Mergers with future rivals can boost prices, bar entry, and intensify market concentration
- 25 February 2023
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Elsevier in International Journal of Industrial Organization
- Vol. 88
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
All Related Versions
This publication has 41 references indexed in Scilit:
- Does Hospital Competition Save Lives? Evidence from the English NHS Patient Choice ReformsThe Economic Journal, 2011
- The effect of Paragraph IV decisions and generic entry before patent expiration on brand pharmaceutical firmsJournal of Health Economics, 2011
- THE PRICE EFFECT OF ELIMINATING POTENTIAL COMPETITION: EVIDENCE FROM AN AIRLINE MERGER*The Journal of Industrial Economics, 2010
- The Effect of Mergers on Consumer Prices: Evidence from Five Mergers on the Enforcement MarginThe Journal of Law and Economics, 2010
- How do Incumbents Respond to the Threat of Entry? Evidence from the Major Airlines*The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2008
- Hospital Ownership and Public Medical SpendingThe Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2000
- Is Hospital Competition Socially Wasteful?The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2000
- Incentives to Form Coalitions with Bertrand CompetitionThe RAND Journal of Economics, 1985
- Limit Pricing and Entry under Incomplete Information: An Equilibrium AnalysisEconometrica, 1982
- Entry, Capacity, Investment and Oligopolistic PricingThe Bell Journal of Economics, 1977