceptive components (effort, threat, pleasure) together; the former specifies what the body does, the latter specifies why it matters and whether the resulting state is worth pursuing or avoiding. When organisms evolved the capacity to generate these predictions offline for action selection, interoceptive components would be carried forward as part of the representational content being modeled. For example, when evaluating escape routes from a predator, accurate simulation requires predicting not only proprioceptive feedback (muscle tension, movement trajectory) but also interoceptive consequences (cardiovascular demands, respiratory load, sense of fear). Because survival-relevant motor actions already carried emotional significance and required autonomic preparation, motor imagery was scaffolded upon pre-existing interoceptive infrastructure. Evidence supports this architecture: motor imagery activates both motor cortex and autonomic systems, including the insula, the primary interoceptive hub (Tinaz et al., 2018;Jeannerod, 2001).Motor simulation addressed challenges requiring coordinated action from a first-person perspective generally directly coupled to immediate motor execution. However, as social species faced increasingly complex pressures from group living, they needed to simulate social scenarios such as tracking rival alliances, predicting dominance conflicts, monitoring mating competitors, and coordinating group responses to threats. These scenarios carried significant survival consequences but required simulating events decoupled from immediate motor execution and involving spatial and social relationships beyond the agent's immediate action space. This decoupling does not mean that imagery lost its connection to action or bodily states. Rather, it follows naturally from the forward model architecture inherited from motor simulation, in which predictions can be generated and evaluated offline without triggering efferent consequences. Interoceptive responses to simulated scenarios became the mechanism for flexible behavioral decision-making. Moreover, beyond discrete simulations, adaptive planning involves temporallyextended behavioral sequences. Interoceptive-sensory binding operates across these temporal structures. Planning a confrontation requires simulating the entire interaction sequence with interoceptive evaluation determining scenario interpretation (threat vs. opportunity), behavioral style (aggressive vs. appeasement), and affective coherence throughout implementation. These simulations are socially directed in that they are oriented toward modeling another agent's likely responses across the sequence, which is why interoceptive grounding is necessary. Furthermore, the simulation must track not...
- 10 March 2026
- Published by Frontiers Media SA in Frontiers in Psychology
- Vol. 17, 1807114
Open AccessThe interoceptive origins of mental imagery: an evolutionary account
Contemporary theories suggest that mental imagery evolved to enable prospective simulation of future events for planning and decision-making (Suddendorf & Corballis, 2007;Schacter et al., 2008). Imagery allows organisms to construct hypothetical scenarios, enabling them to test alternative courses of action before acting (Moulton & Kosslyn, 2009). But how did mental imagery emerge from an evolutionary perspective? I propose that imagery's origins lie in interoceptive processing, the phylogenetically ancient system linking internal bodily states to valence, emotion, and motivational salience (Craig, 2009;Barrett, 2017). Interoception is the necessary foundation for any planning system because planning requires knowing what to plan for; which bodily and emotional states to pursue or avoid. Motor imagery emerged first, by extending forward models offline while inheriting interoceptive integration from survival-relevant actions. However, as social complexity increased, organisms needed to simulate scenarios involving others (e.g. rival alliances, dominance conflicts, mating competitors) and here interoceptive signals alone proved insufficient, since the same autonomic arousal pattern can demand entirely different behavioral responses depending on context. Visual imagery evolved to solve this discriminability problem by binding distinctive sensory features with interoceptive states, creating multimodal representations where affective significance is constitutive of the image itself rather than a subsequent response to neutral sensory content.Interoceptive processing emerged early in animal evolution (Ceunen et al., 2016) due to its foundational role in linking internal bodily states to valence and motivational importance. Nutritional resources are valued through hunger signaling, threats through autonomic arousal, reproductive opportunities through sexual arousal. With the evolution of more complex nervous systems, interoceptive processing came to constitute the foundation of emotions, emerging when interoceptive signals are integrated with contextual appraisal (Craig, 2009;Barrett, 2017). Because organisms act on what is survival-relevant rather than neutral information, any system evolved for prospective planning must be grounded in these interoceptive signals.Motor simulation (the capacity to imagine actions before performing them for offline motor planning; Jeannerod, 2001) arguably represented the first form of imagery to emerge for two reasons. Firstly, motor actions most directly determine survival outcomes; selecting between fight or flight, pursuit or withdrawal, approach or avoidance carries immediate consequences. Secondly, motor imagery could build upon forward models already under selection for online motor control, the predictive systems that estimate sensory consequences of motor commands (Wolpert & Flanagan, 2001). Importantly, survival-relevant motor actions inherently involve interoceptive states such as cardiovascular arousal, respiratory load, autonomic preparation for fight, flight, or pursuit. Forward models for survival-relevant actions must predict both proprioceptive components (movement trajectories, body boundaries as points of contact) and interoceptive components (effort, threat, pleasure) together; the former specifies what the body does, the latter specifies why it matters and whether the resulting state is worth pursuing or avoiding. When organisms evolved the capacity to generate these predictions offline for action selection, interoceptive components would be carried forward as part of the representational content being modeled. For example, when evaluating escape routes from a predator, accurate simulation requires predicting not only proprioceptive feedback (muscle