Stock Performance or Entrenchment? The Effects of Mergers and Acquisitions on CEO Compensation
Authors:
- Praveen KumarPKPraveen Kumar
- Liang-Wei KuoLKLiang-Wei Kuo
- Latha RamchandLRLatha Ramchand
Preprint
- 1 January 2012
- preprint
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Abstract
Using a large sample of U.S. acquiring and non-acquiring firms and covering a broad sample of transactions, we examine the effects of mergers and acquisitions (Keywords
This publication has 55 references indexed in Scilit:
- The Effect of SFAS 141 and 142 on the Market for Corporate ControlSSRN Electronic Journal, 2012
- The Economics of Super ManagersThe Review of Financial Studies, 2011
- Measurement Errors in Investment EquationsThe Review of Financial Studies, 2010
- What Matters in Corporate Governance?The Review of Financial Studies, 2008
- Does the use of peer groups contribute to higher pay and less efficient compensation?☆Journal of Financial Economics, 2008
- CEO compensation and bank mergersJournal of Financial Economics, 2001
- The Core Fiduciary Duties of Outside DirectorsSSRN Electronic Journal, 2001
- Investment opportunities and the structure of executive compensationJournal of Accounting and Economics, 1996
- Another look at the instrumental variable estimation of error-components modelsJournal of Econometrics, 1995
- Some Tests of Specification for Panel Data: Monte Carlo Evidence and an Application to Employment EquationsReview of Economic Studies, 1991