Liang-Wei Kuo
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Liang-Wei Kuo has a total of 6 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Wen-Chang Lin
Department of Finance, National Chung Cheng University, Chia-Yi, Taiwan
2 shared publications Yi-Hsun Lai
2 shared publicationsEve Lai
1 shared publicationLatha Ramchand
1 shared publicationPraveen Kumar
1 shared publicationWen-Chang Lin
National Chung Cheng University
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 19 June 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Financial Services Research
- Vol. 70 (1) , 113-145
Competition, Efficiency, and Financial Soundness in Underwriting-Intensive Markets: Evidence from Asia-Pacific Non-life Insurance
- 19 June 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Financial Services Research
- Vol. 70 (1) , 113-145
Competition, Efficiency, and Financial Soundness in Underwriting-Intensive Markets: Evidence from Asia-Pacific Non-life Insurance
- Open Access
- 18 June 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
National Culture and Competitive Efficiency in Global Property and Liability Insurance Markets
This study investigates the cultural determinants of market competition and operational efficiency in global property and liability (P/L) insurance markets. By integrating Hofstede’s cultural dimensions with the Boone indicator, an efficiency-based measure of competition, we assess the extent to which national cultural characteristics influence insurers’ competitive performance. Using a comprehensive cross-country dataset, the findings show that insurers operating in environments marked by high uncertainty avoidance, low power distance, and low masculinity tend to exhibit greater operational efficiency and, consequently, stronger competitive positions. Overall, this study offers novel evidence that national culture constitutes a fundamental driver of competitive dynamics and efficiency in the global insurance sector.
- 18 June 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessNational Culture and Competitive Efficiency in Global Property and Liability Insurance Markets
This study investigates the cultural determinants of market competition and operational efficiency in global property and liability (P/L) insurance markets. By integrating Hofstede’s cultural dimensions with the Boone indicator, an efficiency-based measure of competition, we assess the extent to which national cultural characteristics influence insurers’ competitive performance. Using a comprehensive cross-country dataset, the findings show that insurers operating in environments marked by high uncertainty avoidance, low power distance, and low masculinity tend to exhibit greater operational efficiency and, consequently, stronger competitive positions. Overall, this study offers novel evidence that national culture constitutes a fundamental driver of competitive dynamics and efficiency in the global insurance sector.
- 5 July 2017
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Business Finance & Accounting
- Vol. 44 (9-10) , 1443-1476
Reputation as a governance mechanism? Evidence from payout policy of insider‐controlled firms in Taiwan
This paper examines the effect of entrenched insiders’ reputational concerns on corporate payout policy in Taiwan, a market in which typical public firms are controlled by a single dominant shareholder who is subject to weak takeover threats and has incentives and abilities to extract private benefits by oppressing minority equity holders. The reputation‐building hypothesis predicts that firms with higher expropriation risk by a controlling shareholder make more payouts to credibly commit not to expropriate minority shareholders, thereby establishing reputation in the capital market for risk diversification and low‐cost external financing. I show that corporate payout intensity is significantly and positively correlated with measures related to the moral hazard of dominant owners. The reputation effect manifests in firms that most value it; the interaction analyses indicate that younger, smaller, or growth firms with higher controlling shareholder expropriation risk pay more cash dividends. Moreover, firms are less likely to omit dividends and more likely to resume dividends when their controlling shareholders are more entrenched. Finally, I show that the value of cash dividends is higher for firms with higher controlling shareholder expropriation risk and that expected dividend increases in these firms are value enhancing.
- 5 July 2017
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Business Finance & Accounting
- Vol. 44 (9-10) , 1443-1476
Reputation as a governance mechanism? Evidence from payout policy of insider‐controlled firms in Taiwan
This paper examines the effect of entrenched insiders’ reputational concerns on corporate payout policy in Taiwan, a market in which typical public firms are controlled by a single dominant shareholder who is subject to weak takeover threats and has incentives and abilities to extract private benefits by oppressing minority equity holders. The reputation‐building hypothesis predicts that firms with higher expropriation risk by a controlling shareholder make more payouts to credibly commit not to expropriate minority shareholders, thereby establishing reputation in the capital market for risk diversification and low‐cost external financing. I show that corporate payout intensity is significantly and positively correlated with measures related to the moral hazard of dominant owners. The reputation effect manifests in firms that most value it; the interaction analyses indicate that younger, smaller, or growth firms with higher controlling shareholder expropriation risk pay more cash dividends. Moreover, firms are less likely to omit dividends and more likely to resume dividends when their controlling shareholders are more entrenched. Finally, I show that the value of cash dividends is higher for firms with higher controlling shareholder expropriation risk and that expected dividend increases in these firms are value enhancing.
- Open Access
- 1 January 2012
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Stock Performance or Entrenchment? The Effects of Mergers and Acquisitions on CEO Compensation
Using a large sample of U.S. acquiring and non-acquiring firms and covering a broad sample of transactions, we examine the effects of mergers and acquisitions (
- 1 January 2012
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessStock Performance or Entrenchment? The Effects of Mergers and Acquisitions on CEO Compensation
Using a large sample of U.S. acquiring and non-acquiring firms and covering a broad sample of transactions, we examine the effects of mergers and acquisitions (