tension, movement trajectory) but also interoceptive consequences (cardiovascular demands, respiratory load, sense of fear). Because survival-relevant motor actions already carried emotional significance and required autonomic preparation, motor imagery was scaffolded upon pre-existing interoceptive infrastructure. Evidence supports this architecture: motor imagery activates both motor cortex and autonomic systems, including the insula, the primary interoceptive hub (Tinaz et al., 2018;Jeannerod, 2001).Motor simulation addressed challenges requiring coordinated action from a first-person perspective generally directly coupled to immediate motor execution. However, as social species faced increasingly complex pressures from group living, they needed to simulate social scenarios such as tracking rival alliances, predicting dominance conflicts, monitoring mating competitors, and coordinating group responses to threats. These scenarios carried significant survival consequences but required simulating events decoupled from immediate motor execution and involving spatial and social relationships beyond the agent's immediate action space. This decoupling does not mean that imagery lost its connection to action or bodily states. Rather, it follows naturally from the forward model architecture inherited from motor simulation, in which predictions can be generated and evaluated offline without triggering efferent consequences. Interoceptive responses to simulated scenarios became the mechanism for flexible behavioral decision-making. Moreover, beyond discrete simulations, adaptive planning involves temporallyextended behavioral sequences. Interoceptive-sensory binding operates across these temporal structures. Planning a confrontation requires simulating the entire interaction sequence with interoceptive evaluation determining scenario interpretation (threat vs. opportunity), behavioral style (aggressive vs. appeasement), and affective coherence throughout implementation. These simulations are socially directed in that they are oriented toward modeling another agent's likely responses across the sequence, which is why interoceptive grounding is necessary. Furthermore, the simulation must track not...
- Open Access
- 17 February 2026
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
The Interoceptive Origins of Mental Imagery: An Evolutionary Account
I propose that imagery's origins lie in interoceptive processing, the phylogenetically ancient system linking internal bodily states to valence, emotion, and motivational salience (Craig, 2009; Barrett, 2017). Interoceptive signals inherently specify survival-relevant goals: hunger with approach, threat-arousal with avoidance, sexual arousal with pursuit. This makes interoception the necessary foundation for any planning system because planning requires knowing what you are planning for: which bodily states and emotions to pursue or avoid. Motor imagery emerged first, extending forward models to enable offline action planning. Because survival-relevant motor actions already involved interoceptive states, motor imagery inherited interoceptive integration from these forward models. Motor imagery worked well for first- person action planning directly coupled to immediate motor execution. However, as social complexity increased, organisms needed to simulate scenarios involving others; tracking rival alliances, predicting dominance conflicts, monitoring mating competitors. Here, organisms faced a discriminability problem rooted in the low-dimensional nature of autonomic arousal (Barrett, 2017). The same autonomic pattern can occur across different social situations (dominance encounters, rival conflicts, mating opportunities) that demand distinct behavioral responses. Visual imagery evolved to solve this discriminability problem by binding distinctive sensory features with interoceptive states. This binding makes simulations goal-directed: imagining a dominant rival automatically activates the associated arousal pattern and avoidance tendency, while imagining a mating opportunity activates approach motivation. Mental simulations therefore evolved as multimodal representations where sensory and interoceptive components are bound during construction itself, creating images that inherently possess valence and motivation, not as subsequent responses to neutral sensory simulations but as constitutive features of mental images themselves (cf Silvanto & Nagai, 2025).
- 17 February 2026
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
Open AccessThe Interoceptive Origins of Mental Imagery: An Evolutionary Account
I propose that imagery's origins lie in interoceptive processing, the phylogenetically ancient system linking internal bodily states to valence, emotion, and motivational salience (Craig, 2009; Barrett, 2017). Interoceptive signals inherently specify survival-relevant goals: hunger with approach, threat-arousal with avoidance, sexual arousal with pursuit. This makes interoception the necessary foundation for any planning system because planning requires knowing what you are planning for: which bodily states and emotions to pursue or avoid. Motor imagery emerged first, extending forward models to enable offline action planning. Because survival-relevant motor actions already involved interoceptive states, motor imagery inherited interoceptive integration from these forward models. Motor imagery worked well for first- person action planning directly coupled to immediate motor execution. However, as social complexity increased, organisms needed to simulate scenarios involving others; tracking rival alliances, predicting dominance conflicts, monitoring mating competitors. Here, organisms faced a discriminability problem rooted in the low-dimensional nature of autonomic arousal (Barrett, 2017). The same autonomic pattern can occur across different social situations (dominance encounters, rival conflicts, mating opportunities) that demand distinct behavioral responses. Visual imagery evolved to solve this discriminability problem by binding distinctive sensory features with interoceptive states. This binding makes simulations goal-directed: imagining a dominant rival automatically activates the associated arousal pattern and avoidance tendency, while imagining a mating opportunity activates approach motivation. Mental simulations therefore evolved as multimodal representations where sensory and interoceptive components are bound during construction itself, creating images that inherently possess valence and motivation, not as subsequent responses to neutral sensory simulations but as constitutive features of mental images themselves (cf Silvanto & Nagai, 2025).